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Pfleeger, CP & Pfleeger, SL 2003, Security in Computing, 3rd Int edn, Prentice Hall PTR, Upper Saddle River, N.J.

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A Prototype for Personal Business Transactions - On Public Networks   (Correct)

....a user is commonly known and since the public key can only decrypt a message encrypted with the corresponding secret key it proves that that particular secret key was used. And since that secret key is only known to the concerned user it proves that such a message was indeed sent by the user. See [1] for more information on encryption in general, as well as the RSA algorithm and its use for electronic signatures. It is widely accepted that the World Wide Web will be the platform on which most initial commercial systems on the Internet is based. Secure versions of the protocols used on the ....

CP Pfleeger, Security in Computing, Prentice-Hall, 1989


Information Security Antipatterns in Software Requirements.. - Kis (2002)   (Correct)

....system security specification methodologies. Conventional methodologies barely even mention information security and offer little or no help (e.g. 1] 2] 3] Methodologies developed by the information security specialists are often too general to be directly applied in software development (e.g. 4][5]) Furthermore, a substantial information security background is needed to understand them (e.g. 6] That makes them unreadable and practically unusable for most software architects. According to the legend, Odysseus saved his ship from being pulled by Charybdis. He lost, however, six of his ....

Charles P. Pfleeger, `Security in Computing', Prentice Hall PTR, 2nd edition, 1996


An implementation of the Chinese Wall security - Model Using Consa   (Correct)

....to an entity e 2 to which subject s 2 has access. In this paper, we shall confine ourselves to discuss the implementation of the Chinese Wall security model using ConSA, and therefore not discuss ways to enforce the access control, or actually implement ConSA on an existing operating system. See [4] for more information on other security models. 3 A description of ConSA ConSA [2] defines an object oriented security model which is independent of the operating system and applications. It is a configurable, plug in model, which can be adapted to the required level of security. Instead of ....

C.P. Pfleeger, "Security in Computing", Prentice-Hall, 1989.


On Communication Security in Wireless Ad-Hoc Sensor.. - Slijepcevic.. (2002)   (10 citations)  (Correct)

....allows efficient resource management that is essential for wireless sensor networks. A location based scheme that protects the rest of a network, even when parts of the network are compromised. Our approach to communication security in sensor networks is based on a principle stated in [12], that says that data items must be protected to a degree consistent with their value. In the particular architecture [4] for which we are developing our communication security scheme, we differentiate between three types of data sent through the network: 1. Mobile code 2. Locations of sensor ....

C. P. Pfleeger, "Security in Computing", Second Edition, Prentice Hall, 1997.


Differentially Secure Multicasting and Its Implementation.. - Holeman, Manimaran, Davis (2001)   (1 citation)  (Correct)

....allow non members to send data How many senders are allowed Must these senders be known in advance of group creation 2 Differential Security As the subject of security has developed, several subtopics have been broached. One of these topics focused on the concept of multilevel security [11]. This is most widely known in its relation to government and, in particular, the military. In this concept, entities are not just secure or insecure, they have varying degrees of sensitivity. In the United States military, these degrees are hierarchical in nature and, listed from least secure to ....

C. P. Pfleeger, Security in Computing, Prentice-Hall, NJ, 1997.


Using Internal Sensors For Computer Intrusion Detection - Zamboni (2001)   (1 citation)  (Correct)

....bogus messages to interfere with authentic detector messages. 46 Note that these drawbacks are limitations of our current implementation of the detector reporting mechanism and not of the ESP architecture itself. Mechanisms such as rate limiting on messages and capability based access control [109] could be employed to address these problems in future implementations. Access to the esp log system call and some other utility functions is provided through a library we implemented for this purpose, called libesp. A full description of the functions in the libesp library is provided in ....

Charles Pfleeger. Security in Computing. Prentice Hall, second edition, 1997.


Teaching Privacy-Enhancing Technologies - Fischer-Hübner, Lindskog   (Correct)

....privacy technologies or could focus on special aspects, such as steganography or anonymous communication. PET projects and practical courses can be given, in which students learn how to implement, test and apply privacy technologies. None of today s major computer security textbooks (such as [Pfleeger 1997], Stallings 1999] or [Gollmann 1999] are actually covering important PET aspects. Only some cryptology books (e.g. Schneier 1996] are briefly discussing privacy technologies. Besides, there are some books dealing with more specific aspects of privacy and privacy enhancing technologies, such ....

Ch.Pfleeger, "Security in Computing", 2nd Edition, Prentice Hall, 1997.


Engineering Access Control in Distributed Applications - Beznosov, Deng   (Correct)

....system, databases and middleware in such a way to make the security mechanisms as relatively independent and self contained components in the systems. Most of operating systems implement authorization logic in the security part of their kernels [9, 18, 19, 23, 25, 30, 31, 35, 42, 44, 45,48, 53, 54, 60, 64] There are also specialpurpose ad on security software packages that furnish authorization decisions for operating systems [9, 15, 16, 32] Abadi et al. 1] and Lampson et al. [39] developed a unified theory of authentication and access control in distributed systems. Practical ....

C. P. Pfleeger, Security in Computing, Prentice-Hall, 1989.


Software Watermarking: Protective Terminology - Nagra, Thomborson, Collberg (2001)   (1 citation)  (Correct)

.... et al. 2001] obfuscation [Collberg et al. 1998] and tamperproofing [Aucsmith, 1996] Non technical means of protection include prosecution under copyright and patent law [Burk, 2001] enforcement of licenses under contract law, appropriate business models [Davis, 2001] and ethical controls [Pfleeger, 1997]. An approximate determination of the author of a software product may be obtained by analysis of what wemight call inadvertent Authorship Marks. These have been studied elsewhere [Krsul, 1994] and will not be considered further in this paper. 3 Setting We develop a precise terminology for ....

Pfleeger, C. P. (1997). Security in Computing. Prentice Hall, 2nd edition.


A Verifiable Multi-Authorities Secret Election Allowing.. - Juang, Lei, Yu (1998)   (1 citation)  (Correct)

....scheme would disclose the privacy of the voters. To overcome this difficulty, many cryptographic A preliminary version was presented at the International Computer Symposium, Tainan, Taiwan, December 1998. y Corresponding author. E mail: lei cc.ee.ntu.edu.tw . 1 protocols have been proposed [5, 10, 12, 13, 16, 19, 22, 26, 29]. Another required feature in electronic voting schemes is that each voter can verify the voting result. When a voter finds that his vote has not been properly counted by the counter, he can make an objection to the counter or other voters. In considering the performance of voting processes, the ....

....considerations of this protocol are examined in Section 4. Then we make some discussions in Section 5. Finally, a concluding remark is given in Section 6. 2 Related work Secret voting protocols have been investigated by many researchers from both the practical and theoretical points of view. In [5, 22, 29], some boardroom voting schemes have been proposed where voters send encrypted messages back and forth until they all agree to the outcome of the election. In these schemes, all procedures are managed by the voters. However, if any voter stops following the protocol during the voting, the election ....

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C. P. Pfleeger, Security in computing, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1989.


A Secure and Practical Electronic Voting Scheme for Real World.. - Juang, Lei (1997)   (4 citations)  (Correct)

....3, we present our secret ballot protocol. The security considerations of this protocol are examined in Section 4. Then we discuss variants and possible extensions of our protocol in Section 5. Finally, a concluding remark is given in Section 6. 2. Related Work Some boardroom voting schemes [4] [6] have been proposed where voters openly send encrypted message back and forth until they all are confident of the outcome of the election. The major problems of these schemes are that the computations of voters are not independent and if any voter stops following the protocol during the ....

C. P. Pfleeger, "Security in computing," Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1989.


Security of High-Performance Messaging Layers on.. - Srigurunath.. (1999)   (Correct)

....accesses by the various processing units of the system. For instance, repeated polling of LANai memory by the host processor, can starve LANai access to its own memory [14] 5. Design Guidelines for Secure High Performance Messaging Layers A fundamental element of building a secure system [9,18,23] is to engineer a security architecture from the beginning stage a principle not being followed by the emerging HPC domains. Many of today s highperformance environments are not designed with a special consideration given to security. The pace of SAN technology, and lack of a uniform standard ....

Pfleeger, P. Charles. Security in Computing. Prentice Hall, 1989.


Catching Spam Before it Arrives: Domain Specific.. - Cook, Hartnett.. (2006)   (Correct)

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Pfleeger, CP & Pfleeger, SL 2003, Security in Computing, 3rd Int edn, Prentice Hall PTR, Upper Saddle River, N.J.


Industrial and Economic Properties of Software -.. - Messerschmitt, al. (2001)   (1 citation)  (Correct)

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Pfleeger, Charles P. Security in Computing, 2 nd edition, Prentice Hall, 1997.


Visualisation for Intrusion Detection - Hooking the Worm - Axelsson (2003)   (3 citations)  (Correct)

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Charles P. Pfleeger. Security in Computing. Prentice Hall, second edition, 1997. ISBN 0-13-185794-0.


Performance study of a COTS Distributed DBMS adapted for.. - Garuba (2004)   (Correct)

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C.P. Pfleeger and S.L. Pfleeger. Security in Computing. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cli#s, New Jersey, 3rd edition, 2003.


Unknown - (2003)   (Correct)

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Pfleeger, C. P. and Pfleeger, S. L. (2003). Security in Computing. Prentice Hall..


A Framework for Organisational Control Principles - Schaad (2003)   (Correct)

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Pfleeger, C. (1997). Security in Computing. Prentice Hall, New Jersey.


Site Security Handbook - Fraser (1997)   (11 citations)  (Correct)

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C. Pfleeger, "Security in Computing", Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1989.


Information Integrity Policies - Peng Li Yun (2003)   (Correct)

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Charles P. P eeger. Security in Computing, pages 5-6. Prentice-Hall, 1997. Second Edition.


Cybersecurity Considerations for Information Systems - Cynthia Irvine Center (2004)   (Correct)

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Pfleeger, C. P. (1996). Security in Computing. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc.


Templates for Misuse Case Description - Guttorm Sindre Andreas (2001)   (2 citations)  (Correct)

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C. P. Pfleeger, Security in Computing, Prentice-Hall, 1997.


Monterey, California - Thesis Approved For   (Correct)

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Pfleeger, Charles P., Security in Computing, PrenticeHall P T R, 1996. 65


Person Version [Year [[ DEC 3100 Sun 3/50 Sun 4/280 VAX 11/780 - Unix Bsd Baldwin   (Correct)

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Charles P. Pfleeger. Security in Computing. Prentice Hall, 1989.


Specification and Verification of Security Policies - Peri (1996)   (Correct)

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Pfleeger, C., 'Security in Computing', Prentice Hall, 1989.

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