Fernando Tohm e and Tuomas Sandholm. Coalition formation processes with belief revision among bounded rational self-interested agents. Journal of Logic and Computation, 9(97--63):1--23, 1999. Early version: IJCAI-97 Workshop on Social Interaction and Communityware, pp. 43--51, Nagoya, Japan. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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....of problems and derive a number of analytic results. We also study language coordination in a game theoretic setting and our results have consequences for the Nash equilibria for such problems (for related research on multi agent systems and game theoretic foundations, see [Boutilier et al. 1997, Tohme Sandholm 1999] among others. In the design of natural language understanding systems, the goal is to develop a computer system that is able to communicate with a human. The statistical approach to this problem assumes an underlying probabilistic model for the human source. This probabilistic model is then ....
Tohme, F. and Sandholm, T. (1999) Coalition Formation Processes with Belief Revision among Bounded Rational SelfInterested Agents. Journal of Logic and Computation, 9(6), 793-815.
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Fernando Tohm e and Tuomas Sandholm. Coalition formation processes with belief revision among bounded rational self-interested agents. Journal of Logic and Computation, 9(97--63):1--23, 1999. Early version: IJCAI-97 Workshop on Social Interaction and Communityware, pp. 43--51, Nagoya, Japan.
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.... 1984; van der Linden and Verbeek, 1985; Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1994; Charnes and Kortanek, 1966; Shapley, 1967; Wu, 1977] One way to interpret this is to consider the coalition members utilities to be the utilities they can guarantee themselves no matter what the nonmembers do [Aumann, 1959; Tohm e and Sandholm, 1999] Definition 1 Given a set of players A,autility possibility for B = b 1 , b nB #Ais a vector (u b1 , u b n B ) representing utilities that the players in B can guarantee themselves by cooperating with each other. A utility possibility set is a set of utility possibility vectors ....
Fernando Tohm e and Tuomas Sandholm. Coalition formation processes with belief revision among bounded rational self-interested agents. Journal of Logic and Computation, 9(97--63):1--23, 1999. Early version: IJCAI-97 Workshop on Social Interaction and Communityware, pp. 43--51, Nagoya, Japan.
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F. Tohme, and T. Sandholm, "Coalition Formation Processes with Belief Revision among Bounded Rational SelfInterested Agents", Journal of Logic and Computation, 9(6): 793-815, 1999.
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F. Tohme and T. Sandholm. Coalition formation processes with belief revision among bounded-rational selfinterested agents. Journal of Logic and Computation, 9, 793--815, 1999.
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Fernando Tohm'e, Tuomas Sandholm. Coalition Formation Processes with Belief Revision among Bounded-Rational Self-Interested Agents. Journal of Logic and Computation, 9(6): 793-815, 1999.
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