Lions, J. ARIANE 5 flight 501 failure. World Wide Web, July 1996. http://ravel.esrin.esa.it/docs/esax -1819eng.pdf.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....all possible onboard conditions in an unsurveyed deep space environment; thus, an upgraded embedded software component can never be guaranteed to have ultra high reliability. There have been cases in which unprotected software upgrades or evolution caused severe damage to space missions (see [2, 3], for example) and the necessity of devising methods for dependable software upgrading was further exemplified by MCI WorldCom s recent 10 day frame relay outage [4] The outage began August 5, 1999, four weeks after a scheduled upgrade to a new switching software intended to allow the network to ....

J. L. Lions (The Chairman of the Board), ARIANE 5 Flight 501 Failure, July 1996. http://sspg1.bnsc.rl.ac.uk/Share/ISTP/ariane5r.htm.

....Rechnerarchitekturen) and the SysLab project, sponsored by the German Research Community (DFG) under the Leibniz program and by Siemens Nixdorf. many systems that are in use today bear inconsistencies that are undetected until particular situations arise, where the effects often are disastrous [9]. 1.1 Applicable Formal Methods Despite the benefits that can be gained by using formal techniques, their use in largescale industrial systems development is still quite uncommon. As has repeatedly been stated, the reasons for this fact are mainly due to the complexity and clumsiness of the ....

J.-L. Lions et al. Ariane 5 Flight 501 Failure. ESA Press Release 33-96, Paris, 1996.

....but neither precision (which might be approached from a probabilistic point of view) nor (economical) benefit. In absence of more theoretical work on this subject, the answer is therefore mostly experimental. For example, fol# lowing the failure of the maiden flight 501 of the Ariane 5 launcher [12], a recent success story was the static analysis of Ariane s embedded programs to prove the absence of runtime errors [9] In contrast to simple special purpose abstract domains (such as bit vectors in dataflow analysis or boolean functions in strictness analysis) the e#ective design of ....

J.L. Lions. Ariane 5 flight 501 failure, report by the inquiry board. http://www.esrin.esa.it/htdocs/tidc/Press/Press96/ariane5rep.html.

.... was traced to a software error in converting a 64 bit floating point number to 16 bit signed integer [15] However, the report by the Inquiry Board goes deeper and blames this error on specification and design errors in the software and inadequate analysis and testing of the failed subsystems [18]. 1 1.2 Tackling the Problems As these recent incidents illustrate, producing high quality software on schedule is a major issue in the computer industry today. However, this is nothing new ever since the beginning of computer programming, bugs and behind schedule projects have been ....

Prof. J. L. Lions (Chairman of the Board). Ariane 5: Flight 501 failure. Report by the Inquiry Board. http://www.cnes.fr/actualites/news/rapport 501.html, July 19, 1996.

....have been exercised extensivel y. Reusing software modules does not guarantee safety in the new system to which they are transferred and sometimes leads to awkward and dangerous designs. p. 552 [146] Unfortunately, a similar reuse of software led to the destruction of the Ariane 5 launcher[149][188] Often, the rush to complete a system leads to the dropping of lesser nonfunctional requirements, such as safety or reliabilit y. Sometimes, interactions between requirements are explicitly considered, yet failures still occu r. For example, consider the tradeoff between flight safet y, ....

Lions, J.L., ARIANE 5: Flight 501 Failure, Report by the Inquiry Board, European Space Agenc y, Paris, July 19, 1996.

.... se[28] 10000000622711310485731409920.000000 se[29] 100000001504746621987668885504.000000 se[30] 1000000015047466219876688855040.000000 se[31] 9999999848243207295109594873856.000000 se[32] 100000003318135351409612647563264.000000 se[33] 1000000071866979741764260066230272.000000 se[34]=10000000409184787596297531937521664.000000 se[35] 100000004091847875962975319375216640.000000 se[36] 1000000040918478759629753193752166400.000000 se[37] 10000000567641112624826207124609564672.000000 se[38] 100000006944061726476491472742798852096.000000 se[39] Inf #include stdio.h #define ....

....se[25] 0.0000000008881783641890 se[26] 0.0000000022204458272057 se[27] 0.0000000055511146790366 se[28] 0.0000000138777869196360 se[29] 0.0000000346944659668225 se[30] 0.0000000867361649170562 se[31] 0.0000002168404193980678 se[32] 0.0000005421010200734599 se[33] 0. 0000013552526070270687 se[34]= 0.0000033881315175676718 se[35] 0.0000084703287939191796 se[36] 0.0000211758215300505981 se[37] 0.0000529395547346211970 se[38] 0.0001323488831985741854 se[39] 0.0003308721934445202351 se[40] 0.0008271804545074701309 se[41] 0.0020679510198533535004 se[42] 0.0051698777824640274048 se[43] ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

J. L. Lions. ARIANE 5 flight 501 failure, report by the inquiry board. http://www.esrin.esa.it/htdocs/tidc/Press/Press96/ariane5rep.html, Paris, 19 July 1996.

....languages that have incorporated exception handling as one of their features, e.g. Ada 95, Java, C , and Eiffel. Nevertheless accidents still occur when computers fail due to inappropriate usage of exception handling as an error recovery mechanism, viz. the crash of Ariane 5 in its maiden flight [Lions 96] Instead of assuming that exception handling should be restricted to the later phases of software development, this paper describes a systematic and effective approach in how to deal with exception handling at all phases of the software lifecycle. The approach provides a stepwise method for ....

J. L. Lions (Chairman of the Board). Ariane 5 - Flight 501 Failure. Report by the Inquiry Board. July, 1996.

....been developed to support Root Requirements Analysis. 1. 1 A Need to Surface Requirement Interactions The importance of requirements engineering can be illustrated with some of the more extreme disasters attributed to failures in requirements engineering: 1) complete loss of the Ariane 5 launcher[25], 2) the crash of Lufthansa A320 in Warsaw[21] 22] and (2) 62 and 79 percent of safety related functional faults in the Voyager and Galileo space probes, respectively[26] Requirements errors are: numerous, ranging from 25 percent to 70 percent of total software errors in US companies, ....

Lions, J.L., ARIANE 5: Flight 501 Failure, Report by the Inquiry Board, European Space Agency, Paris, July 19, 1996.

....suitability to this case study. ffl Performance If there is a performance problem, it may be a good idea to place time critical parts in hardware. This may also be done, when there is an indirect performance problem, e.g. when the requirement to stay below some prescribed processor utilization (Lions, 1996) 1 , cannot be fulfilled without sacrificing safety. Sometimes even slow mechanical processes like elevators may encounter performance problems, e.g. a too slow reaction to interrupting the light barrier during closing of the door. This could result from a centralized synchronous control system ....

Lions, J.L. (1996). Ariane 5 flight 501 failure. Technical report. Report by the Inquiry Board.

....testified by the recent event: At 39 seconds after launch, the Ariane 5 self destruct mechanism activated, obliterating the rocket; the Ariane 5 was an upgrade of the Ariane 4. The upgraded software, based on in part of the Ariane 4 software, could not handle the higher velocities of the Ariane 5 [5]. In summary, with respect to long life applications, the key factors that necessitate on board maintenance for evolvable software are: 1) potential loss of system availability, normal mission functions, and message data during uploading and version switching; 2) possible gaps between the old ....

J. L. Lions (The Chairman of the Board), ARIANE 5 Flight 501 Failure, July 1996. URL=http://sspg1.bnsc.rl.ac.uk /Share/ISTP/ariane5r.htm.

No context found.

Lions, J. ARIANE 5 flight 501 failure. World Wide Web, July 1996. http://ravel.esrin.esa.it/docs/esax -1819eng.pdf.

No context found.

Lions, J. L. (1996). Ariane 5 Flight 501 failure. Report by the enquiry board. http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~demmel/ma221/ariane5rep.html

No context found.

Lions, J., Ariane 5 Flight 501 Failure, European Space Agency, Paris, July 19, 1996.

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J. L. Lions, Ariane 5 Flight 501 Failure, Report of the Inquiry Board, http://sunnyday.mit.edu/accidents/ Ariane5accidentreport.html, July 1996.

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Dordrecht. Lions, J.L. (1996). Ariane 5 flight 501 failure.

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