D. Lehmann, L. I. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. Journal of the ACM, 49(5):577--602, 2002.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....are larger and the trends of the obtained results were similar to the results described above. 5. RELATED WORKS Winner determination problems have been widely studied, and many methods to solve them have been proposed. Some approximate methods for winner determination have been developed [2, 6]. In [2] Fujishima et al. presented an approximating approach for finding semi optimal allocations called the Virtual Simultaneous Auction (VSA) algorithm. This algorithm is interesting since it provides a case study in the power of market based computing [15] However, the performance of the ....

....which we used the technique proposed not only in [11] but also in [2] is not much di#erent from the reported results of CASS. Furthermore, using the LDS algorithm and using the CASS algorithm are not mutually exclusive, i.e. we can introduce LDS to the CASS algorithm to improve its e#ciency. In [6], Lehmann et al. proposed a mechanism that provides an approximate allocation and satisfies incentive compatibility for a restricted class of players preferences. Furthermore, some new methods have recently been proposed [1, 4, 7, 12] In [1] Andersson et al. observed that a winner ....

D. Lehmann, L. I. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-99), 1999.

....without loss of expressive power could be possible by allowing a richer input language. To this end, we introduced the A recent paper shows that if each bidder is interested in only one bundle, then incentive compatibility can be guaranteed even under approximate winner determination [12]. One idea toward this direction was presented early on by Rassenti et al. [24] They allowed each bidder to place combinatorial bids and to state the maximal number of bids that could be accepted from that bidder. Our XOR bidding language could be viewed as a special case of this where that ....

D. Lehmann, L. I. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 96--102, Denver, CO, Nov. 1999.

....bundles of items are not additive. Some items can be complementary, and others can be substitutes. While combinatorial markets have major economic advantages, they can be computationally complex to clear. There has been a recent surge of interest in developing combinatorial clearing algorithms [14, 16, 3, 10, 17, 1, 8, 2, 13, 19]. However, the bulk of this work has focused on single unit combinatorial auctions with free disposal, with some work on multi unit combinatorial auctions with free disposal [15, 17, 12, 5] Certain other generalizations have also been discussed, but their complexity has not been analyzed ....

D. Lehmann, L. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. ACM Ecommerce, p. 96-102, 1999.

....Supported by grants from the Israeli Academy of Sciences. Several researchers have considered the e ect of various computational considerations on the design of auctions: online behavior [14, 6] unbounded supply [7, 10, 6] computational complexity in combinatorial auctions [32, 16, 21, 28, 37], timing uncertainty [26] and more. This paper studies the e ect of severely restricting the amount of communication allowed in an auction of a single item. Each bidder is only allowed to send a single t bit message to the auctioneer, who must then allocate the item and determine the price ....

Daniel Lehmann, Liadan Ita O'Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately ecient combinatorial auctions. In 1st ACM conference on electronic commerce, 1999.

....way of dealing with this non truthfulness using a certain form of appeal functions. The problem of combinatorial auctions has been studied by several researchers in recent years. A comprehensive survey of various aspects of this problem can be found in [2] In particular, various bidding languages [3, 7, 20] and restrictions on the classes of bids that can be submitted (e.g. 6] were proposed. A comparative study of some of these languages can be found in [11] An alternative approach to the one that is taken here is to consider mechanisms where the agents are not required to declare their ....

....versions of this mechanism and prove their basic properties. Section 7 discusses additional implementation issues and section 8 concludes the paper. 2 Preliminaries 2. 1 Combinatorial auctions (CA) The problem of combinatorial auctions (CA) has been extensively studied in recent years (see e.g. [7] [20] 3] 6] 11] The importance of this problem is twofold. Firstly, several important applications rely on it (e.g. the FCC auction [9] Secondly, it is a generalization of many other problems of interest, in particular in the field of electronic commerce. A recent survey of various aspects ....

Daniel Lehmann, Liadan O`Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-99), pages 96--102, November 1999.

....such as shortest paths and scheduling on unrelated machines, and raised some associated computational issues. The papers [11] and [18] address computational di#culties with the VCG mechanism. The topic of revenue maximizing auctions has received a huge amount of attention. See the recent papers [1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 14, 16, 21, 22], or [5] for a recent survey on combinatorial auctions. The issue of frugality is raised in [2] which presents a truthful mechanism for minimizing makespan on machines with speeds. Their mechanism gives a 3 approximation and pays the machines only a logarithmic factor more than the actual costs ....

Daniel Lehmann, Liadan Ita O'Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 96--102, 1999.

....scale. One of the major problems is the computational di#culty of determining an optimal allocation for a given set of bids. This problem is usually formalized as a packing problem and is known to be NP complete to solve, or even to approximate [12] The problem has received much attention lately [14, 3, 7, 13, 1, 4, 11, 10], with three approaches usually taken: heuristics to improve the running time of finding the optimal solution, heuristics to improve the solution quality of e#cient algorithms, or special cases that can be optimally solved e#ciently. This paper follows the second approach: we present a very fast ....

....time O(nm log(m #) # 2 ) which, for fixed #, is nearly linear in the size of a matrix needed in order to represent the input. Second, the algorithm is very simple, and all the hidden constants are small. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to implement an approx 1 As observed in [4, 7] this does not lose generality, since more complicated bids may be expressed in this fashion. imation algorithm for positive linear programs, and indeed we can report significantly faster running times than commercial exact solvers of linear programs. We believe that our algorithm for approximate ....

D. Lehmann, L. I. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. In 1st ACM conference on electronic commerce, 1999.

....scheme. There has been considerable interest in recent years in characterizing polynomial time or approximable special cases of the general combinatorial allocation problem, in which there are multiple di#erent items. The combinatorial allocation problem is both NP complete and inapproximable [15]. Thus, the main contribution of this paper is to identify a non trivial but approximable allocation problem, in particular one in which bidders are provided with an expressive exclusive or bidding language. The bid taker is allowed to accept at most one point on the bid curve, but no more. In ....

....or reverse auction using our marginal decreasing, piecewise constant bidding language. Proof: See the appendix. 5 Related Work The idea of using approximations within mechanisms, while retaining either full strategyproofness or # dominance has received some previous attention. Lehmann et al. [15] propose a greedy and strategyproof approximation to a single minded combinatorial auction problem. Nisan Ronen [17] discussed approximate VCG based mechanisms, but either appealed to particular maximal in range approximations to retain full strategyproofness, or to resource bounded agents with ....

D. Lehmann, L. O'Callaghan and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. In Proc. 1st ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC-99), pages 96--102, 1999.

.... In the absence of test suites, some suggested novel bid generation techniques, parameterized by number of bids and goods [24, 10, 4, 8] Other researchers have used one or more of these distributions, e.g. 17] while still others have refrained from testing their algorithms altogether, e.g. [16, 14]. Parameterization represents a step forward, making it possible to describe performance with respect to the problem size. However, there are several ways in which each of these bid generation techniques falls short of realism, concerning the selection of which goods and how many goods to request ....

D. Lehmann, L. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revalation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 1999.

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D. Lehmann, L. I. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. Journal of the ACM, 49(5):577--602, 2002.

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D. Lehmann, L. I. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. Journal of the ACM, 49(5):577--602, 2002.

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Daniel J. Lehmann, Liadan Ita O'Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the First acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 96--102, 1999.

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Daniel Lehmann, Liadan Ita O'Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. In 1st ACM conference on electronic commerce, 1999.

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Daniel Lehmann, Liadan O`Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-99), pages 96--102, November 1999.

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Daniel Lehmann, Liadan O`Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-99), pages 96--102, November 1999. 75

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D. Lehmann, L. I. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. Journal of the ACM, 49(5):577--602, 2002.

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Daniel Lehmann, Liadan Ita O'Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately ecient combinatorial auctions. In 1st ACM conference on electronic commerce, 1999.

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Daniel Lehmann, Liadan Ita O'Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately ecient combinatorial auctions. In 1st ACM conference on electronic commerce, 1999.

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Daniel Lehmann, Liadan O`Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-99), pages 96--102, November 1999.

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D. Lehmann, L. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately e#cient combinatorial auctions. ACM Ecommerce, p. 96-102, 1999.

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