BALA, V., AND S. GOYAL (1999): "A Non-Cooperative Model of Network Formation," forthcoming in Econometrica.  Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms - Pal, Tardos (2003) (8 citations) (Correct)
....cross monotonic, and their mechanism is only individually strategyproof, not group strategyproof. In contrast, our technique modifies the algorithm to make the cost shares cross monotonic (and hence the resulting mechanism group strategyproof) Much of the previous work on network design games [1, 4, 11, 19] focuses on the Nash equilibria of the corresponding non cooperative games. In its nature, Nash equilibrium is a non cooperative concept: the agents simply observe each others behavior, and respond accordingly. Typically Nash solutions break down if we allow the agents to cooperate. In contrast, ....
V. Bala and S. Goyal. A Non-Cooperative Model of Network Formation. In Econometrica 68(2000), 1181--1229.
Network Formation with Heterogeneous Agents - Larrosa, Tohme (Correct)
.... Formation with Heterogeneous Agents Juan Larrosa and Fernando Tohme Departamento de Economa Universidad Nacional del Sur CONICET Email: jlarrosa,ftohme criba.edu.ar Abstract The present paper analyzes a network formation problem, mainly based on the framework presented in [Bala Goyal 2000]. We depart from their assumptions in two crucial aspects. On one hand, we assume that connecting to an agent pays o# not only for the number of connections that the agent can provide but also for her intrinsic value. Since the values of the agents (which represent the amounts of information ....
....The economic literature introduced recently game theoretic tools in this framework. Instead of being concerned just with the descriptive aspects, some economic theorists tackled the issue of how networks arise, in the first place, and of what makes them stable or e#cient [Jackson Wolinsky 1996] [Bala Goyal 2000], Dutta Jackson 2000] The game theoretic approach to networks exhibits two main approaches: one based in the notion of cooperative games and the other with a strong strategic flavor. The analysis based in cooperative games, as it is usual in that approach, focuses on the problem of the formation ....
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Bala, V.- Goyal, S., A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation, Econometrica 68:1181-1229, 2000.
Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation - Mutuswami, Winter (2000) (4 citations) (Correct)
....method such that no subset of agents have an incentive to deviate and build their own network to the source. See Graham and Hall [5] for a historical survey of this problem. 2 Two other papers in this literature are Johnson and Gilles [8] and Slikker and van den Nouweland [11] Bala and Goyal [2] are also concerned with the e#ciency stability problem but they use a dynamic framework to examine this issue. 3 Jackson and Wolinsky [7] and Dutta and Mutuswami [4] use di#erent ways of evaluating the stability of a network. The reader is referred to their papers for details. 1 the problem ....
....in Section 3 do not go through in a particular model first proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky [7] However, the mechanisms introduced in Section 3 can be modified suitably to obtain identical results to those in Section 4. Section 6 discusses a model of directed graphs analyzed by Bala and Goyal [2] and Section 7 discusses the issue of coalitional stability of our mechanisms. Section 8 concludes. 2 The Model Let N = 1, 2, n denote a set of agents. An undirected graph g is a subset of g N # i, j i #= j, i, j # N . The graph g N is also referred to as the complete ....
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V. Bala and S. Goyal, A Non-Cooperative Model of Network Formation, forthcoming in Econometrica, 1999. 18
Unequal Connections - Goyal, Joshi (2002) Self-citation (Goyal) (Correct)
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V. Bala and S. Goyal (2000), A non-cooperative model of network formation, Econo- metfica, 68, 5, 1181-1231.
PREPRINT VERSION: submitted. manuscript No. - Will Be Inserted (Correct)
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BALA, V., AND S. GOYAL (1999): "A Non-Cooperative Model of Network Formation," forthcoming in Econometrica.
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms - Pal, Tardos (2003) (8 citations) (Correct)
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V. Bala and S. Goyal. A Non-Cooperative Model of Network Formation. In Econometrica 68(2000), 1181--1229.
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair .. - Anshelevich.. (2004) (1 citation) (Correct)
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V. Bala and S. Goyal. A Non-Cooperative Model of Network Formation. In Econometrica 68(2000), 1181--1229.
Network Formation - Groh (2001) (Correct)
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V. Bala and Goyal S. A noncooperative model of network formation. Econometrica, (68):1181--1229, 2000.
Exploring Payoffs and Beliefs in Game Theory - Sarangi (2000) (Correct)
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Bala, V. and S. Goyal (1999a), \A Non-Cooperative Model of Network Formation", forthcoming in Econometrica.
Social Networks in Determining Employment and Wages.. - Calvo-Armengol, Jackson (2002) (Correct)
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Bala, V. and S. Goyal (2000) "A Non-Cooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, 68, pp 1181--1229.
Near-Optimal Network Design with Selfish Agents - Anshelevich, Dasgupta.. (2002) (8 citations) (Correct)
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V. Bala and S. Goyal. A Non-Cooperative Model of Network Formation. In Econometrica 68(2000), pages 1181-1229.
Social Networks In Determining Employment And Wages.. - Calvò, Jackson (Correct)
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Bala, V. and S. Goyal (2000) "A Non-Cooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, 68, pp 1181 1229.
Networks: An Experimental Study - Plott, Callander (Correct)
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Bala, V. and S. Goyal (2000). "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation. " Econometrica 68 (September): 1181-1230.
Why Are Trade Agreements Regional? A Theory Based on.. - Zissimos (2002) (Correct)
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Bala, V. and S. Goyal (2000); "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation." Econometrica, 68(5): 1181-1229.
Bilateralism and Free Trade - Goyal, Joshi (1999) (1 citation) (Correct)
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V. Bala and S. Goyal (1999), A non-cooperative model of network formation, forthcoming in ############.
Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents - Haller, Sarangi (2000) (7 citations) (Correct)
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Bala, V. and S. Goyal (1999a), \A Non-Cooperative Model of Network Formation", forthcoming in Econometrica.
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