Wen-Shenq Juang and Chin-Laung Lei. A Secure and Practical Electronic Voting Scheme for Real World Environments. TIEICE: IEICE Transactions on Communications/Electronics/Information and Systems, 1997.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....of the voter. 1 Introduction Secure electronic voting requires the exchange of untraceable yet authentic messages. Broadly two different approaches have been proposed: i) approaches that require complex encryption schemes [1, 6, 7, 10] and ( ii) approaches that require an anonymous channel [2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14] that is used to cast the ballot as an untraceable message. The protocol we propose does not require any complex cryptographic schemes. Our protocol is similar to the ones in [8, 9] but does not need an anonymous channel. Voting is similar to a guest ftp session. The session may, at best, be ....

W. S. Juang and C. L. Lei. A Secure and Practical Electronic Voting Scheme for Real World Environments. IEICE Transaction on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Science, E80A (1):64--71, January 1997.

....that rely on complex encryption schemes to cast a ballot [1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14] Note: all security protocols use some form of encryption technology; these protocols make use of complex technology that are not widely prevelant. 2. approaches that rely on the existence of an anonymous channel [2, 6, 10, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19] that is used to cast the ballot as an untraceable message. The protocol we propose, does not require any complex cryptographic schemes like the ones in item 1 above. Our protocol is similar to the protocols proposed in [10, 12] however, unlike these protocols, we do not use any 1 of 18 An ....

....9, 11, 14] Note all security protocols use some form of encryption technology; these particular protocols use complex technologies that are not widely prevelant for example zero knowledge protocols and threshold cryptosystems. 2. approaches that rely on the existence of an anonymous channel [2, 6, 10, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19] that is used to cast the ballot as an untraceable message. In the following we review some of these electronic voting protocols. 2.1 Protocols using complex cryptographic techniques DeMillo and Merritt [11] propose an electronic voting protocol based on mutiple encipherments of a voter s vote ....

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W. S. Juang and C. L. Lei. A Secure and Practical Electronic Voting Scheme for Real World Environments. IEICE Transaction on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Science, E80A (1):64--71, January 1997.

....prevent the signer from deriving the exact correspondence between the actual signing process performed by the signer and the signature which later made public. The blind signatures can realize secure electronic payment schemes [1, 5, 6, 7] protecting customers anonymity, and secure voting schemes [8, 9, 10] preserving voters privacy. In a distributed environment, the signed blind messages can be regarded as a fixed amount of electronic money in secure electronic Corresponding author. E mail: lei cc.ee.ntu.edu.tw . 1 payment schemes, or as tickets in applications such as secret voting schemes. The ....

....is the same as that of an individual signature and the signature verification process is equivalent to that of an individual signature. Therefore, these schemes are optimal with respect to the threshold signature size and the verification process. In addition to the secure voting schemes [8, 9, 10] to protect voters privacy, the concept of blind signatures has been widely used in secure electronic payment schemes [1, 5, 6, 7] Up to date, the on line e cash schemes proposed by Chaum [1, 5] are more efficient and practical. The aim of these schemes was to produce an electronic version of ....

Juang, W and Lei, C A secure and practical electronic voting scheme for real world environments, IEICE Trans. on Fundamentals, E80-A(1) (January 1997) 64-71.

....scheme would disclose the privacy of the voters. To overcome this difficulty, many cryptographic A preliminary version was presented at the International Computer Symposium, Tainan, Taiwan, December 1998. y Corresponding author. E mail: lei cc.ee.ntu.edu.tw . 1 protocols have been proposed [5, 10, 12, 13, 16, 19, 22, 26, 29]. Another required feature in electronic voting schemes is that each voter can verify the voting result. When a voter finds that his vote has not been properly counted by the counter, he can make an objection to the counter or other voters. In considering the performance of voting processes, the ....

....Fujioka et al. proposed a secret ballot protocol which is more suitable for large scale general elections since the computation and communication overhead is small even if the number of voters is large. In this scheme, each voter must send two anonymous messages to the counter, but in the schemes [13, 16, 19, 26], each voter only has to send one anonymous message to the counter. In [12] Iversen proposed a voting scheme, which preserves the privacy of the voters against the administrator and other voters. The drawback of this scheme is that if all candidates conspire the privacy of the voters is ....

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W. Juang and C. Lei, "A secure and practical electronic voting scheme for real world environments," IEICE Trans. on Fundamentals, Vol. E80-A, No. 1, pp. 64-71, January, 1997.

....select his own private key and the group public key is determined by all the members. The security of our schemes rely on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithm. 1 Introduction The concept of blind signature was introduced by Chaum [2] It allows the realization of secure voting schemes [8, 9, 15] preserving voters privacy, and secure electronic payment systems [3, 5] protecting customers anonymity. Such systems have a party called the signer who is responsible for producing digital signatures. The other parties called the requesters would like to obtain blind signatures on the messages ....

....the messages are decrypted in threshold cryptosystems, different messages can be signed using a threshold signature scheme without disclosing the group secret key and the corresponding threshold signatures can be verified by the group public key. In many single administrator election schemes [8, 9, 15], every voter requests a blind signature on his intention from the administrator in the registration phase, extracts the real vote from the blind signature and sends the real vote to the administrator through an untraceable email in the voting phase. One of the underlying assumptions of these ....

W. Juang and C. Lei, "A secure and practical electronic voting scheme for real world environments," to appear in IEICE Trans. on Fundamentals (A preliminary version was presented at Proc. 6th National Conf. on Informa. Security, Taiwan, pp. 153-160, 1996).

....duplicated, there is a need to prevent malicious or careless voters from casting multiple votes. The naive approach of simply issuing a unique identification number to each voter would disclose privacy of the voters. To overcome this difficulty, many cryptographic protocols have been proposed [1] [9]. Another feature in electronic voting scheme is that each voter can verify the voting result. When a voter finds that his vote has not been properly counted by the administrator, one approach is that via an anonymous channel he will broadcast his ballot to all voters. The validity of the result ....

....key 2 IEICE TRANS. FUNDAMENTALS, VOL. NO. to the counter through an anonymous channel. Any voter may not send his secret key to the counter and then the counter can not publish all voters intensions. In this scheme, each voter must send two anonymous messages, but in the schemes [3] 7] [9], each voter only has to send one anonymous message. Iversen [2] proposed a voting scheme based on privacy homomorphism [13] His scheme preserves the privacy of the voters against the administrator and other voters. The essential drawback of this scheme is that if all candidates conspire the ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

W. Juang, C. Lei, C. Fan. "A secure and practical electronic voting scheme for real world environments," Proc. 6th National Conf. on Informa. Security, Taiwan, pp. 153160, 1996.

....their underlying structures. # 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Anonymous channel; Authentication; Untraceable e mail systems; Electronic elections; Anonymous group discussions; Privacy and security 1. Introduction Many applications, such as electronic voting schemes [1 3], anonymous group discussions, can be easily realized using anonymous channels [4,5] In wireline networks, several anonymous channel protocols [4 6] have been proposed. The mix net approach is used in Refs. 4,6] to realize a sender untraceable e mail system. In the mix net approach, the ....

....the signer from deriving the exact correspondence between the actual signing process performed by the signer and the signature which is later made public. The blind signatures can realize the secure electronic payment systems [20,21] protecting customers anonymity, and the secure voting schemes [1 3] preserving voters privacy. In a distributed environment, every signed blind message can be thought as a fixed amount of electronic money in secure electronic payment systems, or as a ticket in applications such as secret voting schemes. The security of the blind signature schemes proposed in ....

W. Juang, C. Lei, A secure and practical electronic voting scheme for W.-S. Juang et al. / Computer Communications 22 (1999) 1502--1511 1510

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W. Juang, C. Lei, A secure and practical electronic voting scheme for real world environments, IEICE Trans. Fundamentals E80A (1) (1997) 64--71.

....the signer from deriving the exact correspondence between the actual signing process performed by the signer and the signature which later made public. The blind signatures can realize the secure electronic payment schemes [4, 5, 7] protecting customers anonymity, and the secure voting schemes [14, 15, 29] preserving voters privacy. In a distributed environment, every signed blind message can be thought as a fixed amount of electronic money in secure electronic payment schemes, or as a ticket in applications such as secret voting schemes. In [25] two provably secure blind signature schemes are ....

W. Juang and C. Lei, "A secure and practical electronic voting scheme for real world environments, " IEICE Trans. on Fundamentals, E80-A(1) (1997), pp. 64-71.

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Wen-Shenq Juang and Chin-Laung Lei. A Secure and Practical Electronic Voting Scheme for Real World Environments. TIEICE: IEICE Transactions on Communications/Electronics/Information and Systems, 1997.

No context found.

Wen-Sheng Juang and Chin-Laung Lei. A secure and practical electronic voting scheme for real world environment. IEICE Trans. on Fundamentals, E80-A(1), January 1997.

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