Casper Dik. Non-Executable Stack for Solaris.  Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Generation of Application Level Audit Data via Library.. - Kuperman, Spafford (1999) (4 citations) (Correct)
.... these type of attacks include static analysis, specialized boundary checking compilers (Cowan, Pu, Maier, Hinton, Bakke, Beattie, Grier, Wagle, and Zhang [21] and Cowan, Beattie, Day, Pu, Wagle, and Walthinsen [22] and modifying the stack to be non executable ( Solar Designer [23] Dik [24], and Snarskii [25] 9.2 Design of the library For this prototype, we interposed three library functions that are common culprits in buffer overflow attacks (strcpy, strcat, and getenv) Our library examines the data that is to be copied into a buffer and looks for the following characteristics ....
Casper Dik. Non-executable stack for solaris. Posting to comp.security.unix, 1997.
PointGuard™: Protecting Pointers from Buffer.. - Cowan, Beattie.. (2003) (Correct)
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Casper Dik. Non-Executable Stack for Solaris.
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