TRIVERS, R. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol. 46 (1971), 35--57.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....The social sciences and the economics community have paid considerable attention to the issue of evolution of cooperative behavior among a group of self interested agents. The social sciences researchers analyze the nature of altruism and the cause for its evolution and sustenance in animal groups [16]. Mathematical biologists and economists evaluate the rationality of altruistic behavior in groups of self interested agents by proposing fitness models that analyze the success of altruistic individuals and the evolution of altruistic genetic traits [8, 12] We do not intend to model altruistic ....

R. Trivers. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46:35--57, 1972.

....with a predicted cooperative behavior. When Axelrod and Hamilton ( 4] 3] analyzed the IPD, they found that a co operating strategy, called Tit for Tat (TfT ) did very well against strategies with more defect. This strategy has become an informal guiding principle for reciprocal altruism [18]. A TfT agent begins with cooperation and then imitates its opponent, in a game of unknown length. Axelrod describes this as being nice and forgiving against a defecting strategy that uses threats and punishments. Binmore [7] p194 203) presents a critical review of TfT, and of Axelrod s ....

R. L. Trivers. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46:35--57, 1971.

.... and Chicken Game When Axelrod and Hamilton analyzed the iterated prisoner s dilemma they found out that a cooperating strategy, the Tit for Tat (TfT) strategy, did very well against more defecting strategies [6, 8] This strategy has become an informal guiding principle for reciprocal altruism [87]. A TfT agent begins with cooperation and then follows whatever the other agent is doing in a game lasting an unknown number of times. All agents are interested in maximizing individual utilities and are not pre disposed to help each other. A defecting agent will always win or at least stay equal ....

.... with a predicted cooperative behavior[59] When Axelrod and Hamilton analyzed the IPD, they found that a co operating strategy, called Tit for Tat (TfT) did very well against strategies with more defect ( 6, 8] This strategy has become an informal guiding principle for reciprocal altruism [87]. A TfT agent begins with cooperation 3.3. A Generous and Greedy Model for Strategies 41 and then imitates its opponent, in a game of unknown length. Axelrod describes this as being nice and forgiving against a defecting strategy that uses threats and punishments. Binmore presents a critical ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

R.L. Trivers. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46:35--57, 1971.

....that the cooperating TfT strategy did very well against more defecting strategies. All agents are interested in maximizing individual utilities and are not pre disposed to help each other. If an agent cooperates this is not because of an undirected altruism but because of a reciprocal altruism [20] favoring a selfish agent. The TfT strategy has become an informal guiding principle for reciprocal altruism [1] 2] Binmore [5] gives a critical review of the TfT strategy and of Axelrod s simulation. He concludes that TfT is only one of a very large number of equilibrium strategies and that ....

R.L. Trivers. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46:35--57, 1971.

....ways. They reduce the potential for conflict within social groups by negotiating the allocation of scarce resources. 31] They allow individuals to learn more effectively from their social partners. 25] They facilitate cooperation and coalition formation. 23, 51] They enable reciprocal altruism. [36, 48] They promote friendly relations and reduce social distance. 30] They allow certain species (e.g. dogs) to live with humans and thrive as a result of that close contact. 11] Animals provide an excellent example of autonomous interacting entities. In particular, the social behavior of mammals ....

Trivers, R.L. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46. 35-57.

....behavior among a group of self interested agents have received considerable attention among researchers in the social sciences and economics community. Researchers in the social sciences have focused on the nature of altruism and the cause for its evolution and sustenance in groups of animals [12, 15, 18]. Our goal in this paper is not to model altruistic behavior in animals; so we do not address the issues raised in the social science literature on this topic [10] Most of the work by mathematical biologists or economists on the evolution of altruistic behavior deals with the idealized problem ....

R. Trivers. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46:35--57, 1972.

.... a few specific conditions, was made by Hamilton (1964) Possible exceptions are altruistic behaviour directed towards children or relatives (Hamilton 1964) and reciprocal cooperation, in which helpful actions are rewarded in the future by similar positive acts performed by the initial recipient (Trivers 1971). Which of these two scenarios is the correct model for language It is easy to rule out the first alternative. Admittedly, one can find some peculiarity in the language between mother and child or between twins, but no qualitative bias is to be found in adult speech that indicates a different ....

Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quaterly Review of Biology, 46.

....interpretation of the results, even though a simple estimation of purely genetic coecients of relatedness (following Queller Goodnight, 1989; Queller, 1994) was inconclusive in this respect. Finally, it would also be possible to construe these results as a consequence of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) although there would be little or no di erence between this and the kin selective interpretation since there is no segregation into di erent species in this model. However, a constant fact in all these possible interpretations remains the two way coupling between selection and ecological dynamics ....

Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35-57.

....self interested behaviour in favour of cooperative or altruistic behaviour. The Prisoner s Dilemma is a model of social interactions in which the participants must decide whether to comply with a norm or to pursue self interest by violating it. Based on the two person iterated Prisoner s Dilemma, Trivers (1971) argues that emotions play a crucial role in the evolution of reciprocal altruism. For example, moralistic aggression has been selected for in order to punish unreciprocating individuals ( cheaters ) e.g. by cutting off all future altruistic acts. Guilt has been selected for in order to motivate ....

TRIVERS R L (1971) The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46.

....do. Cosmides and Tooby 1989, 1992 argue that the evolution of cheater detection mechanisms explains the content e ect. jon ICS Lecture 18 March 9, 2000 Domain speci city 20 Cheater detection In the EEA, people bene tted via non zero sum interactions with non kin (eg: hunters co operating) Trivers 1971 argued that although one o altruism is unlikely to be selected for, reciprocal altruims may have survival bene ts. But note that such reciprocal altruism is vulnerable to cheating: cheaper to accept help, but never o er it. For social systems to persisit, this attitude must be detected and ....

Trivers, R. (1971) The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Review of Biology, 46, 35-56.

....mates, siblings and other kin, as described thus far, have a genetic basis. These do not explain why humans are altruistic toward, and cooperate with, individuals whom are unrelated. The process by which altruistic relationships arise between unrelated individuals is termed reciprocal altruism [Trivers, 1971]. There are a number of prerequisites to be met before an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) will arise. The cost of an altruistic act must be low in relation to the received benefit. Individuals must be able to recognise each other as individuals and be capable of keeping track of their ....

Trivers, R. L., "The evolution of reciprocal altruism", Quarterly review of biology, 46, pp35-57, 1971.

.... 15 Computational Social Philosophy Artificial Intelligence Psychology Dyer 1819 Philanthropic society benevolent contribution Game Theory Axelord 1984 True altruism sacrifice for the benefits of others TIT FOR TAT Biology Darwin 1871 Man help fellowmen to be helped back Trivers 1971 Converted Darwin s work to theory of reciprocal altruism Dawkins 1976 Selfish gene Binmore 1994 Reciprocity keeps society going Ridley 1996 Reciprocal cooperation is how human society started and keeps going Newell 1982 Principle of rationality Rosenschein 1985 Benevolent ....

....who fail to punish the defectors. He calls this moralistic strategy [Boyd 1992] 2.5.3 Altruism Trivers believes that our emotion gets between our inner calculator and our outer behavior. Also he thinks that our emotions lead us to altruism, if we think that it will pay off in the long run [Trivers 1971]. Ridley states that some philosophers believe that altruism does not exist in the animal kingdom, because it requires a generous motivation and not just a generous act. Similar to Dawkins s [Dawkins 1976] selfish gene, Ridley believes that chromosomes are not altruistic. They do not give up ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

R. L. Trivers, "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism," Quarterly review of Biology, volume 46, pages 35-56, 1971.

....here, the relative proportion of cooperators can decrease in each separate group, while the proportion of cooperators in the total population can nonetheless increase, at least transiently. The increase of altruistic behavior exhibited in these simulations is not based on reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971), as there are no strategies (e.g. Tit for Tat) conditional on other players past actions, nor does it depend on kin selection via inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964) as there are no genomes. This model is very general in that it can represent both biological and social non zero sum situations in ....

Trivers, R.L. 1971. The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology 46:35-57.

....Robert Axelrod (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, Axelrod 1984) addressed the question of whether individual rationality would still favor defection if instead of playing just once or at random, players were forced to play a series of iterated PD games. This work extended the idea of reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971), an earlier attempt to explain seemingly altruistic behavior between non relatives in terms of individual benefit. Axelrod sponsored a tournament in which various strategies implemented in computer programs were played against each other pair wise in a round robin so that each program played ....

Trivers, R.L. (1971). "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism," Quarterly Review of Biology. 46:35-57.

....behavior among a group of self interested agents have received considerable attention among researchers in the social sciences and economics community. Researchers in the social sciences have focused on the nature of altruism and the cause for its evolution and sustenance in groups of animals [12, 15, 18]. Our goal in this paper is not to model altruistic behavior in animals; so we do not address the issues raised in the social science literature on this topic [10] Most of the work by mathematical biologists or economists on the evolution of altruistic behavior deals with the idealized problem ....

R. Trivers. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46:35--57, 1972.

....with a high degree of group commitment (such as Judaism) would reveal not only strong positive affective motivations concomitant with group membership, but a strong role also for negative emotions such as guilt for motivating non defection from the group and compliance with group goals. Indeed, Trivers (1971) and Baumeister and Leary (1995) emphasize the importance of guilt and empathy for cementing ingroup relationships. The powerful affective components of social identity processes are difficult to explain except as aspects of the evolved machinery of the human mind. We have noted that the tendency ....

Trivers, R. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35-57.

....Prisoner s Dilemma has long been investigated as a model of competition and cooperation among social organisms. When organisms interact, they may cooperate or try to take advantage of each other, and when they interact repeatedly, their previous experiences influence their current actions. Trivers [1971] suggested that when organisms interact, repeated cooperation might benefit both participants more than it costs them; they might repay favors to their cumulative benefit and retaliate at non cooperation. Such behavior, which Trivers called reciprocal altruism, resembles the tit for tat IPD ....

Trivers, R.L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35-57.

.... informative signals of others, without paying the costs of signalling oneself Or worse, why not use the communication system to lie, misinforming others for one s own benefit Possible answers to this dilemma are usually phrased in terms of kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) or reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971): speakers or signallers remain honest because they are helping their relatives or because they want others to do the same for them, respectively. There are alternative explanations: Dessalles (1998, this volume) presents 1 the intriguing suggestion that honest information is given freely because ....

Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35--57.

.... How can honest signalling be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) Furthermore, how might such communication have evolved in the first place why, against an initial background of non communication, would the first proto signallers have been selected for their behaviour Reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), an arrangement in which one animal bears a cost in order that another may gain a (greater) benefit and later has the favour returned, provides a possible answer. Simulation work such as Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) and Axelrod (1984) has shown that reciprocal altruism can generate cooperative ....

Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35--57.

....behavior among a group of self interested agents have received considerable attention among researchers in the social sciences and economics community. Researchers in the social sciences have focused on the nature of altruism and the cause for its evolution and sustenance in groups of animals [Bad93, dVZ94, GB66, Kre70, Sch93, Tri72]. Our goal in this paper is not to model altruistic behavior in animals; so we do not address the issues raised in the social science literature on this topic [HMS98] Most of the work by mathematical biologists or economists on the evolution of altruistic behavior deals with the idealized ....

R. Trivers. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46:35--57, 1972. 18

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TRIVERS, R. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol. 46 (1971), 35--57.

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Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35--57.

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R. Trivers. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol. 46, 35-57. 1971

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R. Trivers. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46: 35--57, 1971.

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Robert Trivers. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46:35-57, 1972.

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