| M. Schut and M. Wooldridge. The control of reasoning in resource-bounded agents. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 16(3), 2001. |
....An agent might abandon a goal or a tactic if the agent perceives that this goal or tactic is not currently achievable or is counter productive, for example. As with any other intentions, the defeasibility of goals in a computational agent requires some structure of intentionreconsideration, e.g. [27]. 7. EXAMPLES In this section, we present two examples from the multiagent negotiation literature and analyse them from the perspective presented above. Our aim is to demonstrate that the strategic criteria adopted by agent designers in these frameworks fall within our proposed sketch. This, we ....
M. Schut and M. Wooldridge. The control of reasoning in resource-bounded agents. Knowledge Engineering Review, 16(3):215--240, 2001.
....An agent might abandon a goal or a tactic if the agent perceives that this goal or tactic is not currently achievable or is counter productive, for example. As with any other intentions, the defeasibility of goals in a computational agent requires some structure of intention reconsideration, e.g. [25]. 7 Examples In this section, we present two examples from the multi agent negotiation literature and analyse them from the perspective of our proposed theory. Our aim is to demonstrate that the strategic criteria adopted by agent designers in these frameworks fall within our proposed sketch. ....
M. Schut and M. Wooldridge. The control of reasoning in resource-bounded agents. Knowledge Engineering Review, 16(3):215--240, 2001.
....with a decisionmaker repeatedly re assessing the costs and benefits of acting now versus undertaking further deliberation. Perhaps because of the difficulties in calibrating the models involved, widespread implementation of these approaches has not occurred in Artificial Intelligence (see Schut and Wooldridge 2000b for a review) As discussed in the Artificial Intelligence community, this issue is related to that of intention reconsideration the question of whether, Group 2 27 Practical Reasoning when and how often to reconsider one s intentions or goals. This has been a concern of philosophers of ....
....of intention reconsideration the question of whether, Group 2 27 Practical Reasoning when and how often to reconsider one s intentions or goals. This has been a concern of philosophers of action and intention (Bratman 1987, 1999) and of the agent design community (Wooldridge and Parsons 1998, Schut and Wooldridge 2000a) especially within the Belief Desires Intention (BDI) paradigm. Within the latter, appropriate operationalization of these ideas is still at an early stage of research development. Interestingly, dialectical argumentation may provide a means to address the problem of limited resources. If one ....
Schut, Martijn C. and Michael J. Wooldridge (2000b). "The control of reasoning in resourcebounded agents." Knowledge Engineering Review (in press).
No context found.
M. Schut and M. Wooldridge. The control of reasoning in resource-bounded agents. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 16(3), 2001.
No context found.
M. Schut and M. Wooldridge. The control of reasoning in resource-bounded agents. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 16(3), 2001.
No context found.
M. Schut and M. Wooldridge. The control of reasoning in resource-bounded agents. Knowledge Engineering Review, 16(3):215--240, 2001.
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