| U. M. Maurer and S. Wolf, Information-theoretic key agreement: from weak to strong secrecy for free, Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2000. |
....of a reduction in the key length. Privacy amplification (PA) is not covered in this paper, since the currently developed protocols can readily be used. It is however relevant to our problem, as the reduction in key length during PA is roughly equal to the number of bits known to an eavesdropper [3, 20], both from tapping the quantum channel and from listening to the public channel. It should thus now appear clearly that the reconciliation information f(XA ) should not give more information than necessary on XA , otherwise resulting in a penalty in the key length. Ideally, only H(XA jXB ) bits ....
U. M. MAURER AND S. WOLF, Information-theoretic key agreement: From weak to strong secrecy for free, in Advances in Cryptology -- Eurocrypt 2000.
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U. M. Maurer and S. Wolf, Information-theoretic key agreement: from weak to strong secrecy for free, Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2000.
No context found.
U. M. Maurer and S. Wolf, Information-theoretic key agreement: from weak to strong secrecy for free, Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2000.
....by a discrete probability distribution PXY Z . The amount of extractable secret correlation of such a distribution was quanti ed by the maximal length of a highly secret key that can be generated by Alice and Bob using public but authenticated two way communication. De nition 1. 6] [7] Let PXY Z be the joint distribution of three discrete random variables X , Y , and Z. The secret key rate S(X ; Y jjZ) is the largest real number R such that for all 0 there exists N 0 2 N such that for all N N 0 there exists a protocol between Alice (knowing N realizations X : X 1 ; ....
....of the distribution PXY Z such as the information theoretic quantities I(X ; Y ) or I(X ; Y jZ) The following lower bound is a consequence of a random coding argument by Csisz ar and K orner [1] and states that an initial advantage can be used for extracting a secret key. Theorem 2. 1] 6] [7] For any distribution PXY Z , we have S(X ; Y jjZ) max fI(X ; Y ) I(X ; Z) I(Y ; X) I(Y ; Z)g : 4) Inequality (4) is not tight: S(X ; Y jjZ) can be positive even when the right hand side of (4) is negative [6] 9] The best upper bound on S(X ; Y jjZ) known so far is the intrinsic ....
U. Maurer and S. Wolf, Information-theoretic key agreement: from weak to strong secrecy for free, Proceedings of EUROCRYPT 2000, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1807, pp. 352-368, Springer-Verlag, 2000.
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U. Maurer and S. Wolf, Information-theoretic key agreement: from weak to strong secrecy for free, Proceedings of EUROCRYPT 2000, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1807, pp. 352-368, Springer-Verlag, 2000.
....Bob can generate a secret key that is equal for Alice and Bob with overwhelming probability and about which Eve has only a negligible amount of (Shannon) information. For a detailed discussion of the general scenario and the secret key rate as well as for various bounds on S(X ; Y jjZ) see [20] [21], 22] Bound (1) implies that if Bob s random variable Y provides more information about Alice s X than Eve s Z does (or vice versa) then this advantage can be exploited for generating a secret key: S(X ; Y jjZ) max fI(X ; Y ) Gamma I(X ; Z) I(Y ; X) Gamma I(Y ; Z)g : 1) This is a ....
....3 (QPA for short) 8] 2] Note that the procedure described in [8] and [2] guarantees that Eve s relative information (relative to the key length) is arbitrarily small, but not that her absolute information is negligible. The analog of this problem in the classical case is discussed in [21]. The precise conditions under which a general state ae AB can be purified are not known. However, the two following conditions are necessary. First, the state must be entangled or, equivalently, not separable. A state ae AB is separable if and only if it can be written as a mixture of product ....
U. Maurer and S. Wolf, Information-theoretic key agreement: from weak to strong secrecy for free, Proceedings of EUROCRYPT 2000, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1807, pp. 352--368, Springer-Verlag, 2000.
No context found.
U. M. MAURER AND S. WOLF, Information-theoretic key agreement: From weak to strong secrecy for free, in Advances in Cryptology -- Eurocrypt 2000.
No context found.
Maurer, U., Wolf, S.: Information-theoretic key agreement: From weak to strong secrecy for free. In: Advances in Cryptology --- EUROCRYPT '00. Volume 1807 of LNCS., Springer-Verlag (2000) 351--368
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