William M. Farmer, Joshua D. Guttman, and Vipin Swarup. Security for mobile agents: Issues and requirements. In Proceedings of the 19th National Information Systems Security Conference, pages 591--597, 1996.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....and the network, which is very useful when employing mobile terminals. Thus, mobile agents potentially can become a widely used new paradigm for distributed computing. However, to make this paradigm acceptable, it is necessary to manage the various security problems arising when it is adopted [1, 2]. Such problems generally fall into two main categories. On one hand, it is necessary to protect hosts from malicious agents coming from the network, on the other hand it is necessary to protect agents from malicious hosts and network intruders. While the first kind of problem has been studied ....

Farmer, W., Guttman, J., Swarup, V.: Security for mobile agents: Issues and requirements. In: Proceedings of the 19th National Information Systems Security Conference, Baltimore, Md. (1996) 591-597

....techniques may not be su#cient anymore. Much research e#ort has been devoted on protecting servers from untrusted and potentially malicious mobile code. On the converse, mobile code must 5 be protected from potentially malicious servers that might try to modify it or other sensible private data [Yee99, FGS96, ST98]. Locality The distribution of resources (at low level) should be as transparent as possible to the end user, who, however, should be aware of the fact that an interaction with a procedure service on a remote computer requires much more time than an operation on the local computer. Additionally, ....

W. M. Farmer, J. D. Guttman, and V. Swarup. Security for Mobile Agents: Issues and Requirements. In Proc. 19th NIST-NCSC National Information Systems Security Conference, pages 591--597, 1996.

....being used. The dynamic loading of the LC is similar to the popular Java Applet model of mobile code. The motivation for limiting our design to this basic model is to avoid introducing the additional system complexity and security liabilities characteristic of more general mobile code mechanisms [7,24]. 3.2 Handling Requests Associated with each Customizer is a set of Web sites called its Domain of Applicability (DA) A Customizer will only operate on requests to (and responses from) sites in its DA. When the LC Server receives an HTTP request from the browser, it can determine if a ....

W. M. Farmer, J. D. Guttman, and V. Swarup, "Security for mobile agents: Issues and requirements," Proceedings o f 19th National Information Systems Security Conference, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Baltimore, MD, USA, October 1996.

....from the industrial and research community. There are several reasons to this, either due to complications and weaknesses of the mobile agent approach, or due to the existence of well (or at least more) established alternatives. The challenging diculties of mobile agents systems As mentioned in [27], security is a crucial issue when using mobile agents systems. In more traditional distributed computing approaches, security is more or less guaranteed nowadays. But when switching to the mobile agent paradigm, the entire architecture of distributed systems is changed. Thus security turns out to ....

W.M. Farmer, J.D. Guttmann, and V. Swarup. Security for Mobile Agents: Issues and Requirements. In Proceedings of NISSC'96, 1996.

....paradigm. The ability to relocate the components of an application supports service customization, optimized access to distributed resources, and deployment in a mobile networking environment [25] On the other hand, the ability to move and execute code fragments has serious security implications [8, 5, 15]. In particular, the recent worm attacks [4, 6] showed that malicious mobile software is tolerant to eradication and allows one to perform distributed denial of service attacks. The security issues introduced by mobile agents have been addressed by extending the authentication and access control ....

W.M. Farmer, J.D. Guttman, and V. Swarup. Security for Mobile Agents: Issues and Requirements. In Proc. of the 19 National Information Systems Security Conf., pages 591-597, Baltimore, MD, USA, October 1996.

....infrastructure such as SINS is central to the successful deployment and transfer of distributed agent technology to Industry because security is a necessary prerequisite for distributed computing. 2. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF MOBILE AGENTS The following requirements of secure mobile agents (see [5]) are addressed by SINS: ffl The author and initiator of an agent must be authenticated. ffl The integrity of an agent s code must be checked. ffl Interpreters must ensure that agent privacy is maintained during data exchange. ffl Interpreters must protect themselves against malicious ....

W. M. Farmer et al. Security for mobile agents: Issues and requirements. In Proc. National Information Systems Security Conference, October 1996.

....such techniques may not be sucient anymore. Much research e ort has been devoted on protecting servers from untrusted and potentially malicious mobile code. On the converse, mobile code must be protected from potentially malicious servers that might try to modify it or other sensible private data [15, 16, 17]. A collection of papers about security in Internet programming can be found in [11] Locality: the distribution of resources (at low level) should be as transparent as possible to the end user, who, however, should be aware of the fact that an interaction with a procedure service on a remote ....

.... the focus of our work, we just want to point out that both Aglets and RMI rely on Java security architecture for supplying customizable security mechanisms (e.g. security managers and access policies) To study in depth security aspects of mobile agents, we refer the interested reader to, e.g. [14, 16, 15, 17]. Persistence of mobile agents is also a key concept: when a server shuts down, the agent (its state and code) must be saved on the server s disk in order to be restarted when server reboots. For this reason, in our ight booking Aglets based implementation, we catch the dispose event generated ....

W. M. Farmer, J. D. Guttman, and V. Swarup. Security for Mobile Agents: Issues and Requirements. In Proc. 19th NIST-NCSC National Information Systems Security Conference, pages 591-597, 1996.

....we can easily identify a person to whom that action can be attributed, and it is safe to assume that that person intends the action to be taken. This assumption fails when applied to mobile agents, because a migrating agent can become malicious by virtue of its state getting corrupted [4]. We cannot assume that an agent properly represents the intentions of its owner, because subsequent to its first hop an agent s state is a function of its own program and state, and the state and program of the hosts that it visited. Let us assume, for a moment, that the identity ....

William M. Farmer, Joshua D. Guttman, and Vipin Swarup. Security for mobile agents: Issues and requirements. In Proceedings of the National Information Systems Security Conference (NISSC 96), pages 591--597, October 1996.

....of the key problems include: security, user and provider psychological resistance, infrastructure integration, interoperability and reliability. 1.1 Key Problems Security. If one wants to deploy mobile agents into the world wide web, security is a critical issue that must be carefully considered [2,3]. There are many points to examine when it comes to mobile agent security. Because the agents are going to arrive at a host that probably knows nothing about them, there must be mechanisms that prevent the agents from damaging the host or access information that they do not have permissions to. ....

W. Farmer, J. Guttman, and V. Swarup, "Security for Mobile Agents: Issues and Requirements," in Proc. National Information Systems Security Conference, 1996.

....agent. A cryptographic hash value of the kernel s signature may serve as a unique anchor to which protocol data can be bound by means of a digital signature. Agent developers must still be aware of the fact that a migrating agent can become malicious by virtue of its state getting corrupted [10]. We cannot assume that a mobile agent properly represents the intentions of its owner, because subsequent to its first hop an agent s state is a function of its own program and state, and the state and program of the hosts that it visited. Hence, any attempt to protect a free roaming agent ....

W. M. Farmer, J. D. Guttman, and V. Swarup, "Security for mobile agents: Issues and requirements," in Proceedings of the National Information Systems Security Conference (NISSC 96), pp. 591--597, October 1996.

....by unauthorized parties. Protecting hosts from attacks of malicious agents. Protecting agents from attacks of other agents. Protecting agents from attacks of malicious hosts. 2 For the first three items, ideas from the distributed computing and operating systems research can be used [3] [4] The problems that exist in security for mobile agents are basically the same that exists on these areas. Securing agents against attacks from malicious hosts is a new and difficult problem that is specific to mobile agent systems [3] At this moment, there is no general solution on the ....

....computing and operating systems research can be used [3] 4] The problems that exist in security for mobile agents are basically the same that exists on these areas. Securing agents against attacks from malicious hosts is a new and difficult problem that is specific to mobile agent systems [3]. At this moment, there is no general solution on the issue of protecting mobile agents from attacks of malicious hosts. At first sight this can be seen as a major limitation on the usefulness of these agents for e commerce. Agents can be the subject of attacks by hosts which can make them take ....

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W. Farmer, J. Guttman, and V. Swarup, "Security for Mobile Agents: Issues and Requirements," presented at National Information Systems Security Conference, 1996.

....in our approach is subject to further research. 5.2.1 Protecting an agent A mobile agent may be preyed upon while it is in transit, or while running on a malicious host. It is impossible to protect an agent against modifications during its transfer or execution in an untrusted environment [4]. At best, it can checked whether an agent has been maliciously modified and take appropriate measures after the fact. Our approach to migration can help here. It is important to realize that, in principle, an agent s blueprint does not change during its lifetime. Consequently, by adding an ....

W.M. Farmer, J.D. Guttman, and V. Swarup. Security for mobile agents: Issues and requirements. In Proceedings of the 19th National Information Systems Security Conference, pages 591--597, Baltimore, MD, October 1996.

....more attention because it seems to exhibit advantages over the traditional client server paradigm in several applications. However, to make mobile agents become a widely used new paradigm for distributed computing, it is necessary to manage the various security problems arising when it is adopted [6, 3]. Such problems generally fall into two main categories. On one hand, it is necessary to protect hosts from malicious agents coming from the network, on the other hand it is necessary to protect agents from malicious hosts and network intruders. While the first kind of problem has been studied ....

W. Farmer, J. Guttman, and V. Swarup. Security for mobile agents: Issues and requirements. In Proceedings of the 19th National Information Systems Security Conference, pages 591--597, Baltimore, Md., October 1996.

....allows exible structuring of distributed computation over wide scale networks such as the Internet [11] One of the main concerns currently impeding the wider acceptance and use of mobile agents, particularly in application areas such as e commerce [6] is the issue of security. Farmer et. al [4] provides an early discussion of the security problems and requirements unique to mobile agents, as well as the types of security goals that are achievable. A more recent overview of mobile agent security issues, along with a comparative discussion of the current techniques available to address ....

W. Farmer, J. Guttman, and V. Swarup. Security for mobile agents: Issues and requirements. In Computer Communications, Special Issue on Advances in Research and Application of Network Security, October 1996.

....between hosts. Here also the secure transfer of code modules has to be provided. Moreover, since host and application owners not necessarily trust each other, host environments need protection against malicious code and vice versa the applications may be attacked by malfunctions of hosts (cf. [10, 18]) Distributed component structured applications can consist of software components which are supplied by different vendors. Therefore one has to distinguish between application owners and software component vendors and there is a needs for corresponding protection: Protection of an ....

W. Farmer, J. Guttman, and V. Swarup. Security for Mobile Agents: Issues and Requirements. In Proc. 19th National Information Systems Security Conference (NISSC 96), pages 591--597, 1996.

....[1 5] are implemented in a scripting language such as Java [14] Tcl Tk [15] or Telescript[16] In contrast, agent systems specializing on large general purpose applications, which are traditionally targeted by parallel and distributed systems, have different requirements. First of all, security [17] is not such an important issue here: the agents are cooperative with each other, as they work together on solving one problem. The application runs on a set of trusted nodes, which treat agents as user programs. On the other hand, the computational speed of the system becomes critical. There are ....

Farmer, W. M., Guttman, J.D., and Swarup, V. 1996. Security for Mobile Agents: Issues and Requirements. Proceedings of the National Information Systems Security Conference, 591-597.

....carried out largely on local, stand alone machines. 2 First, when programs are executed in a remote environment, assurance must be provided that the execution environment will be protected from any malicious behavior of the incoming program. This is commonly known as the malicious code problem [32] [56] A related problem is the protection of code from malicious execution environments. Since the environment is responsible for the program s execution, there appears to be precious little the program can do to protect itself from disclosure, tampering and incorrect execution. Protecting code ....

....for the program s execution, there appears to be precious little the program can do to protect itself from disclosure, tampering and incorrect execution. Protecting code from untrustworthy environments is by far the more difficult security problem. It is known as the malicious host problem [16][32]. Much research has been devoted to the malicious code problem, including proof carrying code [65] policy directed code safety [31] artificial playgrounds for mobile agents [81] and many others [10] 26] 36] The malicious host problem has not been investigated with nearly the same rigor and ....

W. Farmer, J. D. Guttman, and V. Swarup. "Security for Mobile Agents: Issues and Requirements". In Proceedings of the 19 th National Information System Security Conference, pp591-597.Baltimore, Maryland.

....for security functionality. Any actual application requires only a subset of these requirements, and identifying the relevant subsets is a difficult problem of its own. It is also important to keep in mind that some requirements may conflict, and not everything is technically feasible (cf. [32]) This chapter is organized as follows. First, Section 3.1 presents a list of security services identified in the OSI and CORBA security frameworks. These lists are used to organize the discussion in the following sections and to identify the kind of functionality which is not covered by the ....

William M. Farmer, Joshua D. Guttman, and Vipin Swarup. Security for mobile agents: Issues and requirements. In Proceedings of the 19th National Information Systems Security Conference (NISSC 96), pages 591--597, 1996.

....for controlling mobile code and executable content (e.g. Java applets) that are applicable to mobile agent security. We review these countermeasures by considering those techniques that can be used to protect agent platforms, separately from those used to protect the agents that run on them. In [7], Farmer et al. provide an alternate perspective by categorizing, from easy to impossible, commonly sought security objectives and associated conventional techniques that can be applied. Protecting an Agent Platform Without adequate defenses, an agent platform is vulnerable to attack from many ....

William Farmer, Joshua Guttman, and Vipin Swarup, "Security for Mobile Agents: Issues and Requirements," Proceedings of the 19th National Information Systems Security Conference, Baltimore, MD, pp. 591-597, October 1996 <URL: http://csrc.nist.gov/nissc/1996/papers/NISSC96/paper033/>

....that they should be resistant to attempts of rendering it unusable by flooding or overloading, and provide some kind of authentication and confidentiality mechanism. The topics of secure communications, secure distributed computation and security in autonomous agents have been already studied [6, 12], and possibly some previous work can be used in AAFID implementations. 2.4. Other ideas and possible components In the course of designing our system architecture, we explored some alternate architectural components. We briefly discuss two such components. These components are not currently ....

W. M. Farmer, J. D. Guttman, and V. Swarup. Security for mobile agents: Issues and requirements. In Proceedings of the 19th National Information Systems Security Conference, volume 2, pages 591--597. National Institute of Standards and Technology, October 1996.

No context found.

William M. Farmer, Joshua D. Guttman, and Vipin Swarup. Security for mobile agents: Issues and requirements. In Proceedings of the 19th National Information Systems Security Conference, pages 591--597, 1996.

No context found.

W.M. Farmer, J.D. Guttman, and V. Swarup. Security for mobile agents: Issues and requirements. In Proceedings of the 19th National Information Systems Security Conference, pages 591--597, Baltimore, Md., October 1996.

No context found.

Farmer W., Guttman J., and Swarup V., "Security for mobile agents: Issues and requirements", Proceedings of the 19th National Information Systems Security Conference, pp. 591-597, October 1996.

No context found.

W. Farmer, J. Guttman, and V. Swarup, "Security for Mobile Agents: Issues and Requirements," in Proceedings of the 19th National Information Systems Security Conference, pp. 591-597, Baltimore, USA, October 1996

No context found.

W. Farmer, J. Guttman, and V. Swarup, "Security for Mobile Agents: Issues and Requirements," Proc. 19th Nat'l Information Sys. Security Conf., National Inst. of Standards and Technology, Baltimore, Oct. 1996, pp. 591-597.

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