B. Briscoe. MARKS: Zero side-effect multicast key management using arbitrarily revealed key sequences. In Proceedings of 1st International Workshop on Networked Group Communication, 1999.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....because its costs increase linearly with the group size. For large groups with very frequent membership changes, scalable group rekeying becomes an especially challenging issue. In recent years, many approaches for scalable group rekeying have been proposed, e.g. LKH [13, 14] OFT [1, 4] MARKS[2], ELK [9] Subset Difference [8] and self healing [11] Further, it has been proposed that groups be re keyed periodically instead of on every membership change [10, 15] Periodic or batched rekeying can reduce both the processing and communication overhead at the key server, and improve the ....

B. Briscoe. MARKS: Zero Side Effect Multicast Key Management Using Arbitrarily Revealed Key Sequences. In Proc. of First International Workshop on Networked Group Communication, NGC 1999.

....was independently proposed by Wallner et al. [33] and Wong et al. [34] Mittra [22] proposed Iolus, a distributed framework for addressing the same problem. Periodic (batched) group rekeying was proposed and evaluated in [6, 27, 19, 37] There have been several other works on group re keying [4, 15, 1, 12, 7, 25, 3] that have focussed on scalable algorithms and approaches that reduce the number of encryptions at the key server and or the number of keys that need to be securely transmitted to the group during a rekey. In contrast, the focus of this paper has been on the reliable key delivery problem. As ....

R. Briscoe. MARKS: Zero side-effect multicast key management using arbitrarily revealed key sequences. Proc. of First Intl. Wkshp. on Networked Group Comm., Nov. 1999.

....support beyond best effort forwarding. Since our scheme is completely end host based, it can be used to implement group security over IP multicast enabled untrusted, insecure networks. A. Group Keys and Re keying Groups Many secure group communication systems [12] 2] 25] 9] 1] 7] [4], 15] 16] including ours, rely on the notion of a group key a secret known only to the members of the secure communication group . Once a group key is distributed to all current members of the multicast group, secure messages can be sent encrypted with the group key. The overall ....

....a collusion problem, where departed group members can collude to obtain future group keys. Both these schemes reduce the overhead for the group re keying operation for single membership change to O(logN ) If more information is known about group dynamics, then it is possible to do better. MARKS [4] is a scheme that assumes that the duration over which a member stays attached to the group is known at the time the member joins. Using this information a constant overhead solution is presented in [4] In this paper, we present a constant processing, message, and stor age overhead solution for ....

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B. Briscoe. MARKS : Zero side effect multicast key management using arbitrarily revealed key sequences. In 1st International Workshop on Networked Group Communication, Pisa, Italy, November 1999.

....next rekeying interval. Each user however does not have to receive the entire rekey message because it needs only those new keys that are located on the path from the user s u node to the root node (a very small subset of all new keys) To our knowledge, there are three approaches, namely, MARKS [5], TLK [13] and Subset Difference [11] that do not require reliable delivery of a rekey message. However, each of them has its limitations. In particular, MARKS approach assumes the lifetime of each user to be pre determined before it joins the system. TLK approach introduces hint information ....

Bob Briscoe. Marks: Zero side effect multicast key management using arbitrarily revealed key sequences. In Proceedings of NGC 1999.

....of key updates, however. Their approach to scalability uses a hierarchy of key servers (similar to Iolus) that aggregate join and leave events. Within one subgroup the Kronos protocol would minimize the communication overhead by using our ELK protocol. Briscoe designed the MARKS protocol [4]. MARKS is scalable and does not require any key update messages, but the protocol only works if the leaving time of the member is fixed when the member joins the group and so members cannot be expelled. Trappe et al. 32] also observed that key updates should be distributed with the data. In ....

Bob Briscoe. MARKS: Zero side-effect multicast key management using arbitrarily revealed key sequences. In First International Workshop on Networked Group Communication, November 1999.

....over base IP multicast and does not require router support beyond best effort forwarding. Since our scheme is completely end host based, it can be used to implement group security over IP multicast enabled untrusted, insecure networks. Many secure group communication systems [10] 1] 17] 7] [4], 13] including ours, rely on the notion of a group key a secret known only to the members of the secure communication group. Once a group key is distributed to all current members of the multicast group, secure messages can be sent encrypted with the group key. The overall security of the ....

....boolean minimization techniques is described that is efficient for bulk membership changes. Both these schemes reduce the overhead for the group re keying operation for single membership change to O(logN ) If more information is known about group dynamics, then it is possible to do better. MARKS [4] is a scheme that assumes that the duration over which a member stays attached to the group is known at the time the member joins. Using this information a constant overhead solution is presented in [4] In this paper, we present an (amortized) constant processing, message, and storage overhead ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

B. Briscoe. MARKS : Zero side effect multicast key management using arbitrarily revealed key sequences. In 1st International Workshop on Networked Group Communication, Pisa, Italy, November 1999., Pisa, Italy, November 1999.

....and does not require router support beyond best effort forwarding. Since our scheme is completely end host based, it can be used to implement group security over IP multicast enabled untrusted, insecure networks. 1. 1 Group Keys and Re keying Groups Many secure group communication systems [9, 1, 16, 6, 3, 12], including ours, rely on the notion of a group key a secret known only to the members of the secure communication group 1 . Once a group key is distributed to all current members of the multicast group, secure messages can be sent encrypted with the group key. The overall security of the ....

....boolean minimization techniques is described that is efficient for bulk membership changes. Both these schemes reduce the overhead for the group re keying operation for single membership change to O(log N) If more information is known about group dynamics, then it is possible to do better. MARKS [3] is a scheme that assumes that the duration over which a member stays attached to the group is known at the time the member joins. Using this information a constant overhead solution is presented in [3] In this paper, we present a constant processing, message, and storage overhead solution for ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

B. Briscoe. MARKS : Zero side effect multicast key management using arbitrarily revealed key sequences. In 1st International Workshop on Networked Group Communication, Pisa, Italy, November 1999., Pisa, Italy, November 1999.

....authors show that their scheme uses O(log N) messages to redistribute the new keys. Further, the incremental cost of re keying decreases as the membership changes increase. Compared to [6] members in our scheme only maintain an amortized constant number of keys, instead of O(log N ) In MARKS [3], a low overhead key distribution scheme has been proposed where a key manager reveals a key sequence to each member, at the time it joins. However, the protocol assumes an accurate knowledge of the duration over which a member stays joined to the secure group at the time the member joins (and a ....

B. Briscoe. Marks : Zero side effect multicast key management using arbitrarily revealed key sequences. In 1st International Workshop on Networked Group Communication, Pisa, Italy, November 1999., Pisa, Italy, November 1999.

.... main proposals for secure multicast in large dynamic groups in 3 categories: 1) The IOLUS approach: Mittra 1997] 2) The KEYGRAPH approach: Wong et al. 1998] Wallner et al. 1998] Canetti et al. 1999] Caronni et al. 1998] McGrew and Sherman 1998] Chang et al. 1999] 3) The MARKS approach: [Briscoe 1999]. In IOLUS, the recipients are partitioned in subgroups attached to a local server. The set of servers is organized in a tree. The source sends data to the root of the tree and the data is decrypted and re encrypted each time it goes through a server in the hierarchy until it finally reaches a ....

Briscoe, B. 1999. MARKS: Zero side-effect multicast key management using arbitrarily revealed key sequences. In First International Workshop on Networked Group Communication (Nov. 1999).

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B. Briscoe. MARKS: Zero side-effect multicast key management using arbitrarily revealed key sequences. In Proceedings of 1st International Workshop on Networked Group Communication, 1999.

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B. Briscoe. MARKS: Zero side-effect multicast key management using arbitrarily revealed key sequences. In Proceedings of 1st International Workshop on Networked Group Communication, 1999.

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Bob Briscoe. Marks: Zero side effect multicast key management using arbitrarily revealed key sequences. In Proceedings of NGC 1999.

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