S. Smith. Secure Coprocessing Applications and Research Issues. Technical Report Los Alamos Unclassified Release LA-UR-96-2805, Los Alamos National Laboratory, August 1996. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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SHEMP: Secure Hardware Enhanced MyProxy - John Marchesini Bindview (2005) Self-citation (Smith) (Correct)
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S. Smith. Secure Coprocessing Applications and Research Issues. Technical Report Los Alamos Unclassified Release LA-UR-96-2805, Los Alamos National Laboratory, August 1996.
Outbound Authentication for Programmable Secure Coprocessors - Smith (2001) Self-citation (Smith) (Correct)
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S. W. Smith. Secure Coprocessing Applications and Research Issues. Los Alamos Unclassified Release LA-UR-96-2805, Los Alamos National Laboratory. August 1996.
Practical Private Information Retrieval with Secure Coprocessors - Smith, Safford (2000) (8 citations) Self-citation (Smith) (Correct)
....instruction fetches from leaking execution details but explicitly dismissed secure coprocessors as infeasible. Secure File Systems Previous work in secure file systems (e.g. 1] and cryptopaging (e.g. 10] protects database privacy against theft, but not against a malicious root. Indeed, [8] inquired about how adversaries might learn internal operational details from observing cryptopaging details. Anonymizers Previous work in anonymizers (e.g. 7] protects the privacy of who is taking some action. Rootsecurity addresses the complementary problem of protecting what the action ....
S. W. Smith. Secure Coprocessing Applications and Research Issues. Los Alamos Unclassified Release LA-UR96 -2805, Los Alamos National Laboratory. August 1996.
Using a High-Performance, Programmable Secure Coprocessor - Smith, Palmer, Weingart (1998) (2 citations) Self-citation (Smith) (Correct)
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S. W. Smith. Secure Coprocessing Applications and Research Issues. Los Alamos Unclassi#ed Release LA-UR-96-2805, Los Alamos National Laboratory. August 1996. 16
Validating a High-Performance, Programmable Secure.. - Smith, Perez, Weingart.. (1999) Self-citation (Smith) (Correct)
....these keys; and these adver saries may include the end user of the application. The potential of both buildinghigh performance programmable secure coprocessors, as well as using such platforms to build secure applications, have been long standing areas of research, both at our laboratory (e.g. [1, 2, 10, 14, 15, 21, 22]) and elsewhere (e.g. 9, 17, 18, 19, 20] In order for secure coprocessing technology to enable real solutions in the real world, we felt that a flexible, generic platform must exist as a mass produced product, not just a hand built laboratory prototype. This platform must provide: # physical ....
....As we have noted, secure coprocessors are finally migrating from research prototypes to commercial products. Besides our programmable device, recent examples include the new generation of postal meters [15, 16, 22] and various proposed rights management tokens. We suspect many more will emerge. [10] Work in this area has long cited the FIPS 140 standard as a specification of tamper resistance since nothing else exists. However, FIPS 140 1 was clearly aimed at only those tamper resistant modules whose purpose was to perform some suite of cryptographic services. But in order to apply to ....
S. W. Smith. Secure Coprocessing Applications and Research Issues. Los Alamos Unclassified Release LAUR -96-2805, Los Alamos National Laboratory. August 1996.
Application Support Architecture for a.. - Dyer, Perez, Smith.. (1999) (3 citations) Self-citation (Smith) (Correct)
....of physical and logical attacks. Such devices can be trusted to carry out their operations despite a hostile environment (which may even include the host computer) with the right application software, such devices can solve security problems that otherwise would be difficult or impossible (see [7, 16, 17] for some examples) Previous reports on this work have focused exclusively on security: security architectecture problems [9] and solutions [11] physical security [15] FIPS 140 1 Level 4 validation [10] In contrast, this paper focuses on the system itself. It is easy to speculate about the ....
S. W. Smith. Secure Coprocessing Applications and Research Issues. Los Alamos Unclassified Release LAUR -96-2805, Los Alamos National Laboratory. August 1996.
On Atypical Database Transactions: Identification of Probable.. - Kokkinaki (Correct)
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Smith, S., "Secure Coprocessing Applications and Research Issues", Los Alamos Unclassified Release LA-UR-9692805, 1996.
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