L. van der Torre and Y. Tan. Contrary-to-duty reasoning with preference-based dyadic obligations. Annals of Mathematics and AI, 27:49--78, 1999.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....shared plans [8, 13, 18] conventions and social responsibility [10, 11] social commitment [2] social laws [16] spheres of commitment [17] reasoning with obligations [1] etcetera. In this paper we present a new approach to social reasoning which integrates prior work on norms and obligations [3, 5, 20] with the now standard BDI approach to agent architectures [14] In the BDI approach, the behaviour of an individual agent is shaped by the agent s state of knowledge about the environment (beliefs) the states of the world it seeks to bring about (goals) and the execution of pre programmed ....

....of conflicts mentioned above can be identified and resolved. In this paper we do not offer a complete solution, but propose an approach based around different orderings. Formally, we represent obligations and norms using a preference based dyadic deontic logic, Prohairetic Deontic Logic (PDL)[20]. The standard Kripke models of PDL include a binary accessibility relation that is interpreted as a preference ordering over possible worlds. We allow multiple such preference orderings, to support different types of obligations and norms and admitting conflicting norms and obligations. For ....

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L. van der Torre and Y.-H. Tan. Contrary-To-Duty Reasoning with Preference-based Dyadic Obligations. In Annals of Mathematics and AI, submitted. 8

....a top element. The best we can do in this case is to determine the situations in which as many desires as possible are fulfilled and give a (partial) ordering on these situations. Norms and obligations The formal semantics of obligations (and norms) is based on Prohairetic Deontic Logic (PDL) [17]. PDL is a logic of dyadic obligation defined axiomatically in terms of a monadic modal preference logic. Only dyadic obligation is defined, i.e. all obligations are conditional, O(pjq) however unconditional obligation can be represented using a tautology for the condition, O(p) O(pjq :q) PDL ....

....constraint between the desires and the preference ordering. The definition of the preference orderings of norms and obligation already implies a similar constraint, namely, that worlds in which more norms and or obligations are fulfilled are preferred. As discussed in [7] we can now follow [17] for describing a preference semantics of the conditional norms and obligations. Refer to [17] for an extensive explanation of the choice of operators, which might not always be obvious, and to [7] for discussion in the current context. Goals, beliefs and intentions The formalisation of the other ....

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L. van der Torre and Y.-H. Tan. Contrary-To-Duty Reasoning with Preference-based Dyadic Obligations. In Annals of Mathematics and AI, submitted.

.... some decision models are based on goal based planning or on variants of decision theory like qualitative decision theory [15, 3] other models are based on cognitive models like belief desire intention models [7, 16] and yet other models are based on social concepts like obligations and norms [10, 23, 22], as in deontic action programs [12] Typically, the decision model is based on an attempt to reach goals, satisfy desires, ful ll obligations etc. Here we consider decision models for an agent that is overloaded with input, and typically lives in a complex and noisy environment. His main problem ....

van der Torre and Tan. Contrary-to-duty reasoning with preference-based dyadic obligations. Annals of Mathematics and Articial Intelligence, 27:49-78, 1999.

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L. van der Torre and Y. Tan. Contrary-to-duty reasoning with preference-based dyadic obligations. Annals of Mathematics and AI, 27:49--78, 1999.

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L. van der Torre and Y. Tan, `Contrary-to-duty reasoning with preference-based dyadic obligations', Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 27, 49--78, (1999).

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L. van der Torre and Y. Tan. Contrary-to-duty reasoning with preferencebased dyadic obligations. Annals of Mathematics and Arti cial Intelligence, 27:49-78, 1999.

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L. van der Torre and Y. Tan. Contrary-to-duty reasoning with preferencebased dyadic obligations. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 27:49--78, 1999.

....conditional obligations by either p q or (p q) has been criticized, because both representations cannot satisfactorily formalize contrary to duty reasoning. For example, the following formalization of Forrester s paradox [25] in SDL is inconsistent, whereas intuitively it is consistent (see [68,73] for a detailed discussion) Smith should not murder Jones :k, if he murders him, then he should do it gently k g, Smith murders Jones k and gentle murder implies murder g k. Hansson [27] proposed a simple, but popular dyadic deontic logic which he called Dyadic ....

....28 L. van der Torre Contextual Deontic Logic formalized in De nition 6 is very strong, in the sense that many independence relations are derived from the explicit representation. Example 9. Let N = f p; qg. Due to the theorem ( characteristic of the preference based approach [68], N [ DI(N) not only derives : p q) p and : p q) q, but also the contradictory : p q) p :q) and : p q) p q) Thus, in CDL extended with De nition 6 these two obligations of N can only be represented in a consistent way by N 0 = f (p q)g. The example also illustrates that if we ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

L. van der Torre and Y. Tan. Contrary-to-duty reasoning with preference-based dyadic obligations. Annals of Mathematics and Articial Intelligence, 27:49-78, 1999.

.... some decision models are based on goal based planning or on variants of decision theory like qualitative decision theory [13, 1] other models are based on cognitive models like belief desire intention models [5, 14] and yet other models are based on social concepts like obligations and norms [6, 20, 19], as in deontic action programs [8] Typically, the decision model is based on an attempt to reach goals, satisfy desires, or ful ll obligations. In the Belief Obligation IntentionDesire or BOID architecture [4] decision models are considered in which the main problem is not nding out how to ....

L. van der Torre and Y. Tan. Contrary-to-duty reasoning with preference-based dyadic obligations. Annals of Mathematics and Articial Intelligence, 27:49-78, 1999.

....two desires, one being more strictly more specific than the other one, conflict in their conclusion part, specificity solves immediately the problem by giving the priority to the more specific desire when both are applicable. A similar explanation can be given for contrary to duty obligations (van der Torre and Tan 2000)) Layout of the paper The paper is organized as follows. First we discuss respectively the the first class of conflicts (those based on utopian worlds) and the second one (those based on normality and update) Finally we discuss related research about conflicts. Utopian conflicts Informally, a ....

L. van der Torre and Y. Tan. Contrary-To-Duty Reasoning with Preference-based Dyadic Obligations. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 2000.

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L. van der Torre and Y. Tan. Contrary-to-duty reasoning with preference based dyadic obligations. Annals of Mathematics and Arti cial Intelligence, 27:49-78, 1999.

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L. van der Torre and Y.-H. Tan. Contrary-To-Duty Reasoning with Preference-based Dyadic Obligations. Submitted to Annals of Mathematics and AI.

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van der Torre, L. and Tan, Y. (2000). Contraryto -duty reasoning with preference-based dyadic obligations. Annals of Mathematics and Arti cial Intelligence.

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