| P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A provably secure operating system: The system, its applications, and proofs. Technical Report CSL-116, Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International, 1980. |
....technique. In fact, it is doubtful whether that model really provides a sound basis for the verification of any sort of security kernel but then it was not formulated for that purpose. Feiertag s model was intended to provide a basis for verifying the Secure Object Manager (SOM) of PSOS [22] for which purpose it is eminently suitable. The model formulates a specification of multilevel security for a system which consumes inputs that are tagged with their security classifications and produces similarly tagged outputs. Ordinary programs, such as the SOM or a file server, are sound ....
P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A provably secure operating system: The system, its applications, and proofs. Technical report, SRI International, May 1980. Second Edition, Report CSL116.
....there is no provision in the Rushby formulation for the actions of the step function to revise the security assertions as access rights are legitimately propagated or mandatory constraints are revised. Neumann et al. constructed extensive proof synthesis mechanisms in connection with PSOS [12]. While a proof sketch of the security properties of this system was included in the report, no proof of correctness for con nement in the PSOS system has been published. The proof sketched in the report fails to demonstrate that the operational semantics of the system architecture actually satis ....
P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A Provably Secure Operating System: The System, Its Applications, and Proofs. Technical Report Report CSL116, Computer Science Laboratory, may 1980.
....policy, implement the kernel, and prove the implementation correct. Some projects were intended to complete only an initial portion of this sequence of goals. The goals were met with varying degrees of success. Many security kernel projects are reported in the literature: PSOS [Feiertag 79, Neumann 77] KSOS [McCauley 79, Berson 79] UCLA Secure Unix project [Popek 79, Walker 80] KVM 370 [Gold 79] and SCOMP [Fraim 83] The Secure Ada Target (SAT, now called LOCK) Boebert 85] is an ongoing project at Honeywell. Landwehr [Landwehr 83] gives a useful summary of the state of the art circa 1983. ....
P.G. Neumann, R.S. Boyer, R.J. Feiertag, K.N. Levitt, L. Robinson. A Provably Secure Operating System: The System, Its Applications, and Proofs. Technical Report, SRI, February, 1977. 28
....This section discusses general issues for capabilities in Java, rather than specifics of the Electric Communities or JavaSoft systems. Dating back to the 1960 s, hardware and software based capability systems have often been seen as a good way to structure a secure operating system [Hardy 1985; Neumann et al. 1980; Tanenbaum et al. 1986] Fundamentally, a capability is an unforgeable pointer to a controlled system resource. To use a capability, a program must have been first explicitly given that capability, either as part of its initialization or as the result of calling another capability. Once a ....
NEUMANN, P. G., BOYER, R. S., FEIERTAG, R. J., LEVITT, K. N., AND ROBINSON, L. 1980. A provably secure operating system: The system, its applications, and proofs. Tech. Rep. CSL-116, 2nd Ed., SRI International.
....problem [6] They would learn how security policies and their mathematical formulations, e.g. 2, 8] provide a blueprint for constructing a system intended to provide policy enforcement. Students could start by seeing how systems with assured security properties were built in the past, e.g. [9] and [11] Tracing the application and extension of basic security principles through the evolving technology to the hottest developments emerging from industry, the educational program would prepare students to understand how these concepts might be applied in the future. Needless to say hefty ....
P. Neumann, R.S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A Provably Secure Operating System: The System, Its Applications and Proofs. Technical Report CSL-116, SRI International, Menlo Park, CA, May 1980.
....section discusses general issues for implementing capabilities in Java, rather than specifics of the Electric Communities or JavaSoft implementations. Dating back to the 1960 s, hardware and softwarebased capability systems have often been seen as a good way to structure a secure operating system [17, 30, 39]. Fundamentally, a capability is an unforgeable pointer to a controlled system resource. To use a capability, a program must have been first explicitly given that capability, either as part of its initialization or as the result of calling another capability. Once a capability has been given to a ....
NEUMANN, P. G., BOYER, R. S., FEIERTAG, R. J., LEVITT, K. N., AND ROBINSON, L. A provably secure operating system: The system, its applications, and proofs. Tech. Rep. CSL-116, 2nd Ed., SRI International, May 1980.
No context found.
P.G. Neumann, R.S. Boyer, R.J. Feiertag, K.N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A Provably Secure Operating System: The system, its applications, and proofs. Technical report, Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International, Menlo Park, California, May 1980. 2nd ed., Report CSL-116.
No context found.
P.G. Neumann, R.S. Boyer, R.J. Feiertag, K.N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A Provably Secure Operating System: The system, its applications, and proofs. Technical report, Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International, Menlo Park, California, May 1980. 2nd edition, Report CSL-116.
No context found.
P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A provably secure operating system: The system, its applications, and proofs. Technical Report CSL-116, Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International, 1980.
No context found.
P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A provably secure operating system: The system, its applications, and proofs. Technical Report CSL-116, SRI International, 1980.
No context found.
P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A provably secure operating system: The system, its applications, and proofs. Technical Report CSL-116, SRI International, 1980.
No context found.
P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A provably secure operating system: The system, its applications, and proofs. Technical Report CSL-116, SRI International, 1980.
No context found.
P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A provably secure operating system: The system, its applications, and proofs. Technical Report CSL-116, SRI International, 1980.
No context found.
P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A provably secure operating system: The system, its applications, and proofs. Technical Report CSL-116, SRI International, 1980.
No context found.
Peter G. Neumann, Robert S. Boyer, Richard J. Feiertag, Karl N. Levitt, and Lawrence Robinson. A provably secure operating system: The system, its applications, and proofs. Technical Report CSL-116, 2nd Ed., SRI International, May 1980.
No context found.
P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, L. Robinson. A Provably Secure Operating System: The System, Its Applications, and Proofs, CSL-116, Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International, Inc., May 1980.
No context found.
P.G. Neumann, R.S. Boyer, R.J. Feiertag, K.N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A Provably Secure Operating System: The system, its applications, and proofs. Technical report, Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International, Menlo Park, California, May 1980. 2nd edition, Report CSL-116.
No context found.
P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A Provably Secure Operating System: The System, Its Applications, and Proofs. Computer Science Laboratory Report CSL-116, Second Edition, May 7, 1980, SRI International.
No context found.
P.G. Neumann, R.S. Boyer, R.J. Feiertag, K.N. Levitt, L. Robinson. A Provably Secure Operating System: The System, Its Applications, and Proofs. Technical Report, SRI, February, 1977.
No context found.
P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A Provably Secure Operating System: The System, Its Applications, and Proofs, Second Edition. Technical Report CSL-116, SRI, May 1980.
No context found.
P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A Provably Secure Operating System: The System, Its Applications, and Proofs. Computer Science Laboratory Report CSL-116, Second Edition, May 7, 1980, SRI International.
No context found.
P.G. Neumann, R.S. Boyer, R.J. Feiertag, K.N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A provably secure operating system: The system, its applications, and proofs. Technical Report CSL-116, SRI International, Menlo Park, CA, 1980. 2nd. edition.
No context found.
P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N. Levitt, and L. Robinson. A Provably Secure Operating System: The System, Its Applications, and Proofs. Computer Science Laboratory Report CSL-116, Second Edition, May 7, 1980, SRI International.
Online articles have much greater impact More about CiteSeer.IST Add search form to your site Submit documents Feedback
CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC