I. Cervesato. A specification language for crypto-protocol based on multiset rewriting, dependent types and subsorting. In G. Delzanno, S. Etalle, and M. Gabbrielli, editors, Proceedings of the Workshop on Specification, Analysis and Validation for Emerging Technologies --- SAVE'01, pages 1--22, Paphos, Cyprus, 2001.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

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I. Cervesato. A specification language for crypto-protocol based on multiset rewriting, dependent types and subsorting. In G. Delzanno, S. Etalle, and M. Gabbrielli, editors, Proceedings of the Workshop on Specification, Analysis and Validation for Emerging Technologies --- SAVE'01, pages 1--22, Paphos, Cyprus, 2001.

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I. Cervesato, A Specification Language for Crypto-Protocols based on Multiset Rewriting, Dependent Types and Subsorting, in: G. Delzanno, S. Etalle, M. Gabbrielli (Eds.), Workshop on Specification, Analysis and Validation for Emerging Technologies --- SAVE'01, Paphos, Cyprus, 2001, pp. 1--22. A Additional Roles

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Cervesato, I.: 2001a, `A specification language for crypto-protocols based on multiset rewriting, dependent types and subsorting'. In: Workshop on Specification, Analysis and Validation for Emerging Technologies. pp. 1--22.

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I. Cervesato. A specification language for crypto-protocols based on multiset rewriting, dependent types and subsorting. In Workshop on Specification, Analysis and Validation for Emerging Technologies, pages 1--22, 2001.

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I. Cervesato. A specification language for crypto-protocol based on multiset rewriting, dependent types and subsorting. In G. Delzanno, S. Etalle, and M. Gabbrielli, editors, Proceedings of the Workshop on Specification, Analysis and Validation for Emerging Technologies --- SAVE'01, pages 1--22, Paphos, Cyprus, 2001.

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I. Cervesato. A Specification Language for Crypto-Protocols based on Multiset Rewriting, Dependent Types and Subsorting. In G. Delzanno, S. Etalle, and M. Gabbrielli, editors, Workshop on Specification, Analysis and Validation for Emerging Technologies --- SAVE'01, pages 1--22, Paphos, Cyprus, 2001.

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I. Cervesato. A specification language for crypto-protocol based on multiset rewriting, dependent types and subsorting. In G. Delzanno, S. Etalle, and M. Gabbrielli, editors, Workshop on Specification, Analysis and Validation for Emerging Technologies --- SAVE'01, Paphos, Cyprus, 2001.

....or a variable: Elementary terms e : a (Constants) Predicates may take multiple arguments. Consequently, we introduce syntax for tuples of messages: Message tuples # t : t, # t (Tuple extension) In MSR, every object has a type drawn from the theory of dependent types with subsorting [Cer01a]. In this paper, we will use the following layout: Types: # : principal (Principals) nonce (Nonces) shK AB (Shared keys) pubK A (Public keys) privK k (Private keys) msg (Messages) 49 The types principal and nonce classify principals and nonces, respectively. The next three ....

....#nB : nonce. L(A, nB ) # C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C 52 6.1.3 Semantics MSR supports two static checks and one dynamic behavior model, which altogether form the semantics of this formalism. The first static check is obviously type checking, whose definition [Cer01a] is a simple adaptation of traditional schemes for dependently typed languages. We will not display the typing rules of MSR in this paper, and we will implicitly encode their verification as type checking for CLF terms. A more domain specific test is data access specification, or DAS . It ....

Iliano Cervesato. A specification language for crypto-protocol based on multiset rewriting, dependent types and subsorting. In G. Delzanno, S. Etalle, and M. Gabbrielli, editors, Proceedings of the Workshop on Specification, Analysis and Validation for Emerging Technologies --- SAVE'01, pages 1--22, Paphos, Cyprus, 1 December 2001.

....can be assigned a different type, in turn distinct from their digital signature keys. Protocol specifications, called protocol theories in MSR, are strongly typed, and we have devised algorithms for statically catching type violations, e.g. the use of a shared key to perform public key encryption [7]. Our typing infrastructure can point to more subtle access control errors, such as a principal trying to encrypt a message with a key that does not belong to him [6] Memory predicates allow a principal to remember information across role executions. Their presence opens the doors to the ....

....available to the roles, and other data constitute the state of execution of a protocol. Rules implement partial transformations between states. Their applicability is constrained by the contents of the current state and by the satisfaction of guards. Execution is preceded by static type checking [7] and access control validation [6] which limits the number of run time checks and allows catching common specification errors early. This section describes the form of an MSR specification. More specifically, in Section 2.1, we define our notion of messages. In Section 2.2, we present the ....

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I. Cervesato. A specification language for crypto-protocol based on multiset rewriting, dependent types and subsorting. http://www.cs.stanford.edu/iliano.

....can be assigned a different type, in turn distinct from their digital signature keys. Protocol specifications, called protocol theories in MSR, are strongly typed, and we have devised algorithms for statically catching type violations, e.g. the use of a shared key to perform public key encryption [6]. Our typing infrastructure can point to more subtle errors, such as a principal trying to encrypt a message with a key that does not belong to him. A procedure for enforcing such access control policies is analyzed in [7] Memory predicates allow a principal to remember information across role ....

....available to the roles, and other data constitute the state of execution of a protocol. Rules implement partial transformations between states. Their applicability is constrained by the contents of the current state and by the satisfaction of guards. Execution is preceded by static type checking [6] and access control validation [7] which limits the number of run time checks and allows catching common specification errors early. This section describes the form of an MSR specification and hints at its execution model. More specifically, in Section 2.1, we define the messages, or more ....

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I. Cervesato. A specification language for crypto-protocol based on multiset rewriting, dependent types and subsorting. Submitted to the Seventeenth Conference on the Mathematical Foundations of Programming Semantics --- MFPS-XVII (O. Danvy and M. Mislove and D. Schmidt, Editors), Aarhus, Denmark, 24--27 May 2001.

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Iliano Cervesato. A specification language for crypto-protocols based on multiset rewriting, dependent types and subsorting. In Workshop on Specification, Analysis and Validation for Emerging Technologies, pages 1--22, 2001.

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