R. Cramer, I. Damgard, S. Dziembowski, M. Hirt, and T. Rabin. E#cient Multiparty Computations Secure Against an Adaptive Adversary. In Proc. EUROCRYPT 1999, pages 311-326. 15 Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Constant-Round Multiparty Computation Using a Black-Box.. - Damgård, Ishai (2005) Self-citation (Damgard) (Correct)
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R. Cramer, I. Damgard, S. Dziembowski, M. Hirt, and T. Rabin. E#cient Multiparty Computations Secure Against an Adaptive Adversary. In Proc. EUROCRYPT 1999, pages 311-326. 15
General Secure Multi-Party Computation from any Linear .. - Cramer.. (2000) (32 citations) Self-citation (Cramer Damgard) (Correct)
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R. Cramer, I. Damgard, S. Dziembowski, M. Hirt and T. Rabin, E#cient multiparty computations secure against an adaptive adversary, Proc. EUROCRYPT '99, Springer Verlag LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 311--326.
Two-Threshold Broadcast and Detectable Multi-Party.. - Fitzi, Hirt.. (2003) Self-citation (Hirt) (Correct)
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R. Cramer, I. Damgard, S. Dziembowski, M. Hirt, and T. Rabin. E- cient multiparty computations secure against an adaptive adversary. In EUROCRYPT '99, vol. 1592 of LNCS, pp. 311-326. Springer-Verlag, 1999.
A Generalization of Paillier's Public-Key System with.. - Damgard, Jurik, Nielsen (2003) (2 citations) Self-citation (Damgard) (Correct)
....v) or u 2 = E(0, v) provided 2 is less than the smallest prime factor of n. Our final building block allows a prover to convince a verifier that three encryptions contain values a, b and c such that ab = c mod n . For this, we propose a protocol inspired by a similar construction found in [6]. Protocol Multiplication mod n Input: n, g, e a , e b , e c Private Input for P : a, b, c, r a , r b , r c such that ab = c mod n and e a = E(a, r a ) e b = E(b, r b ) e c = E(c, r c ) 1. P chooses random values d s , r d , r db Z # n and sends to V encryptions e d = E(d, r d ) e ....
R. Cramer, S. Dziembowski, I. Damgard, M. Hirt and T. Rabin: E#cient Multiparty Computations Secure against an Adaptive Adversary, Proceedings of EuroCrypt 99, Springer Verlag LNCS series 1592, pp. 311-326.
Secure Distributed Linear Algebra in a Constant Number of.. - Cramer, Damgård (2000) (13 citations) Self-citation (Cramer Damgard) (Correct)
....against general adversaries [15] are given by Cramer, Damgaard and Maurer [9] Their protocols make no restriction on the field size, as opposed to [7, 5] where this must be larger than the size of the network. 1 For the broadcast model of Rabin and Ben Or [23] one can take the protocols of [10], tolerating an actively (and adaptively) corrupted minority at the expense of negligible errors and the assumption that a secure broadcast primitive is given. 2 An example in the cryptographic model is given by the protocols of Gennaro, Rabin and Rabin [13] Here the size of the field is ....
R. Cramer, I. Damgard, S. Dziembowski, M. Hirt and T. Rabin: E#cient multiparty computations secure against an adaptive adversary, Proc. EUROCRYPT '99, Springer Verlag LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 311--326, 1999.
Efficient Protocols based on Probabilistic Encryption.. - Damgård, Jurik (2001) (2 citations) Self-citation (Damgard) (Correct)
...., an n th root of u 2 , provided 2 t is less than the smallest prime factor of n. Our final building block allows a prover to convince a verifier that three encryptions contain values a, b and c such that ab = c mod n. For this, we propose a protocol inspired by a similar construction found in [2]. Protocol Multiplication mod n Input: n, g, e a , e b , e c Private Input for P : a, b, c, r a , r b , r c such that ab = c mod n and e a = E(a, r a ) e b = E(b, r b ) e c = E(c, r c ) 1. P chooses a random value d # Zn and sends to V encryptions e d = E(d, r d ) e db = E(db, r db ) 2. ....
R.Cramer, S.Dziembowski, I. Damgard, M.Hirt and T.Rabin: E#cient Multiparty Computations Secure against an Adaptive Adversary, Proc. of EuroCrypt 99, Springer Verlag LNCS series 1592, pp. 311-326.
General Secure Multi-Party Computation from any Linear .. - Cramer.. (1999) (32 citations) Self-citation (Cramer Damgard) (Correct)
....must leak no information to the adversary beyond the fact that ab = c. Moreover, in the event that [c] i is opened, the adversary must learn nothing about a, b beyond what is implied by c and the other information he holds. The following CMP protocol is a generalization of a protocol suggested in [15] and works for any homomorphic commitment scheme. 1. Inputs are commitments [a] i , b] i , c] i where P i claims that ab = c. P i chooses a random # and makes commitments [#] i , #b] i . 2. The other players jointly generate a random challenge r using standard techniques. 3. P i opens the ....
....of a non committing encryption[10] of the same message. This will, by the results shown in [10] lead to an adaptively secure protocol for the cryptograhic scenario. This protocol will only be secure against a Q 3 adversary. However doing the same transformation on the Q 2 secure protocol from [15] (which is derived from a threshold protocol using ideas from this paper) will give us Q 2 security in the cryptographic scenario. Current state of the art for non committing encryption menas that these transformations result in rather ine#cient protocols. If we are willing to settle for ....
R. Cramer, I. Damgard, S. Dziembowski, M. Hirt and T. Rabin, E#cient multiparty computations secure against an adaptive adversary, Proc. EUROCRYPT '99, Springer Verlag LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 311--326.
A Generalisation, a Simplification and some Applications of.. - Damgård, Jurik (2001) Self-citation (Damgard) (Correct)
.... th root of u 2 , provided 2 t is less than the smallest prime factor of n. Our final building block allows a prover to convince a verifier that three encryptions contain values a, b and c such that ab = c mod n s . For this, we propose a protocol inspired by a similar construction found in [3]. Protocol Multiplication mod n s Input: n, g, e a , e b , e c Private Input for P : a, b, c, r a , r b , r c such that ab = c mod n and e a = E(a, r a ) e b = E(b, r b ) e c = E(c, r c ) 1. P chooses a random value d # Zn s and sends to V encryptions e d = E(d, r d ) e db = E(db, r db ....
R.Cramer, S.Dziembowski, I. Damgard, M.Hirt and T.Rabin: E#cient Multiparty Computations Secure against an Adaptive Adversary, Proc. of EuroCrypt 99, Springer Verlag LNCS series 1592, pp. 311-326.
On Expected Constant-Round Protocols for Byzantine Agreement - Katz, Koo (2006) (Correct)
No context found.
R. Cramer, I. Damgard, S. Dziembowski, M. Hirt, and T. Rabin. E#cient multiparty computations secure against an adaptive adversary. In Advances in Cryptology --- Eurocrypt '99.
Secure Multi-Player Protocols: Fundamentals, Generality, and.. - Fehr (2003) (Correct)
No context found.
Ronald Cramer, Ivan Damgard, Stefan Dziembowski, Martin Hirt, and Tal Rabin. E#cient multiparty computations secure against an adaptive adversary. In Advances in Cryptology---EUROCRYPT '99, volume 1592 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 1999.
Extensions to the Paillier Cryptosystem with Applications to.. - Jurik (2003) (Correct)
No context found.
R. Cramer, I. Damgard, S. Dziembowski, M. Hirt, and T. Rabin: E#- cient Multiparty Computations Secure against an Adaptive Adversary, Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT '99, LNCS volume 1592, pp. 311-326. Springer Verlag, 1999.
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