D. Malkhi, M. Merritt, and O. Rodeh, \Secure reliable multicast protocols in a WAN," Distributed Computing, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 19-28, 2000.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....It is therefore not fully asynchronous, but also requires no public key operations. Its implementation (in C on Unix) on a LAN performs several orders of magnitude faster than SINTRA, taking only a few milliseconds for each atomic broadcast. The broadcast protocols of Malkhi, Merritt, and Rodeh [10] work in a similar model as SINTRA, but implement only consistent broadcast (akin to SINTRA s consistent channel) The authors report no performance evaluation for their protocols. SecureRing [8] and the protocols of Doudou, Garbinato, Guerraoui, and Schiper [6] are examples of protocols that ....

D. Malkhi, M. Merritt, and O. Rodeh, "Secure reliable multicast protocols in a WAN," Distributed Computing, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 19--28, 2000.

....execution have either been the synchronous or the asynchronous models. Recent research in this area, however, has mostly focused on asynchronous systems, since this model is well suited for describing networks like the Internet and other WANs with unpredictable timeliness (examples can be found in [4, 18, 10, 8, 14, 3]) The assumption of this model has also one added advantage the resulting protocol tolerates timing attacks. Nevertheless, the asynchronous model has some drawbacks, and among them is the constrain that it imposes on the maximum number of processes that are allowed to fail simultaneously. For ....

.... using a method of chaining acknowledgments to amortize the cost of computing the digital signatures through several messages [11] Malkhi, Merrit and Rodeh proposed a secure reliable multicast protocol based on dissemination quorums, as a way to reduce delays specially in the case where f n [10]. This protocol assumes similar channels and uses public key signatures as the previous protocols, but considers, like in [11] static membership. The SecureRing system provides a reliable message delivery protocol that uses public key cryptography and assumes a fully connected network [8] The ....

D. Malkhi, M. Merrit, and O. Rodeh. Secure reliable multicast protocols in a WAN. In International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, pages 87--94, 1997.

....low level ring protocol against Byzantine failure and hence maintains the reliable ordered message delivery and group membership services despite the corruption of some group communication servers by an attacker. The extension of Rampart and Immune work from LAN to WAN environments is described in [12]. Another approach is to assume that the group communication servers will not be corrupted and hence focus on attacks such as eavesdropping and spoofing. Ensemble security [19] allows application dependent trust models. The group key generation and distribution protocols used in Ensemble are ....

D. Malkhi, M. Merritt, and O. Rodeh. Secure Reliable Multicast Protocols in a WAN. In ICDCS'97, May 1997.

....application of our protocols for trusted services, such behavior cannot be tolerated and we have to use more expensive agreement methods. Another class of protocols circumvent the impossibility of consensus in asynchronous environments by assuming a probabilistic behavior of the network links [6, 29, 31]. In particular, Moser and Melliar Smith [31] present algorithms to obtain a total order from a partial order imposed by an underlying communication system. However, this model is not suitable for applications that need high security guarantees because such assumptions are rather dicult to justify ....

....applications, however, totality is not necessary and can be ensured by other means, as long as consistency and integrity are satis ed. We call the resulting notion consistent broadcast and discuss it in this section. Several protocols for consistent broadcast have been proposed by Reiter et al. [36, 29]. To ensure agreement (i.e. totality) for delivered messages, these protocols are complemented by an external stability mechanism from which parties learn about the existence of messages they have not yet delivered. No such general mechanism is assumed here, but the parties may learn that also ....

D. Malkhi, M. Merritt, and O. Rodeh, \Secure reliable multicast protocols in a WAN," Distributed Computing, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 19-28, 2000.

....focus on distributing trusted services, but assumes a di erent model as explained in the previous sections: it implements atomic broadcast on top of a group membership protocol that dynamically removes apparently faulty servers from the set. The broadcast protocols of Malkhi, Merritt, and Rodeh [25] work again with a static group in a model similar to ours, but implement only reliable broadcast and do not guarantee a total order, as needed for maintaining consistent state. The e Vault prototype for secure distributed storage [20] addresses a subset of the applications considered here, ....

D. Malkhi, M. Merritt, and O. Rodeh, \Secure reliable multicast protocols in a WAN," Distributed Computing, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 19-28, 2000.

....application of our protocols for trusted services, such behavior cannot be tolerated and we have to use more expensive agreement methods. Another class of protocols circumvent the impossibility of consensus in asynchronous environments by assuming a probabilistic behavior of the network links [6, 28, 30]. In particular, Moser and Melliar Smith [30] present algorithms to obtain a total order from a partial order imposed by an underlying communication system. However, this model is not suitable for applications that need high security guarantees because such assumptions are rather dicult to justify ....

....applications, however, totality is not necessary and can be ensured by other means, as long as consistency and integrity are satis ed. We call the resulting notion consistent broadcast and discuss it in this section. Several protocols for consistent broadcast have been proposed by Reiter et al. [35, 28]. To ensure agreement (i.e. totality) for delivered messages, these protocols are complemented by an external stability mechanism from which parties learn about the existence of messages they have not yet delivered. No such general mechanism is assumed here, but the parties may learn that also ....

D. Malkhi, M. Merritt, and O. Rodeh, \Secure reliable multicast protocols in a WAN," Distributed Computing, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 19-28, 2000.

....fault tolerance and the underlying model of virtual synchronous process groups might be required for securely and reliably replicating services [37] of great importance. However, these protocols are very expensive as they rely on reliable and atomic multicasts secure against byzantine faults, see [38], 39] for some protocols. VII. Summary In summary, this paper identified the requirements for IKA and AKA operations and developed corresponding CLIQUES protocols based on the Diffie Hellman key exchange. The protocols presented above achieve secure and efficient key agreement in the context of ....

D. Malkhi, M. Merrit, and O. Rodeh, "Secure reliable multicast protocols in a WAN," in International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 97), 1997, pp. 87--94.

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D. Malkhi, M. Merritt, and O. Rodeh, \Secure reliable multicast protocols in a WAN," Distributed Computing, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 19-28, 2000.

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D. Malkhi, M. Merritt, and O. Rodeh, "Secure reliable multicast protocols in a WAN," Distributed Computing, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 19--28, 2000.

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D. Malkhi, M. Merritt, and O. Rodeh, \Secure reliable multicast protocols in a WAN," Distributed Computing, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 19-28, 2000.

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D. Malkhi, M. Merritt, and O. Rodeh, "Secure reliable multicast protocols in a WAN," Distributed Computing, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 19--28, 2000.

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