| O. Rodeh, K. P. Birman, and D. Dolev, "A study of group rekeying," Technical Report TR2000-1791, Department of Computer Science, Cornell University, Mar. 2000. |
....argued above, a secure GCS must provide a means to switch the current group key. This requires ecient, low latency rekeying algorithms. Such algorithms must provide e ective handeling for common scenarios: member join and leave. We have designed and implemented several ecient rekeying protocols [31, 32]. In this section, we describe a particularly fast protocol that is designed for solving a speci c case: a single member 13 g g , g (1) 2) 3) 4) 5) q p q q q q p p p p K p K p K p K q K q K q v q v q v q v p K n K N K N K N Figure 3: A variation on the ....
....Point to Point and multicast reliable communication, secure channels provided by SecChan, and the ability to prompt the stack to perform a view change. The basic communication pattern of a rekeying protocol can be described using a very simple protocol, Basic, that we have studied elsewhere [32]. The Basic algorithm uses a simple method to rekey a group. The leader chooses a new key and disseminates it to the members using secure channels. The members send acknowledgments back to the leader. Once the leader receives acknowledgments from all the members, it performs a view change, and ....
O. Rodeh, K. P. Birman, and D. Dolev. A study of group rekeying. Technical Report TR20001791, Cornell University Computer Science, March 2000.
No context found.
O. Rodeh, K. P. Birman, and D. Dolev, "A study of group rekeying," Technical Report TR2000-1791, Department of Computer Science, Cornell University, Mar. 2000.
No context found.
O. Rodeh, K. P. Birman, and D. Dolev, "A study of group rekeying," Technical Report TR2000-1791, Cornell University Computer Science, March 2000.
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