M. Belzer. A logic of deliberation. In Proceedings of the AAAI'86, pages 38-43, 1986.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....and Sergot s problem in Example 1. Moreover, the deontic independence relation is suggested by the explicit manner of presentation, because F (p d) is deontically independent of d only if it is given explicitly (in N 2 ) Deontic independence can also be used to analyze the Reykjavik Scenario [7,64]. The example is taken from a discussion by Makinson [44] The explicit obligations are that neither Reagan nor Gorbatchov should be told the secret, if Reagan is told the secret then Gorbatchov should be told, and if Gorbatchov is told then Reagan should be told. Intuitively, under the condition ....

M. Belzer. A logic of deliberation. In Proceedings of the AAAI'86, pages 38-43, 1986.

.... 1 The unique minimal (strict, superstrict) distinguished utility function u satisfying DS is given by u(m r) u(m :r) 1, u( m r) 2, u( m :r) 0. D 1 (mjr) takes precedence over D 1 ( mj ) because it is more speci c. The following example is borrowed from the literature on deontic logics (Belzer, 1986) and illustrates a more complex form of overriding based on speci city. In (van der Torre, 1994) two interpretations of the Reykjavik scenario are given; here we refer to the mixed defeasibility and violability interpretation. EXAMPLE 8. Reykjavik scenario) 1. You should not tell the secret ....

Belzer, M.: 1986, `A logic of deliberation'. In: Proceedings of the Fifth National Conference on Articial Intelligence (AAAI'86). pp. 38-43.

....and Sergot s problem in Example 1. Moreover, the deontic independence relation is suggested by the explicit manner of representation, because F (pd) is deontically independent of d only if it is given explicitly (in S 2 ) Deontic independence can also be used to analyze the Reykjavik Scenario [5, 29]. The example is taken from a discussion by Makinson [18] The explicit obligations are that neither Reagan nor Gorbatchov should be told the secret, if Reagan is told the secret then Gorbatchov should be told, and if Gorbatchov is told then Reagan should be told. Intuitively, under the condition ....

M. Belzer. A logic of deliberation. In Proceedings of the AAAI'86, pages 38--43, 1986.

....are not represented by the absolute obligations. Another advantage of changing EFD instead of CO is that it is less ad hoc. In [ van der Torre, 1994 ] we had to further adapt the definition of C 0 O for another notorious (and highly ambiguous) paradox , the so called Reykjavic Paradox [ Belzer, 1986 ] A third advantage of changing the EFD rule is that EFD cannot formalize fulfilled obligations satisfactorily. A fulfilled obligation is something that ought to be the case and that is also factually the case. For example, in the Forrester Paradox the obligation O( f) f could represent that ....

M. Belzer. A logic of deliberation. In Proceedings of the Fifth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 38--43, 1986.

....1994; Nute Yu, 1997) The problem of the paradox is that it is inconsistent, whereas intuitively it is consistent. Hence, a pragmatic formalization of the paradox can make use of restoring consistency techniques in case of a paradox. 7 Non monotonic techniques were already used by Loewer and Belzer (1983; 1986), who solve the Forrester paradox in their temporal deontic logic Dyadic Deontic Detachment (3D) 8 Moreover, it is observed in (van der Torre Tan, 1998a) that approaches based on contextual reasoning (e.g. Prakken Sergot, 1996) use non monotonic techniques, when ff ought to be (done) ....

....Chisholm s paradox derivations of fl( r g) j r) from fl( r :g j ) and fl(p j a) from fl( a pj ) can be made from the following two sets of premises. S = ffl( r :gj ) fl(r gjr) fl(r gjg)g S 0 = ffl( aj ) fl(a pj ) fl( pja)g The set S formalizes a variant of the Reykjavik Scenario (Belzer, 1986), when r is read as telling the secret to Reagan and g as telling the secret to Gorbatchov, see e.g. van der Torre, 1994) S 0 formalizes an extension of the apples and pears example introduced in (Tan van der Torre, 1996) when a is read as buying apples and p as buying pears. The ....

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Belzer, M. 1986. A logic of deliberation. In Proceedings of the Fifth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'86), 38--43.

....of CO . Moreover, AD also formalizes an intuitive notion of fulfilled obligations, because it deals with fulfilled obligations in exactly the same way as CD with violated obligations. We illustrate the applicability of our approach by the analysis of the following Reykjavic Scenario, introduced by Belzer (1986). Example 5.1 (Reykjavic Scenario) Consider the premise set of obligations S = ffl( r j ) fl( g j ) fl(r j g) fl(g j r)g, where r can be read as the agent tells the secret to Reagan and g as the agent tells the secret to Gorbatsjov . Figure 12 illustrates that the Reykjavic Scenario is a ....

Belzer, M. (1986). A logic of deliberation. In Proceedings of the Fifth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 38--43.

....a model M 0 and a mapping such that M 0 ; w) j= S and M 0 M (M is a preferred model of S) S preferentially entails OE, written as S j= OE, iff for all M and w, if M;w j= S then M;w j= OE. We will illustrate the notion of preferential entailment in L by the Reykjavic paradox [2]. See [26] for several interpretations of this paradox. Example 11 Let S be the set of obligations fO( r:gj ) O(rjg) O(gjr)g, where r can be read as telling a secret to Reagan and g as telling the secret to Gorbatsjov. The preferred model is given in Figure 1. We have S 6j= O( rj ) S 6j= ....

M. Belzer. A logic of deliberation. In Proceedings of the Fifth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 38--43, 1986.

.... to the assistance of his neighbors and t as the man telling his neighbors that he will come, S 00 formalizes the apples and pears example (Tan van der Torre, 1996) when a is read as buying apples and p as buying pears, and finally, S 000 formalizes a part of the Reykjavik scenario (Belzer, 1986; van der Torre, 1994) when r is read as telling a secret to Reagan and g as telling it to Gorbatsjov. The last obligation of each premise set is a contrary to duty obligation of the first obligation of the set, because its antecedent is contradictory with the consequent of the latter. The ....

Belzer, M. 1986. A logic of deliberation. In Proceedings of the Fifth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'86), 38--43.

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