S. H. Weingart. Physical security for the ABYSS System. In IEEE Computer Society Conference on Security and Privacy, pages 38--51, 1987.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....for real problems, with a feasible commercial and technological path to broader deployment. We have been calling this project WebALPS: Web Applications with Lots of Privacy and Security. Prior Work Prior work in secure coprocessing has established how to build tamper responding secure hardware [17]; how to use this tamper response technology (and This name emerged at lunch one day, partly in jest: since it connotes little Switzerlands : little neutral areas distributed on the Web. many other techniques) to build general purpose secure coprocessors, that can be trusted to carry out their ....

S. Weingart. Physical security for the abyss system. In Security and Privacy. IEEE, 1987.

.... devices available at that time, it was found that increased data retention started about 20C and increased as temperature fell further [2] Some devices are therefore designed with temperature sensors; any drop below 20C is treated as a tampering event and results in immediate memory zeroisation [4][5] We set out to repeat this work. Our goal was to find whether the memory devices available in the year 2000 exhibit the same behaviour. Another important thing to keep in mind is that security information could be restored even if part of the memory is corrupted. Suppose an attacker has ....

Steve H. Weingart. Physical Security for the ABYSS System, Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society Conference on Security and Privacy, 1987, pp. 52--58

....certificates tell a user what program executed and what hardware and software environment surrounded the program, which are key facts in deciding whether to trust a program s output. 1 Introduction Although research on the use of tamper resistant hardware has been in progress for nearly 15 years [10, 11, 12, 7, 5], public concerns for issues such as copy protection and secure remote execution and the recent push in commodity secure hardware [2] suggest that the benefits of using secure hardware is now exceeding its overhead in complexity, performance, and cost. This paper describes a trusted computing ....

....login software and the operating system appear on a list of software known not to steal data. As a result, the terminal approaches the safety of the user s own laptop. 3 Related Work Previous research in secure processors and co processors makes the use of a tamper resistant CPU realistic. ABYSS [10], Citadel [11] and the IBM 4758 secure co processor [7] place CPU, DRAM, battery backed RAM, and FLASH ROM in a physically tamper resistant package such that any tamper attempt causes secrets stored in the DRAM or battery backed RAM to be erased. AEGIS [4] uses a processor that ties a secret to ....

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S. Weingart. Physical security for the ABYSS system. In Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society Conference on Security and Privacy, pages 38--51, 1987.

.... These devices provide the best security and computational ability of which we are aware; in the case of the IBM Citadel, the circuitry is wrapped with nichrome wire whose penetration triggers zeroization, and a 386, a megabyte RAM, and high speed DES engine all reside within the secure envelope [Wein87, Yee94] Although the term smart card is often used for nearly every item in this list, we conform to the general standard of using it only for IC chip cards. To underscore the difference, some wags have suggested the term smart ass card for the more powerful secure coprocessors. 1.3.2. ....

S. H. Weingart. "Physical Security for the ABYSS System." Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society Conference on Security and Privacy. 1987.

....processors exist, and more are forthcoming. Some of these are very secure, satisfying the highest security level specified by FIPS PUB 140 1 [53] This publication gives four security levels for cryptographic modules, including secure coprocessors. Announced secure coprocessors include the ABYSS [55] and Citadel [57] systems from IBM, the iPower [34] encryption card by National Semiconductor, some extended implementations of the Clipper and Capstone systems [2, 51, 52] proposed by the NSA as DES replacements, the Crypta Plus [47] encryption card by Telequip, the CY512i [13] chip from Cylink, ....

Steve H. Weingart. Physical security for the ABYSS system. In Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society Conference on Security and Privacy, pages 52--58, 1987.

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S. H. Weingart. Physical security for the ABYSS System. In IEEE Computer Society Conference on Security and Privacy, pages 38--51, 1987.

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