Fodor, J. A. (1975). The Language of Thought. Crowell, New York. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Dynamic Concept Graph Generation From Stream-Based Cases - Mastenbrook, Berkowitz (2003) (Correct)
....the order in which they are supplied to the system. The system is designed to be useful to an autonomous system because it seeks to create a lexicon of independently generated yet organized patterns relevant to the experiences of the system. 1 INTRODUCTION The Language of Thought hypothesis [Fod75] proposes that humans use an internal combinatoric language (also called mentalese ) which stores and represents concepts. This language stores the concepts which drive our understanding of natural language, but is not actually a natural language. Davidsson [Dav92] raises the issue of the need ....
J. Fodor. The Language of Thought. Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975.
Learning to Understand - Tellier (1998) (Correct)
....: f 1(John , f1(love 2 , Mary ) OVS : f1(f 1(Mary , love 2 ) John ) The fact that nearly every possible ordering is represented in at least one natural language proves that Proposition 3 surely does not apply for natural languages. If we take seriously the mentalese hypothesis ( Fodor 75] the universals of natural languages can be interpreted in our model as coming from properties of this universal language of thought. The logical language L used here can be considered as an approximation of this mentalese, noted M, supposed to be innate or, at least, learned before language ....
: J. Fodor, The Language of Thought, Thomas Y. Crowell, New-York, 1975.
From Logic to Grammars via Types - Dudau-Sofronie, Tellier, Tommasi (Correct)
....categories (under the form of types) but letting the operators to be learnt. From a cognitive point of view, our choice seems more relevant, because the data we provide can be interpreted as coming from semantic information. If we admit the existence of a universal symbolic mental language ([Fod75]) types are related with this language and are thus language independent. On the contrary, the operators used in categories are connected with the word order of a speci c natural language and this linguistic parameter is not arguably innate. The ability to identify types, i.e. for example to ....
J. Fodor. The Language of Thought. Harvester Press, 1975.
Infinite RAAM: Initial Explorations into a Fractal Basis for.. - Levy (2002) (Correct)
....to each other. Examples include the syntactic transformations of transformational generative grammar [13] like passive (John loves Mary ) Mary is loved by John) and quanti ed rules in predicate calculus (8 x human(x) mortal(x) Atoms and structures support the requirements that Fodor [33] lays out for cognitive representations in his language of thought . Systematicity dictates that the representation of an object in a language must be the same in all contexts which refer that object. Thus the representation of the person John must be identical in John loves Mary, Mary loves ....
J.A. Fodor. The Language of Thought. Crowell, New York, 1975.
The study of learning and problem solving using artificial.. - Verschure, Althaus (Correct)
....is of no relevance. Although this problem of multi instantiation seems unpleasant from the perspective of a unified view relating the mind to the brain, the commitment to a computational program defines a special science of the disembodied mind which proceeds in isolation from the natural sciences [Fodor, 1975]. Next to the implication of multi instantiation the cognitivist program leads to a strict nativism. For instance, the explanation of cognition provided by a PSS is crucially dependent on the a priori definition of its world model. One has to assume that the world reveals itself to a behaving ....
Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought. Cambridge, Ma.: Hardvard University Press.
Implicit Learning and Consciousness: A Graded, . . . - Cleeremans (2001) (Correct)
....between consciousness and learning has, however, often tended to be overlooked in classical models of cognition. As argued in Cleeremans (1997) and also in Jimnez and Cleeremans (1999) this is most likely due to the fact that classical models of cognition (the Computational Theory of Mind , see Fodor, 1975) take it as a starting point that cognition is symbol manipulation. As we will try to highlight in the next few paragraphs, we surmise that one takes cognition to be exclusively and exhaustively about symbol manipulation, then there are but a few conceptual possibilities with which to think about ....
Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought. New York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers Inc.
Infinite RAAM: A Principled Connectionist Substrate for.. - Levy, Pollack (Correct)
....We conclude that IRAAM can provide a principled connectionist substrate for unification in a variety of cognitive modeling domains. Language and Connectionism: Three Approaches Language, to a cognitive scientist, can be held to include natural language and the language of thought (Fodor 1975), as well as symbolic programming languages developed to simulate these, like LISP and Prolog. Attempts to build connectionist models of such systems have generally followed one of three approaches. The first of these, exemplified by (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986) dispenses entirely with ....
Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought. New York: Crowell.
Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis - Fodor, Pylyshyn (1988) (189 citations) Self-citation (Fodor) (Correct)
.... are not, of course, committed to the details of these machines as exemplified in Turing s original formulation or in typical commercial computers; only to the basic idea that the kind of computing that is relevant to understanding cognition involves operations on symbols (see Newell, 1980, 1982; Fodor 1976, 1987; or Pylyshyn, 1980, 1984) In contrast, Connectionists propose to design systems that can exhibit intelligent behavior without storing, retrieving, or otherwise operating on structured symbolic expressions. The style of processing carried out in such models is thus strikingly unlike what ....
Fodor, J. (1976). The Language of Thought, Harvester Press, Sussex. (Harvard University Press paperback).
A Framework Supporting Creativity in the Design.. - Arnellos, Spyrou.. (2005) (Correct)
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Fodor, J. A. (1975). The Language of Thought. Crowell, New York.
A Model for Deliberation, Action, and Introspection - Doyle (1980) (1 citation) (Correct)
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Fodor, J. A., 1975. The Language of Thought, New York: Crowell.
The Foundations Of Psychology: A . . . - Doyle (1982) (Correct)
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Fodor, J. A., 1975. The Language of Thought, New York: Crowell.
Synamic Approaches to Cognitive Science - Beer (Correct)
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Fodor, J.A. (1975) The Language of Thought, Harvard University Press
Enactive Cognitive Science. Part 1: Background and Research Themes - McGee (2005) (Correct)
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Fodor, J. (1975) The language of thought. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.
Adaptive And Statistical Approaches In - Conceptual Modeling Timo (Correct)
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Fodor, J.A.: The Language of Thought. MIT Press/Bradford, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975.
Unknown - (Correct)
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Fodor, J. A. (1975). The language of thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Fodor, J. A. (1981). Representations: Philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity - Phillips (1995) (Correct)
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Fodor, J. A. (1975). The Language of Thought. Language and Thought. New York, NY: Crowell.
Cognitive Psychology 39, 3--36 (1999) - Article Id Cogp (1999) (Correct)
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Fodor, J. A. (1975). The language of thought. New York: Crowell.
Bridging the Gap between Cognition and Developmental Neuroscience: .. - Carey (2001) (Correct)
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FODOR. J.. 1975. The Language of Thought. New York: Crowell.
The Origin and Evolution - Of Everyday Concepts (1992) (Correct)
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Fodor, J. 1975. The Language of Thought. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
Concepts and Autonomous Agents - Davidsson (1994) (1 citation) (Correct)
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J.A. Fodor. The Language of Thought. Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975.
Plasticity and nativism: Towards a resolution of an apparent.. - Marcus (2001) (1 citation) (Correct)
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Fodor, J.A., The language of thought. 1975: New York: T. Y. Crowell.
Synthesising the Origins of Language and - Meaning Using Co-Evolution (1997) (Correct)
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Fodor, J. (1975) The Language of Thought. Crowell, Scranton, PA. 24
Reassessing Piaget's Theory of Sensorimotor Intelligence: A View .. - Rutkowska (1996) (2 citations) (Correct)
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Fodor, J.A. (1975). The Language of Thought. New York: Cromwell.
Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An.. - Aydede (1999) (Correct)
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Flavell, John ?? Fodor, Jerry A. (1975). The Language of Thought, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Toward A Neurally Plausible Language Of Thought - Levy, Pollack (2000) (Correct)
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Fodor, J.A.. (1975) The Language of Thought. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard.
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