Viswanathan, K., Boyd, C. and Dawson, E. (2000). A Three Phased Schema for Sealed Bid Auction System Design, Proceedings of ACSIP 2000 - Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, vol.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....more general (M 1)st price auctions attracted much attention. Starting with the work by Franklin and Reiter [13] which introduced the basic problems of sealed bid auctions, but disregarded the privacy of bids after the auction is finished, many secure auction mechanisms have been proposed, e.g. [1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 31, 32]. When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are only suitable for the secure execution of first price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 32, 25, 24, 15, 19, 31, 4] the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the ....

.... mechanisms have been proposed, e.g. 1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 31, 32] When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are only suitable for the secure execution of first price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 32, 25, 24, 15, 19, 31, 4], the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the publications rely on threshold computation that is distributed among auctioneers [16, 18, 17, 14, 28] This technique requires m auctioneers, out of which a fraction (e.g. m 1 #) must be trustworthy (threshold cryptography) ....

K. Viswanathan, C. Boyd, and E. Dawson. A three phased schema for sealed bid auction system design. In Australasian Conference for Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2000.

....recently (M 1)st price auctions attracted much attention. Starting with the work by Franklin and Reiter [13] which introduced the basic problems of sealed bid auctions, but disregarded the privacy of bids after the auction is finished, many secure auction mechanisms have been proposed, e.g. [1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 30, 33, 34, 37]. When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 34, 26, 25, 15, 19, 33, 4] the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the ....

.... have been proposed, e.g. 1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 30, 33, 34, 37] When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 34, 26, 25, 15, 19, 33, 4], the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the publications rely on computation that is distributed among auctioneers [16, 18, 17, 14, 30] This technique requires m auctioneers, out of which a fraction (e.g. m 1 #) must be trustworthy (threshold cryptography) ....

K. Viswanathan, C. Boyd, and E. Dawson. A three phased schema for sealed bid auction system design. In Australasian Conference for Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2000.

....recently (M 1)st price auctions attracted much attention. Starting with the work by Franklin and Reiter [13] which introduced the basic problems of sealed bid auctions, but disregarded the privacy of bids after the auction is finished, many secure auction mechanisms have been proposed, e.g. [1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 30, 33, 34]. When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 34, 26, 25, 15, 19, 33, 4] the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the ....

.... mechanisms have been proposed, e.g. 1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 30, 33, 34] When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 34, 26, 25, 15, 19, 33, 4], the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the publications rely on computation that is distributed among auctioneers [16, 18, 17, 14, 30, 1] This technique requires m auctioneers, out of which a fraction (e.g. m 1 #) must be trustworthy (threshold cryptography) ....

K. Viswanathan, C. Boyd, and E. Dawson. A three phased schema for sealed bid auction system design. In Australasian Conference for Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2000.

....equivalent to English auctions for bidders that privately evaluate a good, attracted much attention. Starting with the work by Franklin and Reiter [9] which introduced the basic problems, but disregarded the privacy of bids after the auction, many secure auction mechanisms have been proposed [1, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28]. When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [9, 28, 21, 20, 11, 15, 27, 3] the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the ....

.... auction mechanisms have been proposed [1, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28] When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [9, 28, 21, 20, 11, 15, 27, 3], the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the publications rely on the (limited) security of distributed computation [12, 14, 13, 10, 24] This technique requires m auctioneers, out of which a fraction (e.g. # m 1 3 #) must be trustworthy. Bidders send shares of their ....

K. Viswanathan, C. Boyd, and E. Dawson. A three phased schema for sealed bid auction system design. In Australasian Conference for Information Security and Privacy (ACISP

....[86, 3] may require a monitor (a node) to verify the ciphertexts sent by the dealer of the secret (the source) to a shareholder (the sink) in order to ascertain that the shareholder will obtain a valid share. Similar examples are available in key recovery [90] e cash [12] e voting and e auction [91] systems. Verifiable encryption techniques are primarily concerned with the formation of specialised message formats that contain security objects produced by some confidentiality system (such as an encryption algorithm) and diagnostic data for some integrity verification system. Stadler [86] ....

Kapali Viswanathan, Colin Boyd, and Ed Dawson. A three phased schema for sealed bid auction system design. In Ed Dawson, Andrew Clark, and Colin Boyd, editors, Information Security and Privacy, ACISP'

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Viswanathan, K., Boyd, C. and Dawson, E. (2000). A Three Phased Schema for Sealed Bid Auction System Design, Proceedings of ACSIP 2000 - Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, vol.

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Viswanathan, K., Boyd, C. and Dawson, E. (2000). A Three Phased Schema for Sealed Bid Auction System Design, Proceedings of ACSIP 2000 - Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, vol.

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K. Viswanathan, C. Boyd, and E. Dawson, "A Three Phased Schema for Sealed Bid Auction System Design," in Proceedings of ACISP 2000 --Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy (E. Dawson, A.Clark, and C. Boyd, eds.), vol. 1841 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 412--426, SpringerVerlag (Berlin), 2000.

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K. Viswanathan, C. Boyd, and E. Dawson, "A Three Phased Schema for Sealed Bid Auction System Design," in Proceedings of ACISP 2000 --Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy (E. Dawson, A.Clark, and C. Boyed, eds.), vol. 1841 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 412--426, Springer-Verlag (Berlin), 2000.

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Kapali Viswanathan, Colin Boyd and Ed Dawson. A Three Phased Schema for Sealed Bid Auction System Design. In ACISP, 2000.

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Kapali Viswanathan, Colin Boyd and Ed Dawson. A Three Phased Schema for Sealed Bid Auction System Design. In ACISP, 2000.

No context found.

K. Viswanathan, C. Boyd, and E. Dawson. A three phased schema for sealed bid auction system design. In Proceedings of the Australasian Conference for Information Security and Privacy (ACISP), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 412-- 426, 2000.

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Kapali Viswanathan, Colin Boyd and Ed Dawson. A Three Phased Schema for Sealed Bid Auction System Design. In ACISP, 2000.

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