| Sandholm, W.H. (2000). "Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets" (submitted). See also "Evolutionary Justification of Nash Equilibrium" by the same author, PhD thesis, Northwestern University, 1998. |
.... equilibrium) have been established under quite general conditions, and many ecient computational methods have been developed (see [25] for an overview) This type of equilibrium has also been discovered in the context of mobile telecommunications in [15] and in the context of Potential games in [28] (see also [27] Wardrop principles have also been obtained independently around thirty years before Wardrop in an economical context [26] An alternative game formulation arises when decisions are not taken by each individual, but instead, by a nite number of big organizations (the players) ....
W. H. Sandholm, "Potential games with continuous player sets", submitted, 2000.
....equilibrium can be obtained using an equivalent optimization problem with a single player with the cost f(x) is a feature common to a whole class of games known as potential games. This class of games has been formally introduced by [29] for the case of nitely many players. It was extended in [38] to the case of population games (which includes the setting of Wardrop equilibrium) In developing the concept of potential games, game theorists seem not to have been aware of the huge literature on road trac equilibria starting from Wardrop and Beckmann [41, 7] Monderer and Shapley write in ....
.... for each i, every s 2 S and every t 2 S , P (sjt ) P (s) h (sjt ) h (s) Existence and uniqueness of equilibria of potential games in that setting has been established in [29] and [30] An adaptation of this de nition is needed for population games, see [31, Chap 3] and [38], in which there are N classes of populations of in nitesimal players, where the mass of players of type i is given by some constants d i . Let (j; t) be the fraction of members of population type j that use action t 2 S . A multistrategy is the collection = j; t) We assume that ....
W. H. Sandholm. Potential games with continuous player sets. submitted, 2000.
No context found.
Sandholm, W.H. (2000). "Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets" (submitted). See also "Evolutionary Justification of Nash Equilibrium" by the same author, PhD thesis, Northwestern University, 1998.
No context found.
W. H. Sandholm, "Potential games with continuous player sets", Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 97, 81-108, 2001.
No context found.
W. H. Sandholm, "Potential games with continuous player sets", submitted, 2000.
No context found.
W. H. Sandholm. Potential games with continuous player sets. submitted, 2000.
No context found.
Sandholm WH. Potential games with continuous player sets. Journal of Economic Theory 2001;97:81--108.
No context found.
W. H. Sandholm, "Potential games with continuous player sets", submitted, 2000.
No context found.
W. H. Sandholm. Potential games with continuous player sets. submitted, 2000.
No context found.
W. H. Sandholm. Potential games with continuous player sets. submitted, 2000.
No context found.
W.H. Sandholm, "Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets," forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory (2000).
Online articles have much greater impact More about CiteSeer.IST Add search form to your site Submit documents Feedback
CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC