K. Larson and T. Sandholm. Deliberation in equilibrium: Bargaining in computationally complex problems. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2000. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial.. - Hudson, Sandholm (2002) (4 citations) Self-citation (Sandholm) (Correct)
....has received much less attention, is that of bidding. There are 2 1 bundles, and each agent may need to bid on all of them to fully express its preferences. This can be undesirable for any of several reasons: determining one s valuation for any given bundle can be computationally intractable [9, 13,17]; there is a huge number of bundles to evaluate; communicating the bids can incur prohibitive overhead (e.g. network traffic) and agents may prefer not to reveal all of their valuation information due to reasons of privacy or long term competitiveness [16] Appropriate bidding languages [7, 8, ....
....that even when it does not (that is, some agent i gets all the items) there is some set of queries that includes v i (K) and which has size q min . 7. 2 Order queries In some applications, agents might not know the values of bundles, and might need to expend a lot of effort to determine them [9, 17], but might easily be able to see that one bundle is preferable over another. In such settings, it would be sensible for the elicitor to ask order queries, that is, ask an agent i to order two given bundles c i and c # i (to say which of the two it prefers) The agent will answer c i c # i or c ....
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K. Larson and T. Sandholm. Deliberation in equilibrium: Bargaining in computationally complex problems. AAAI, 2000.
Costly Valuation Computation in Auctions - Larson, Sandholm (2001) (7 citations) Self-citation (Larson Sandholm) (Correct)
.... agents have often been descriptive rather than prescriptive [23, 17] In order to provide a prescriptive model, Larson and Sandholm proposed incorporating deliberation actions into agents strategies in order to analyze, game theoretically, bounded rational agents in a 2 agent bargaining game [11]. In auctions there has been work on both bounded rational bidding agents and mechanisms. For bounded rational bidding agents, Sandholm noted that under a model of costly computation, the dominant strategy property of Vickrey auctions fails to hold [21] Instead, an agent s best deliberation ....
....uses this information to decide how to allocate its computation at every step in the process, based on the results of its computation so far. There has been much work on performance profile based deliberation control [24, 5, 2, 6] To represent the performance profiles we use a tree structure [11]. The advantage of this approach is that it allows optimal conditioning on results of execution so far, and allows conditioning on the actual problem instance. We specify two different types of performance profiles, stochastic and deterministic.Inastochastic performance profile there is ....
Kate Larson and Tuomas W Sandholm. Deliberation in equilibrium: Bargaining in computationally complex problems. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 48--55, Austin, 2000.
Computationally Limited Agents in Auctions - Larson, Sandholm (2001) (4 citations) Self-citation (Larson Sandholm) (Correct)
....the process, based on the results of its computation so far. There has been muchwork on performance pro le based deliberation control [Zilberstein and Russell, 1996; Boddy and Dean, 1994; Horvitz, 1987; Hansen and Zilberstein, 2001] To represent the performance pro les we use a tree structure [Larson and Sandholm, 2000] . The advantage of this approach is that it allows optimal conditioning on results of execution so far, and can condition on the actual problem instance. We index the problem by # and # where # is an agent and # is an item (or bundle of items) in the auction. For each # and # there is a ....
.... descriptive rather than prescriptive [Simon, 1955; Rubinstein, 1998] In order to provide a prescriptive model, Larson and Sandholm proposed incorporating deliberation actions into agents strategies in order to analyze, game theoretically, bounded rational agents in a 2 agent bargaining game [Larson and Sandholm, 2000] . In auctions there has been work on both bounded rational bidding agents and mechanisms. For bounded rational bidding agents, Sandholm noted that under a model of costly computation, the dominant strategy property of Vickrey auctions fails to hold [Sandholm, 2000] Instead, an agent s best ....
Kate Larson and Tuomas W Sandholm. Deliberation in equilibrium: Bargaining in computationally complex problems. In Proceedings of the National ConferenceonArticial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 48-55, Austin, TX, 2000.
Boosting Stochastic Problem Solvers through Online Self-Analysis .. - Cicirello (2003) (Correct)
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K. Larson and T. Sandholm. Deliberation in equilibrium: Bargaining in computationally complex problems. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2000.
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