Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Confidentiality and integrity with untrusted hosts. Technical Report 2000-1810, Cornell University, August 2000. 19  Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Trustless Grid Computing in ConCert - Chang, Crary, DeLap, Harper.. (2002) (6 citations) (Correct)
....to give code access to private information (such as the computer s configuration) so long as this information does not, for instance, make its way back onto the network. Such requirements are known as information flow properties, and work is being carried out on type systems that certify them [19, 36, 27]. 3 ConCert Architecture A chief property of our architecture is decentralization. A decentralized grid allows us to use idle resources while avoiding bottlenecks that could overload hosts or networks and degrade performance possibly even for users who are not involved in grid computation. ....
Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Confidentiality and integrity with untrusted hosts. Technical Report 2000-1810, Cornell University, 2000. 14
Confidentiality and Integrity with Untrusted Hosts - Steve Zdancewic Andrew (2 citations) Self-citation (Zdancewic Myers) (Correct)
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Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Confidentiality and integrity with untrusted hosts. Submitted
Secure Information Flow and CPS - Zdancewic, Myers (2001) (13 citations) Self-citation (Zdancewic Myers) (Correct)
....the mild assumption that initial programs introduce all linear continuation values (not variables) via letlin. During execution this constraint is not required, and programs in the image of the translation satisfy this property. This type system is sound with respect to the operational semantics [36]. The proof is, for the most part, standard, following in the style of Wright and Felleisen [35] We simply state the lemmas necessary for the discussion of the non interference result of the next section. Lemma 1 (Subject Reduction) If e and M is a well formed memory such that Loc(e) ....
....continuations is respected. The Progress lemma (and hence Soundness) applies only to closed programs, as usual. 4 Non Interference This section proves a non interference result for the secure CPS language, generalizing Smith and Volpano s preservation style argument [30] A technical report [36] gives a detailed account of our approach in a more expressive language. Informally, the non interference result shows that low security computations are not able to observe high security data. Here, low security refers to the set of security labels #, where # is an arbitrary point in and ....
Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Confidentiality and integrity with untrusted hosts. Technical Report 2000-1810, Cornell University, 2000.
Secure Information Flow and CPS - Zdancewic, Myers (2001) (13 citations) Self-citation (Zdancewic Myers) (Correct)
....the mild assumption that initial programs introduce all linear continuation values (not variables) via letlin. During execution this constraint is not required, and programs in the image of the translation satisfy this property. This type system is sound with respect to the operational semantics [36]. The proof is, for the most part, standard, following in the style of Wright and Felleisen [35] We simply state the lemmas necessary for the discussion of the non interference result of the next section. Lemma 1 (Subject Reduction) If . # K [pc] # e and M is a well formed memory such that ....
....continuations is respected. The Progress lemma (and hence Soundness) applies only to closed programs, as usual. 4 Non Interference This section proves a non interference result for the secure CPS language, generalizing Smith and Volpano s preservation style argument [30] A technical report [36] gives a detailed account of our approach in a more expressive language. Informally, the non interference result shows that low security computations are not able to observe high security data. Here, low security refers to the set of security labels # #, where # is an arbitrary point in L, ....
Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Confidentiality and integrity with untrusted hosts. Technical Report 2000-1810, Cornell University, 2000.
Confidentiality and Integrity with Untrusted Hosts - Zdancewic, Myers (2000) (2 citations) Self-citation (Zdancewic Myers) (Correct)
....produce equivalent programs, these programs are rejected because of apparent information flows. Spl uses a novel mechanism based on ordered linear continuations to permit a richer class of program transformations, including secure program partitioning. This report is the technical companion to [ZM00]. It contains expanded discussion and extensive proofs of both the soundness and noninterference theorems mentioned in Section 3.3 of that work. 1 Introduction Stronger protection for the confidentiality (secrecy, privacy) and integrity of data is becoming increasingly important, because ....
Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Confidentiality and integrity with untrusted hosts.
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Steve Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers. Confidentiality and integrity with untrusted hosts. Technical Report 2000-1810, Cornell University, August 2000. 19
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