K. Sakurai and S. Miyazaki, "A Bulletin-Board Based Digital Auction Scheme with Bidding Down Strategy," in International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce, pages 180-187, 1999.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....more general (M 1)st price auctions attracted much attention. Starting with the work by Franklin and Reiter [13] which introduced the basic problems of sealed bid auctions, but disregarded the privacy of bids after the auction is finished, many secure auction mechanisms have been proposed, e.g. [1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 31, 32]. When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are only suitable for the secure execution of first price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 32, 25, 24, 15, 19, 31, 4] the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the ....

.... mechanisms have been proposed, e.g. 1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 31, 32] When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are only suitable for the secure execution of first price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 32, 25, 24, 15, 19, 31, 4], the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the publications rely on threshold computation that is distributed among auctioneers [16, 18, 17, 14, 28] This technique requires m auctioneers, out of which a fraction (e.g. m 1 #) must be trustworthy (threshold cryptography) ....

K. Sakurai and S. Miyazaki. A bulletin-board based digital auction scheme with bidding down strategy - towards anonymous electronic bidding without anonymous channels nor trusted centers. In Proc. International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce, pages 180--187, 1999.

....recently (M 1)st price auctions attracted much attention. Starting with the work by Franklin and Reiter [13] which introduced the basic problems of sealed bid auctions, but disregarded the privacy of bids after the auction is finished, many secure auction mechanisms have been proposed, e.g. [1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 30, 33, 34, 37]. When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 34, 26, 25, 15, 19, 33, 4] the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the ....

.... have been proposed, e.g. 1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 30, 33, 34, 37] When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 34, 26, 25, 15, 19, 33, 4], the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the publications rely on computation that is distributed among auctioneers [16, 18, 17, 14, 30] This technique requires m auctioneers, out of which a fraction (e.g. m 1 #) must be trustworthy (threshold cryptography) ....

K. Sakurai and S. Miyazaki. A bulletin-board based digital auction scheme with bidding down strategy - towards anonymous electronic bidding without anonymous channels nor trusted centers. In Proc. International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce, pages 180--187, 1999.

....recently (M 1)st price auctions attracted much attention. Starting with the work by Franklin and Reiter [13] which introduced the basic problems of sealed bid auctions, but disregarded the privacy of bids after the auction is finished, many secure auction mechanisms have been proposed, e.g. [1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 30, 33, 34]. When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 34, 26, 25, 15, 19, 33, 4] the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the ....

.... mechanisms have been proposed, e.g. 1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 30, 33, 34] When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [13, 34, 26, 25, 15, 19, 33, 4], the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the publications rely on computation that is distributed among auctioneers [16, 18, 17, 14, 30, 1] This technique requires m auctioneers, out of which a fraction (e.g. m 1 #) must be trustworthy (threshold cryptography) ....

K. Sakurai and S. Miyazaki. A bulletin-board based digital auction scheme with bidding down strategy - towards anonymous electronic bidding without anonymous channels nor trusted centers. In Proc. International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce, pages 180--187, 1999.

....prices is maximized. The winner determination problem has been tackled using various optimization techniques recently [8, 22,25, 26] On the other hand, from the view point of security, to hide bidding prices is an important problem, and there are many researches on secure auction protocols [1, 2, 5 7, 10 12, 19, 20, 23, 24, 29, 30]. If we can trust the auctioneer, we simply gather all private information (i.e. bidding prices) at the auctioneer, who can then solve the problem using any available centralized optimization technique. However, we cannot take it for granted that there exists such a trusted auctioneer. For ....

....very large, i.e. 2 m . However, this seems somewhat inevitable if we are to solve this problem using dynamic programming, since the winner determination problem of a general combinatorial auction is NP complete [22] 5 Discussions There have been various works on secure auction protocols [1, 2, 5 7, 10 12, 19, 20,23, 24, 29, 30]. However, as far as the authors know, there has been no other research on secure dynamic programming nor on secure combinatorial auction based on dynamic programming techniques. Here, we discuss some related works. Kikuchi [12] developed a secure M 1 st price auction protocol by using secret ....

Sakurai, K. and Miyazaki, S.: A bulletin-board based digital auction scheme with bidding down strategy, Proceedings of

....equivalent to English auctions for bidders that privately evaluate a good, attracted much attention. Starting with the work by Franklin and Reiter [9] which introduced the basic problems, but disregarded the privacy of bids after the auction, many secure auction mechanisms have been proposed [1, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28]. When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [9, 28, 21, 20, 11, 15, 27, 3] the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the ....

.... auction mechanisms have been proposed [1, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28] When taking away all the protocols that (in their current form) are not suitable for the secure execution of second price auctions or reveal (partial) information after the auction is finished [9, 28, 21, 20, 11, 15, 27, 3], the remaining work can be divided into two categories. Most of the publications rely on the (limited) security of distributed computation [12, 14, 13, 10, 24] This technique requires m auctioneers, out of which a fraction (e.g. # m 1 3 #) must be trustworthy. Bidders send shares of their ....

K. Sakurai and S. Miyazaki. A bulletin-board based digital auction scheme with bidding down strategy - towards anonymous electronic bidding without anonymous channels nor trusted centers. In Proc. International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce, pages 180--187, 1999.

....[13] which is more ecient than the scheme by Stadler [14] However, its application to the auction scheme will remain inecient, as compared with our scheme. We shall provide an estimation for the number of exponentiations required for this approach in Section 4.3. Sakurai and Miyazaki [11] proposed an elegant auction system where the con dentiality of bid is controlled only by the bidder. For non repudiation of the bid, Sakurai and Miyazaki used the undeniable signature scheme. Unfortunately, the computational and communicational complexity of their scheme [11] is dependent on the ....

....Sakurai and Miyazaki [11] proposed an elegant auction system where the con dentiality of bid is controlled only by the bidder. For non repudiation of the bid, Sakurai and Miyazaki used the undeniable signature scheme. Unfortunately, the computational and communicational complexity of their scheme [11] is dependent on the number of participants, thereby rendering their system inecient for large scale auction systems. Moreover, their scheme requires every bidder to be on line, which may not be a desirable property in large scale auctions over open networks. Sako [10] attempted to modify their ....

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K. Sakurai and S. Miyazaki. A bulletin-board based digital auction scheme with bidding down strategy. In Proceedings of CrypTEC'99, pages 180-187. City University of Hong Kong Press, July 1999.

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K. Sakurai and S. Miyazaki, "A Bulletin-Board Based Digital Auction Scheme with Bidding Down Strategy," in International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce, pages 180-187, 1999.

No context found.

K. Sakurai and S. Miyazaki. A Bulletin-Board based Digital Auction Scheme with Bidding Down Strategy. Proc. of the International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce, CrypTEC'99, City University of Hong Kong Press, pp. 180-187 (1999).

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K. Sakurai and S. Miyazaki. A bulletin-board based digital auction scheme with bidding down strategy. Proceedings of 1999 International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce, pages 180--187, 1999.

No context found.

K. Sakurai and S. Miyazaki. A Bulletin-Board Based Digital Auction Scheme with Bidding Down Strategy. In International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce, pages 180-187, 1999.

No context found.

K. Sakurai and S. Miyazaki. A Bulletin-Board Based Digital Auction Scheme with Bidding Down Strategy. In International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce, pages 180-187, 1999.

No context found.

Kouichi Sakurai and Shingo Miyazaki. A bulletin-board based digital auction scheme with bidding down strategy. In CrypTEC'99, pages 180--187. City University of Hong Kong Press, 1999. 10

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K. Sakurai and S. Miyazaki. A bulletin-board based digital auction scheme with bidding down strategy - Towards anonymous electronic bidding without anonymous channels nor trusted centers. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce, pages 180--187, 1999.

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