M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. Hernandez, M. Kirkup, and A. Menezes. PGP in constrained wireless devices. In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 247--261. USENIX, August 2000. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Establishing Pair-wise Keys For Secure Communication in.. - Zhu, Xu, Setia, Jajodia (2003) (13 citations) (Correct)
....key. This can be easily achieved if we assume the existence of a public key infrastructure. However, many mobile ad hoc networks cannot afford the deployment of public key cryptosystems due to their high computational and communication overheads and storage constraints. For instance, Brown et al. [2] have reported that a 512 bit RSA signature generation takes 2 6 seconds on a RIM Pager and a Palm Pilot, and Perrig et al. [22] report that a current generation sensor node has just 4500 bytes for security and the application. Consequently, # also with Dept. of Computer Science, George Mason ....
M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. Hernandez, M. Kirkup, and A. Menezes. PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices. In 9th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 247261, August 2000.
A Formally Verified Decentralized Key Management.. - Law, Corin, Etalle.. (2003) (1 citation) (Correct)
....since cryptographic operations tend to be resource intensive. 4. Time: Public key cryptography should be avoided or at least limited to applications which are not time constrained, because they are a few order of magnitude more resource and time consuming than symmetric key cryptography [3]. The security and functional requirements of most WSNs are such that under the above constraints, the following guidelines need to be taken into account: 1. NO SINGLE KEY: The system should not operate on a system wide key (or keys) Due to the sensor nodes lack of tamper resistance, having a ....
M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. L. Hernandez, M. Kirkup, and A. Menezes. PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices. In 9th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 247--261. USENIX Association, Aug 2000.
Establishing Pair-wise Keys For Secure Communication in.. - Zhu, Xu, Setia, Jajodia (2003) (13 citations) (Correct)
....key. This can be easily achieved if we assume the existence of a public key infrastructure. However, many mobile ad hoc network cannot afford the deployment of public key cryptosystems due to their high computational and communication overheads and storage constraints. For instance, Brown et al. [1] have reported that a 512 bit RSA signature generation takes 2 6 seconds on a RIM Pager and a Palm Pilot, and Perrig et al. [12] report that a current generation sensor node has just 4500 bytes for security and the application. Consequently, it is necessary to explore approaches that are based on ....
M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. Hernandez, M. Kirkup, and A. Menezes. PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices. In 9th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 247261, August 2000.
An Anonymous On Demand Routing Protocol with Untraceable.. - Kong, Hong, Gerla (Correct)
....cryptosystems require 30 100 milliseconds of computation per encryption or per signature verification, 80 900 milliseconds of computation per decryption or per signature generation. These measurements are consistent with previous results generated by other research groups on similar platforms [6]. Therefore, ANODR avoids using public key cryptosystems if symmetric key cryptosystems can provide the needed support. It also avoids using symmetric key cryptosystems if not indispensable. 3.3. Design components ANODR divides the routing process into two parts: anonymous route discovery and ....
M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. L. Hernandez, M. Kurkup, and A. Menezes. PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices. In USENIX Security Symposium (Security '00), 2000.
ANODR: ANonymous On Demand Routing with Untraceable Routes for.. - Kong, Hong (2003) (5 citations) (Correct)
....cryptosystems require 30 100 milliseconds of computation per encryption or per signature verification, 80 900 milliseconds of computation per decryption or per signature generation. These measurements are consistent with previous results generated by other research groups on similar platforms [5]. Therefore, ANODR avoids using public key cryptosystems if symmetric key cryptosystems can provide the needed support. It also avoids using symmetric key cryptosystems if not indispensable. 3.2 Design components ANODR divides the routing process into two parts: anonymous route discovery and ....
M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. L. Hernandez, M. Kurkup, and A. Menezes. PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices. In USENIX Security Symposium (Security '00), 2000.
Packet Leashes: A Defense against Wormhole Attacks in.. - Hu, Perrig, Johnson (2001) (42 citations) (Correct)
....about 0.5 ms on a fast workstation. Adding a digital signature to each packet is computationally expensive for the verifier (receiver) but overwhelmingly expensive for the signer (sender) On less powerful CPUs, each digital signature generation and verification takes on the order of seconds [7]. Since many wireless applications rely heavily on broadcast communication, and since setting up O(n ) keys is expensive, we design the TIK protocol in Section V C, based on a new protocol for efficient broadcast authentication that simultaneously provides the functionality of a temporal ....
Michael Brown, Donny Cheung, Darrel Hankerson, Julio Lopez Hernandez, Michael Kirkup, and Alfred Menezes. PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices. In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 247--262, August 2000.
LHAP: A Lightweight Hop-by-Hop Authentication Protocol.. - Zhu, Xu, Setia, Jajodia (2003) (1 citation) (Correct)
....other researchers have proposed for bootstrapping trust in Section 7. Fourth, we assume that the mobile nodes under consideration are relatively underpowered. Public key operations such as digital signatures are relatively expensive to compute on platforms such as handhold PDAs. Brown et al. [1] have measured the speed of RSA signing and verifying on various platforms. For example, a 512 bit RSA signature generation takes 2 6 seconds on a RIM Pager and a Palm Pilot, whereas a signature verification takes 100 200 milliseconds when the public exponent e = 3. We also assume loose ....
....determined by network density and node mobility. Obviously, a node encounters more nodes in a network with a higher node density and higher node moving velocities. Generally, LHAP is computationally scalable because the overhead of verifying signatures is affordable even for the handhold PDAs [1] that have very constrained computational capability. Latency In LHAP, a node verifies a traffic packet it receives by computing one or several hashes. Thus the additional latency LHAP incurs is usually neglectable with respect to the overall normal end to end transmission latency of a ....
M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. Hernandez, M. Kirkup, and A. Menezes. PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices. In 9th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 247261, August 2000.
Ecient Constructions for One-way Hash Chains Yih-Chun Hu - Markus Jakobsson And (Correct)
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M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. Hernandez, M. Kirkup, and A. Menezes. PGP in constrained wireless devices. In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 247--261. USENIX, August 2000.
Packet Leashes: A Defense against - Wormhole Attacks In (Correct)
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Crypto for Tiny Objects - Malan (2004) (Correct)
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Michael Brown, Donny Cheung, Darrel Hankerson, Julio Lopez Hernandez, Michael Kirkup, and Alfred Menezes. Pgp in constrained wireless devices. In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Security Symposium. USENIX Association, August 2000.
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M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. L. Hernandez, M. Kirkup, and A. Menezes, "PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices," in Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Security Symposium. USENIX Association, August 2000.
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M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. L. Hernandez, M. Kirkup, and A. Menezes. Pgp in constrained wireless devices. In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Security Symposium. USENIX Association, August 2000.
Observation-based Cooperation Enforcement in Ad hoc Networks - Bansal, Baker (2003) (4 citations) (Correct)
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M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J.L. Hernandez, M. Kirkup and A. Menezes. PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices. In 9th USENIX Security Symposium, Aug. 2000.
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M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. Hernandez, M. Kirkup, and A. Menezes. PGP in constrained wireless devices. In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 247--261. USENIX, August 2000.
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M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. Hernandez, M. Kirkup, and A. Menezes., "PGP in constrained wireless devices," in The 9th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX, August 2000.
Personal Servers as Digital Keys - Allan Beaufour Philippe (2003) (3 citations) (Correct)
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A New Set Of Passive Routing Attacks In Mobile Ad Hoc Networks - Kong, Hong, Gerla (Correct)
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M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. L. Hernandez, M. Kurkup, and A. Menezes. PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices. In USENIX Security Symposium (Security '00), 2000.
Crypto for Tiny Objects - Malan (2004) (Correct)
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Michael Brown, Donny Cheung, Darrel Hankerson, Julio Lopez Hernandez, Michael Kirkup, and Alfred Menezes. Pgp in constrained wireless devices. In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Security Symposium. USENIX Association, August 2000.
Personal Servers as Digital Keys - Beaufour, Bonnet (2004) (3 citations) (Correct)
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Michael Brown, Donny Cheung, Darrel Hankerson, Julio Lopez Hernandez, Michael Kirkup, and Alfred Menezes. PGP in constrained wireless devices. In Security Symposium. USENIX, 2000.
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Brown, M., Cheung, D.: PGP in constrained wireless devices. In: Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Security Symposium. (2000)
Analyzing and Modeling Encryption Overhead - For Sensor Network (Correct)
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M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. Hernandez, M. Kirkup, A. Menezes, "PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices", in Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Security Symposium, Denver Colorado, pp. 247-261, Aug. 2000.
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks - Haowen Chan Adrian (2003) (54 citations) (Correct)
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Michael Brown, Donny Cheung, Darrel Hankerson, Julio Lopez Hernandez, Michael Kirkup, and Alfred Menezes. PGP in constrained wireless devices. In 9th USENIX Security Symposium, August 2000.
A Key-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Home Automation.. - Wacker, Heiber, Cermann (2004) (Correct)
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M. Brown and D. Cheung, "PGP in constrained wireless devices," in Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Security Symposium, 2000.
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks - Haowen Chan Adrian (2003) (54 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
Michael Brown, Donny Cheung, Darrel Hankerson, Julio Lopez Hernandez, Michael Kirkup, and Alfred Menezes. PGP in constrained wireless devices. In 9th USENIX Security Symposium, August 2000.
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