J. S. Smith. Aggregation of preferences with variable electorate. Econometrica, 41:1027-- 41, 1973. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Rank Aggregation Methods for the Web - Dwork, Kumar, Naor, Sivakumar (2001) (36 citations) (Correct)
....In 1785 Marie J. A. N. Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, proposed that if there is some elementofS,nowknown as the Condorcet al..ternative, that defeats every other in pairwise simple majorityvoting, then that this element should be ranked first [9] A natural extension, due to Truchon [22] see also [21]) mandates that if there is a partition (C# C) of S suchthatforany x 2 C and y 2 C the majority prefers x to y, then x must be ranked above y. This is called the extended Condorcet criterion (ECC) We will show that not only can the ECC be achieved efficiently, but it also has excellent ....
J. H. Smith. Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate. SIAM J. on Applied Math., 41:1027--1041, 1973.
Copeland Method Ii: Manipulation, Monotonicity, And Paradoxes - Merlin, Saari (Correct)
....CM score is the sum of assigned points and the scores determine the CM ranking of the candidates. To simplify proofs, we use the equivalent weights (1, 0, 1) In spite of its wide use (e.g. the CM is commonly used to rank sports teams) surprisingly little is known about it. Our first paper [SM] examines single profile CM properties by contrasting the CM rankings with those of positional procedures, by describing how the CM rankings vary as candidates enter or drop out of the election, and by comparing the natural and CM rankings associated with certain profiles. Recall; a profile is ....
....watching a TV debate, Mr. Smith decides to rank Ms. Young second instead of last while keeping fixed his relative ranking of the other two candidates. We would expect this preference change to help, not hurt, Young s chances. Indeed, procedures failing monotonicity (such as, say, runo# elections [Sm, S1]) admit the perversity that a candidate can be beaten by increasing her support Suppose c 1 , Young, is a CM winner. Before the debate, Smith had c 1 bottomranked, so in the original profile p 1 his type was either four or five; assume he was type four with the c 3 # c 2 # c 1 ranking. By ....
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Smith, JH, Aggregation of preferences with variable electorate, Econometrica 41 (1973), 1027-1041.
Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach - Gilboa, Schmeidler (1999) (Correct)
....function of outcomes are derived from preferences. This model generalizes Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997) in which the utility function is assumed given and only the similarity function is derived from observed preferences. Another interpretation is the derivation of scoring rules in voting theory. Smith (1973), Young (1975) and Myerson (1995) provide such axiomatic derivations. These models bear similarity to ours in that they assume a selection of candidates as a function of the number of votes cast of each possible ballot, corresponding in our model to the ranking of eventualities as a function of ....
Smith, J. H. (1973), "Aggregation of Preferences With Variable Electorate ", Econometrica, 41, 1027-1041.
Deriving Consensus in Multiagent Systems - Ephrati, Rosenschein (1996) (10 citations) (Correct)
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J. S. Smith. Aggregation of preferences with variable electorate. Econometrica, 41:1027-- 41, 1973.
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