| Johnson N.F. et al., (1999) Crowds Eects and Volatility in a Competitive Market. Physica A 269 |
.... , which implies that is much larger than in the previous case. Note that in both cases hAi = 0, but global eciency is very di erent The transition from a state where N to a state with is generic in the minority game, and it has been been discussed by several authors [24,35,7,36]. For = 0, the asymptotic state of the dynamics depends on the initial conditions. Indeed the above argument generalizes by observing that i (t) i (0) does not depend on i. Hence the initial heterogeneity across agents is preserved by the dynamics and the asymptotic state will depend on ....
....into A (t) A(t) a i (t) s;i . With = 0 Eq. 14) models agents who neglect their market impact, i.e. who behave as price takers. The last term corrects this behavior either approximately ( 1) or exactly ( 1) 3. 5 Early results The MG was introduced [3] and is often discussed [24 26,35,7,30] with = 0, 1 which means that agents use their best strategy and with Eq. 14) replaced by U s;i (t 1) U s;i (t) s;i sign A(t) In this setting, numerical studies [3,24,40] have uncovered a remarkably rich phenomenology as a function of the the number of states or information ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
Johnson N.F. et al., (1999) Crowds Eects and Volatility in a Competitive Market. Physica A 269
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Johnson, N.F. and M. Hart and P. M. Hui, (1999), Crowd eects and volatility in a competitive market, Physica A, vol. 269
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Johnson, N.F. and M. Hart and P. M. Hui, \Crowd eects and volatility in a competitive market", cond-mat/9811227.
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