Josh Benaloh and Moti Yung, Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters, In the proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), 1986.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....ineligible entities to vote. 9 4.3 Veri ability The third requirement is that of veri ability. One version of this requirement is individual veri ability, namely that individuals are able to verify that their votes had been counted correctly. A stronger requirement is universal veri ability [BY86], ensuring that any party, including a passive observer, can convince herself that the election is fair, i.e. that the published nal tally is computed fairly from the ballots that were correctly cast. Since the individual vote vectors are published by the talliers in our scheme, both individual ....

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. \Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters". In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), pp. 52-62, 1986.

....subject of many papers. At this point, it is fair to mention that the probabilistic cryptosystem that we propose is actually quite close to the most general case of the homomorphic encryption schemes introduced by Benaloh in his Ph D thesis [4] Still, both in this thesis and in the related work ([5, 6, 7]) the security and potential applications are only investigated in a setting where the bandwith remains small. A more recent paper by Park and Won (see [24] describes a related probabilistic cryptosystem using a trapdoor based on injecting a single power of a small odd integer into p Gamma 1 or ....

J. D. Cohen Benaloh and M. Yung, Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters, Proc. of 5h Symp. on Principles of Distributed Computing, 1986, 52--62.

....subcollection of the remaining parties. Bit commitment [19, 81] is a two party version of secret sharing. Mental poker [106, 45, 29, 31, 32] is a multi party protocol for producing, and partially applying, a random permutation (i.e. shu e and deal a deck of cards) Secret ballot election schemes [28, 17] are essentially a special case of secure multi party computation in which the function is a simple sum of ones and zeros. 20 3. BUILDING BLOCKS 3.1 Secure Two Party Permutation Protocols 3.1.1 Secure Two Party Permutation Problem Problem 3.1.1. Secure Two Party Permutation Problem) Alice has ....

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. In Proceedings of the Fifth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 52-62, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, August 11 - 13, 1986.

....secretballot election scheme using PVSS as a basic tool. We show that by using our PVSS scheme we get a simple and efficient election scheme. This is not the case for the PVSS schemes of [Sta96] and [FO98] We follow the model for universally verifiable elections as introduced by Benaloh et al. [CF85,BY86,Ben87b], which assumes the availability of a so called 10 bulletin board, to which all of the players in the scheme will post their messages. The players comprise a set of tallying authorities (talliers) A 1 ; An , a set of voters V 1 ; Vm , and a set of passive observers. These sets ....

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. In Proc. 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC '86), pages 52--62, New York, 1986. A.C.M.

....political party, representatives of organizations such as the Consumentenbond, and so on. In this way we achieve a form of distributed trust. The idea of distributed trust is incorporated in the bulletin board model, a paradigm for verifiable elections set forth by Benaloh et al. e.g. see [7, 6, 4]) Another important aspect of the model is that the bulletin board is assumed to behave as a broadcast channel such that everybody is able to see what is posted in the bulletin board. To discuss the bulletin board model we distinguish four types of roles in the election process. Officers ....

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. In Proc. 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC '86), pages 52--62, New York, 1986. A.C.M.

....and Abe [OA00] Abe [Abe98, Abe99] Jakobsson [Jak98, Jak99] attacked in [DK00, MK00] and Jakobsson and Juels [JJ99] For actual implementations of MIX networks see [SGR97] and the references therein. In contrast to the schemes mentioned in the previous paragraph, the ones introduced in [CF85, BY86, Ben87] do not rely on the use of anonymous channels. In these schemes ballots are distributed over a number of tallying authorities through a special type of broadcast channel. Rather than hiding the correspondence between the voter and his ballot, the value of the vote is hidden. Among these latter ....

....As in [CGS97] the work needed to verify that a voter sent in a well formed ballot is O(k) per voter. Our MTS proposal combines features of two parallel lines of research concerning electronic voting schemes, those based on MIX networks (a la [Cha81] and in homomorphic encryption schemes (a la [CF85, BY86, Ben87]) We use homomorphic (ElGamal) encryption in order to hide the vote tallies.We rely on special properties of the ElGamal cryptosystem in order to perform an equality test between the tally and members of S. We use MIX networks (ElGamal based) in order to hide the value of the member of S involved ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. In Proc. 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing - PODC'86, 52-62. ACM.

....not to cast a vote, nobody is able to cast a fraudulent vote in place of the voter. 1 Introduction Secure electronic voting requires the exchange of untraceable yet authentic messages. Broadly two different approaches have been proposed: i) approaches that require complex encryption schemes [1, 6, 7, 10], and ( ii) approaches that require an anonymous channel [2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14] that is used to cast the ballot as an untraceable message. The protocol we propose does not require any complex cryptographic schemes. Our protocol is similar to the ones in [8, 9] but does not need an anonymous ....

J. Benaloh and M. Young. Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters. In Proc. of the 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 52--62, August 1986.

....Internet. Secure electronic voting requires the exchange of untraceable yet authentic messages. Over the past few years quite an amount of work has been done in this area. Broadly two different approaches have been proposed: 1. approaches that rely on complex encryption schemes to cast a ballot [1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14] (Note: all security protocols use some form of encryption technology; these protocols make use of complex technology that are not widely prevelant. 2. approaches that rely on the existence of an anonymous channel [2, 6, 10, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19] that is used to cast the ballot as an untraceable ....

....vote casting. To our knowledge no other voting protocol can make such a claim. 2 Related Work A number of electronic voting protocols have been proposed over the last few years. These can be broadly divided into two types: 1. approaches that rely on complex encryption schemes to cast a ballot [1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14]. Note all security protocols use some form of encryption technology; these particular protocols use complex technologies that are not widely prevelant for example zero knowledge protocols and threshold cryptosystems. 2. approaches that rely on the existence of an anonymous channel [2, 6, 10, ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

J. Benaloh and M. Young. Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters. In Proc. of the 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 52--62, August 1986.

....privacy is sometimes required [8] while we only require computational privacy. Receipt freeness [2] and preventing vote duplication can be achieved by other means (see, for example, 17] and are not considered here. Many voting schemes meeting the above requirements have been proposed [6, 3, 4, 8, 9, 23, 10]. However, all previously known schemes achieving universal verifiability rely on fully homomorphic encryption schemes, where the homomorphism is over additive group Z n and n is larger than the number of voters (our use of the term fully homomorphic is explained above) One typical paradigm is ....

....in the authorities, they may also provide a (publicly verifiable) proof that decryption was done correctly. In this way, everyone is assured that all votes were correctly counted. Many examples of fully homomorphic encryption schemes are known (for example: 12, 6, 21] The voting schemes of [6, 3, 4] are based on the r th residuosity assumption, those of [8, 9, 23] are based on the discrete logarithm assumption in prime groups, and the scheme of [10] is based on hardness of deciding residue classes in Z N 2 . Even so, it is interesting to determine the minimal assumptions under which an ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters. PODC 1986.

....key) the protocol could require that the donor s additionally submit an encryption of the representations under their public key and a ZK proof that they encrypted the correct value. These data are additionally entered into the public database. 3. Using techniques from distributed cryptography [6, 14] the trust can be distributed over several agencies that cooperate in the execution of the protocol. 4. As the donors and the values g b h r they submitted are publicly known they can be forced to reveal their secret values in the revelation phase by external means. 5. Our cryptography based ....

J. Benaloh and M. Yung, "Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters", ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, 1985.

.... include, e.g. S91,NSS91,FOO92,CC97,HS98] that involve privacy schemes such as blind signatures [Cha85] All or Nothing Disclosure of Secrets (ANDOS) BC86] and anonymous communication channels [Cha81,RR98] The latter include decentralized schemes that are based on homomorphic secret sharing [BY86,SK94,CFSY96,CGS97,Sch99], and a self adjudicating scheme which requires public signatures only [DmLM82] All of these protocols require the voter to seal and or anonymize her ballot by employing fairly heavy cryptographic tools. We introduce a new voting scheme that relaxes this requirement. 3 Model We assume a system ....

....the registrars know the VID s until after the voting is over. For Veri ability, i.e. the ability of each voter to verify that her vote is correctly tallied, the protocol allows anyone to verify that published ballots are correctly tallied, i.e. it achieves universal veri ability in the sense of [BY86], and for each voter to separately verify that her ballot is included in the tally. Finally, we consider Privacy. Since ballots are cast in pieces and combined using AMPC, and likewise the VIDs that validate them, no ballot can be linked to the voter who cast it. An interesting property of the ....

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. \Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters". In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), pp. 52-62, 1986.

....string for eventual NIZKPK. Notice that the authority would intervene only once and for all. 4 Election Protocols At CRYPTO 94 Sako and Kilian presented a new voting scheme based on partially compatible homomorphisms [13] Their scheme is based on a previous protocol of Benaloh and Yung [1]. They improve on the previous scheme by using a more general family of homomorphic encryption functions based on a discrete log like problem. Moreover they incorporate more modern techniques (which were not available at the time of the original paper of Benaloh and Yung) to improve the overall ....

Josh Benaloh and Moti Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. In 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 52--62, 1986.

....More recent proposals of these type are those of Abe [Abe98] Jakobsson [Jak98, Jak99] and Jakobsson and Juels [JJ99] For actual implementations of MIX networks see [SGR97] and the references therein. In contrast to the schemes mentioned in the previous paragraph, the ones introduced in [CF85, BY86, Ben87] do not rely on the use of anonymous channels. In these schemes ballots are distributed over a number of tallying authorities through a special type of broadcast channel. Rather than hiding the correspondence between the voter and his ballot, the value of the vote is hidden. Among 2 these latter ....

....of O(k) bit sized numbers will be our unit with respect to which we measure computational costs. 3 Our MTS proposal combines features of two parallel lines of research concerning electronic voting schemes, those based on MIX networks (a la [Cha81] and in homomorphic encryption schemes (a la [CF85, BY86, Ben87]) We use homomorphic (ElGamal) encryption in order to hide the vote tallies. We rely on special properties of the ElGamal cryptosystem in order to perform an equality test between the tally and members of S. We use MIX networks (ElGamal based) in order to hide the value of the member of S ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. In Proc. 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing - PODC'86, 52--62. ACM.

....implements the cryptographic protocols designed for veri able elections. For further reading on the topic of (universally) veri able elections we have included some references at the end of this article. The approach described above follows the paradigm introduced by Benaloh et al. e.g. see [CF85, BY86, Ben87]) the scheme of [CGS97] uses novel cryptographic tools to obtain a secure and ecient implementation of such a scheme. We used a variant of this scheme as the voting engine for the InternetStem project, a small scale shadow election held during the Dutch national elections in May 1998. The ....

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. In Proc. 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC '86), pages 52-62, New York, 1986. A.C.M.

....is veri able to any observer of the election, while due to the use of a matching fault tolerant threshold decryption technique, the individual votes will remain private and the (benign or malign) failure of authorities can be tolerated. We work in the model set forth by Benaloh et al. CF85, BY86, Ben87] where the active parties are divided into l voters V 1 ; V l and n tallying authorities (talliers) A 1 ; A n . To achieve universal veri ability all parties have access to a so called bulletin board. A bulletin board is like a broadcast channel with memory to the extent ....

....privacy By far, the majority of election protocols that support some level of veri ability (either universal or limited to voters, who can check their own vote) merely provide computational protection of the voter s privacy. For example, the schemes presented by Benaloh et al. CF85, BY86, Ben87, BT94] all rely on the so called r th residuosity assumption. Once this assumption is broken (e.g. when the public modulus is factorized) the content of each individual ballot can be decrypted. Similarly, schemes using anonymous channels or mixes [Cha81] usually rely on computational ....

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. In Proc. 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC '86), pages 52-62, New York, 1986. A.C.M.

....As a result, verifiable vote buying is impossible. Several schemes have been proposed, they can be divided in the class of schemes without administrators (e.g. HuTe90, PfWa92] schemes with administrators, which use special encryption functions to guarantee the anonymity of the votes (e.g. [BeYu86, Iver91, BeTu94, SaKi94, CFSY96]) and schemes with administrators which use anonymous channels to guarantee the anonymity of the votes. Within the latter class there are schemes based either on a general anonymous channel (e.g. FuOO92, HoMP95] a special type of an anonymous channel [Chau81, OkFO93] or an anonymous channel ....

J.C.Benaloh, M.Yung, "Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters", Proc. of Symposium of Principles of Distributed Computing, (1986), pp. 52--62.

....for, where the receipt of a vote, which proves that a voter has voted for a candidate, could be used by another party to coerce the voter. Benaloh and Tuinsra [BT94] introduced the concept of the receipt free voting based on the framework of the voting scheme using higher degree residue encryption [BY86, CF85]. They used a physical assumption, the existence of a voting booth. Their scheme allows voters only yes no voting and is very impractical for large scale elections, since a lot of communication and computation overhead is needed to prevent the dishonesty of voters by using zero knowledge (like) ....

....of voters by using zero knowledge (like) protocols. Sako and Kilian [SK94] and Cramer, Franklin, Schoenmaker and Yung [CFSY96] improved the efficiency of the underlying zero knowledge protocols by using discrete logarithm encryption in place of the higher degree residue encryption used in [BY86, CF85, BT94]. However, their schemes do not satisfy receipt freeness. Moreover, their scheme allows voters only yes no voting, and if it is extended to multiple bit voting, their schemes are still inefficient in practice. Sako and Kilian [SK95] proposed a receipt free voting scheme based on the Mixnet ....

J. Benaloh and M. Yung, "Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Votes", Proc. of PODC'86, pp.52--62 (1986).

....using results in [2, 6] it is known that multiple theorems can be proven using the same random string. 4 Election Protocols At CRYPTO 94 Sako and Kilian presented a new voting scheme based on partially compatible homomorphisms [10] Their scheme is based on a previous protocol of Benaloh and Yung [1]. Their improvements on the previous scheme are twofold: ffl they use a more general family of homomorphic encryption functions based on a discrete log like problem. ffl they incorporate more modern techniques (which were not available at the time of the original paper of Benaloh and Yung) to ....

Josh Benaloh and Moti Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. In 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 52--62, 1986.

....an authority and then collected by way of anonymous channel such as Mixnet[2] so that no one can associate a vote with a voter, but only authorized votes are tallied. This mechanism is equivalent to the class of digital cash protocols that satisfie the privacy of payment. 2. Multiparty computation [6, 9, 8, 10] Votes are divided up among independent CTFs so that no single (or up to a constant) CTF can determine any individual vote. Secret sharing and relevant techniques are used to sum up all votes without revealing anyone s vote. Verifiable secret sharing schemes and zero knowledge protocols are often ....

Benaloh, J. and Yung, M., Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voter, Proc. of ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pp.52-62, 1986

....the result of the voting. Fairness : Nothing must affect the voting. 4.2 Reviews of Some Secure Voting Schemes. Chaum [7] was the first who proposed an election protocol. Several other voting schemes have been proposed by other researchers emphasizing theoretical and practical aspects of voting [18, 1, 9, 14, 7, 2, 13]. In some proposals, the whole voting procedure is controlled by voters themselves. However many interactions among voters are necessary to prove that the voting procedure has been done correctly. As in real voting systems there is no interaction among voters, these protocols are interesting ....

....that provides secrecy and authenticity, we can use the two following methods of transmission of untraceable yet authentic ballots: 1. the ballot is sent in an encrypted form; 2. the ballot is sent through an anonymous communication channel. The first approach is proposed by Benaloh and Yung [1], Cohen and Fischer [9] and Iversen [14] Their schemes utilize encryption techniques. The second approach has been proposed by Chaum [7] Boyd [2] and Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta [13] Their schemes used an anonymous communication channel, and one administrator. They provide unconditional ....

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of votes. Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 52--62, August 1986.

....is verifiable to any observer of the election, while due to the use of a matching fault tolerant threshold decryption technique, the individual votes will remain private and the (benign or malign) failure of authorities can be tolerated. We work in the model set forth by Benaloh et al. CF85, BY86, Ben87] where the active parties are divided into l voters V 1 ; V l and n tallying authorities (talliers) A 1 ; An . To achieve universal verifiability all parties have access to a so called bulletin board. A bulletin board is like a broadcast channel with memory to the extent ....

....privacy By far, the majority of election protocols that support some level of verifiability (either universal or limited to voters, who can check their own vote) merely provide computational protection of the voter s privacy. For example, the schemes presented by Benaloh et al. CF85, BY86, Ben87, BT94] all rely on the so called r th residuosity assumption. Once this assumption is broken (e.g. when the public modulus is factorized) the content of each individual ballot can be decrypted. Similarly, schemes using anonymous channels or mixes [Cha81] usually rely on computational ....

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. In Proc. 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC '86), pages 52--62, New York, 1986. A.C.M.

....society. The problem of providing a secure system which ensures privacy of the voters and accuracy of the votes, and is suitable for application in large scale voting has been the subject of research for a number of years. Work has been done from both theoretical and practical points of view [1, 2, 9, 5, 15, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 3]. In some proposal, the whole voting procedure is controlled by the voters. To ensure the correctness of voting results usually many interactions among voters are necessary. However, in a real voting system there is no interaction among voters and hence such schemes are only of theoretical ....

....protocol that provides secrecy and authenticity, two approaches for the transmission of untraceable yet authentic ballots are proposed: 1. the ballot be sent in an encrypted form, and 2. the ballot be sent through an anonymous communication channel. In first approach proposed by Benaloh and Yung [5], Cohen and Fischer [15] and Iversen [4] using encryption techniques. The second approach, proposed by Chaum [6] Ohta [10] Asano, Matsumoto and Imai [11] Boyd [12] and Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta [3] uses an anonymous communication channel, and an administrator, and provides unconditional ....

J. Benaloh, and M. Yung, "Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Votes", Proceeding of the 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing pp.52-62 (Aug.1986).

....is verifiable to any observer of the election, while due to the use of a matching fault tolerant threshold decryption technique, the individual votes will remain private and the (benign or malign) failure of authorities can be tolerated. We work in the model set forth by Benaloh et al. CF85, BY86, Ben87] where the active parties are divided into l voters V 1 ; V l and n tallying authorities (talliers) A 1 ; A n . To achieve universal verifiability all parties have access to a so called bulletin board. A bulletin board is like a broadcast channel with memory to the extent ....

....privacy By far, the majority of election protocols that support some level of verifiability (either universal or limited to voters, who can check their own vote) merely provide computational protection of the voter s privacy. For example, the schemes presented by Benaloh et al. CF85, BY86, Ben87, BT94] all rely on the so called r th residuosity assumption. Once this assumption is broken (e.g. when the public modulus is factorized) the content of each individual ballot can be decrypted. Similarly, schemes using anonymous channels or mixes [Cha81] usually rely on computational ....

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. In Proc. 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC '86), pages 52--62, New York, 1986. A.C.M.

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Josh Benaloh and Moti Yung, Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters, In the proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), 1986.

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Josh Benaloh and Moti Yung, Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters, In the proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), 1986.

....this one value W to determine the tally of the election; and by providing a certificate u of this decryption, the government can prove to all observers that the claimed tally is accurate. There are, of course, many problems with this scheme. But this is the fundamental idea used in [CoFi85] [BeYu86], Cohe86] Bena87] and [BeTu94] to enable a variety of practical verifiable election schemes. 4 Conclusions This paper has described a method of dense probabilistic encryption which has many similarities to, but many advantages over, the original method of probabilistic encryption introduced ....

Benaloh, J. and Yung, M. "Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters." Proc. 5 th ACM Symp. on Principles of Distributed Computing, Calgary, AB (Aug. 1986), 52--62.

....that only a subset (of a size larger than a certain threshold) of the authorities is required to participate throughout the execution of the scheme in order to compute the final tally. 1. 2 Related Work The type of voting schemes considered in this paper was first introduced and implemented in [CF85, BY86, Ben87b]. In these schemes, privacy and robustness are achieved by distributing the ballots over a number of tallying authorities, while still achieving universal verifiability. This contrasts with other approaches in which the ballots are submitted anonymously to guarantee privacy for the individual ....

....of blind signatures as in privacy protecting payment systems (see, e.g. Che94] to achieve privacy. For these approaches it seems difficult however to attain all desired properties, 2. Cryptographic Primitives 4 and still achieve high performance and provable security. The voting schemes of [CF85, BY86, Ben87b] rely on an r th residuosity assumption. In [SK94] it is shown that such schemes can also be based on a discrete logarithm assumption (without fully addressing robustness, though) and how this leads to considerable efficiency improvements. In the present paper we will also address various ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. In Proc. 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC '86), pages 52--62, New York, 1986. A.C.M.

....that only a subset (of a size larger than a certain threshold) of the authorities is required to participate throughout the execution of the scheme in order to compute the final tally. 1. 2 Related Work The type of voting schemes considered in this paper was first introduced and implemented in [CF85, BY86, Ben87b]. In these schemes, privacy and robustness are achieved by distributing the ballots over a number of tallying authorities, while still achieving universal verifiability. This contrasts with other approaches in which the ballots are submitted anonymously to guarantee privacy for the individual ....

....[Cha81] or even some form of blind signatures as in privacy protecting payment systems (see, e.g. Che94] to achieve privacy. For these approaches it seems difficult however to attain all desired properties, and still achieve high performance and provable security. The voting schemes of [CF85, BY86, Ben87b] rely on an r th residuosity assumption. In [SK94] it is shown that such schemes can also be based on a discrete logarithm assumption (without fully addressing robustness, though) and how this leads to considerable efficiency improvements. In the present paper we will also address various ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

J. Benaloh and M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. In Proc. 5th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC '86), pages 52--62, New York, 1986. A.C.M.

No context found.

J. D. Cohen Benaloh and M. Yung, Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters, Proc. of 5h Symp. on Principles of Distributed Computing, 1986, 52--62.

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J. D. Cohen Benaloh and M. Yung, Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters, Proc. of 5h Symp. on Principles of Distributed Computing, 1986, 52--62.

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J. Benaloh, M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pp. 52-62, 1986.

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J. D. Cohen Benaloh and M. Yung, Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters, Proc. of 5h Symp. on Principles of Distributed Computing, 1986, 52--62.

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J. D. Cohen Benaloh and M. Yung, Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters, Proc. of 5h Symp. on Principles of Distributed Computing, 1986, 52--62.

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Benaloh, J., and M. Yung. \Distributing the Power of Government to Enhance the Privacy of Votes." Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on the Principles of Distributed Computing. (August 1986).

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J. D. Cohen Benaloh and M. Yung, Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters, Proc. of 5h Symp. on Principles of Distributed Computing, 1986, 52--62.

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J. Benaloh and M. Yung. Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters. PODC 1986.

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J. Benaloh, M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pp. 52-62, 1986.

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J. Benaloh, M. Yung, "Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters", ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, 52-62, 1986.

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J. Benaloh, M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pp. 52-62, 1986.

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