Martn Abadi. Personal communication.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....But it is not all that bad either; see for example [SBM92] where an (incomplete) proof is given of Fischer s protocol. When it would be written out in full detail, that proof would be about as long and tedious as ours is [Sch94] and the same probably holds for a detailed temporal logic proof [Aba94]. Looking at our proof one observes that, although conceptually very clear and easy, the inner workings required a lot of bothersome and failure prone computations. It seems valid to doubt whether all these calculations were really necessary. Much of their complexity results from the fact that the ....

M. Abadi, 1994. Personal communication.

....But it is not all that bad either; see for example [SBM92] where an (incomplete) proof is given of Fischer s protocol. When it would be written out in full detail, that proof would be about as long and tedious as ours is [Sch94] and the same probably holds for a detailed temporal logic proof [Aba94]. Looking at our proof one observes that, although conceptually very clear and easy, the inner workings required a lot of bothersome and failure prone computations. It seems valid to doubt whether all these calculations were really necessary. Much of their complexity results from the fact that the ....

M. Abadi, 1994. Personal communication.

.... Manber proposed one simple approach based on hashing a random salt with the password; the resulting hash digest is stored, but the salt is securely deleted [Man96] Abadi, Lomas, and Needham recently independently proposed a scheme for strengthening passwords which is very similar to Manber s [Aba97]; Abadi et al. also show how to apply that approach to communication security in a setting similar to the one we envision for key stretching. They point out several important di#erences between key stretching and password strengthening, which are worth repeating: Strengthening requires extra ....

M. Abadi, personal communication.

.... Manber proposed one simple approach based on hashing a random salt with the password; the resulting hash digest is stored, but the salt is securely deleted [Man96] Abadi, Lomas, and Needham recently independently proposed a scheme for strengthening passwords which is very similar to Manber s [Aba97]; Abadi et al. also show how to apply that approach to communication security in a setting similar to the one we envision for key stretching. They point out several important differences between key stretching and password strengthening, which are worth repeating: Strengthening requires ....

M. Abadi, personal communication.

....Diffie Hellman keyexchange. As written, the document indicates that the server should sign an empty structure when anonymous key exchange is in use. An earlier version of this paper included a critical analysis based on that erroneous interpretation. However, we have since been informed [Aba96, Die96] that our understanding of the specification was faulty: the SSL 3.0 designers intended that the signature be omitted entirely when the server was anonymous, and implementors have followed this route. To prevent confusion, we recommend that this small typo be fixed. For clarity, we reprint the ....

M. Abadi, personal communication, October 1996.

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Martn Abadi. Personal communication.

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M. Abadi, personal communication.

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