K. Honda, V. Vasconcelos, and N. Yoshida. Secure information ow as typed process behaviour. In Proceedings ESOP'00, number 1782 in LNCS, pages 180-199, 2000.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....x in the type environment and the process P . Given that names are the only kind of value, this technique is simpler than the standard technique from dependent type theory [NPS90,Bar92] of de ning typing judgments with respect to an equivalence relation on values. Honda, Vasconcelos, and Yoshida [HVY00] also use the technique of applying 19 substitutions to environments while type checking. 7 Conclusions The long term objective of this work is to check secrecy and authenticity properties of security protocols by typing. This paper introduces several key ideas in the minimal yet general ....

K. Honda, V. Vasconcelos, and N. Yoshida. Secure information ow as typed process behaviour. In European Symposium on Programming, Lectures Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2000.

....which happens to be public, that is, not secret. We try to use public key only with the latter meaning, and prefer encryption key for the former. The type system. The type system is based on old ideas on secrecy levels [15] and on the newer trend of representing these levels in types (e.g. [1, 11, 19 21, 29, 30, 33, 35]) For example, Public and Secret are the types of public data and secret data, respectively. In addition, the type system gives information on the intended usage and structure of data, like standard type systems. For example, T 1 ; T 2 ] is the type of a secret encryption key that is used to ....

Kohei Honda, Vasco Vasconcelos, and Nobuko Yoshida. Secure information ow as typed process behaviour. In Gert Smolka, editor, Programming Languages and Systems: Proceedings of the 9th European Symposium on Programming (ESOP 2000.

....keys and their usage are hidden from the low observable view so that the resulting security condition allows for protocols with encryption to be represented in a noninterference like fashion. Honda et al. propose a powerful type system for tracking information ow in the asynchronous pi calculus [25, 26]. While not designed for expressing information ow in high level languages, their rich channel types allow for encoding other type systems (e.g. 47] for high level multi threaded languages. The compositionality principle of [33] focuses on the level of processes rather than on the level of ....

K. Honda, V. Vasconcelos, and N. Yoshida. Secure information ow as typed process behaviour. In Proc. of European Symposium on Programming, LNCS 1782, pages 180-199, 2000.

....the type environment and the process P . Given that names are the only kind of value, this technique is simpler than the standard technique from dependent type theory [NPS90, Bar92] of de ning typing 18 judgments with respect to an equivalence relation on values. Honda, Vasconcelos, and Yoshida [HVY00] also use the technique of applying substitutions to environments while type checking. 7 Conclusions The long term objective of this work is to check secrecy and authenticity properties of security protocols by typing. This paper introduces several key ideas in the minimal yet general setting of ....

K. Honda, V. Vasconcelos, and N. Yoshida. Secure information ow as typed process behaviour. In European Symposium on Programming, Lectures Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2000. 29

....kernel of more sophisticated practical languages. 22 The question of secure information ow and noninterference has also been investigated in the setting of process calculi [5, 15] More recently, there have been studies on noninterference for functional languages [14] and mobile process calculi [9], 8] and [7] The latter papers are closer to our work, as they use a type system to enforce noninterference. The treatment in [9] and [8] however, seems overly restrictive: it amounts (at least in the core calculus) to forbid all control ow from actions on high channels to actions on low ....

....in the setting of process calculi [5, 15] More recently, there have been studies on noninterference for functional languages [14] and mobile process calculi [9] 8] and [7] The latter papers are closer to our work, as they use a type system to enforce noninterference. The treatment in [9] and [8] however, seems overly restrictive: it amounts (at least in the core calculus) to forbid all control ow from actions on high channels to actions on low channels. In [9] the core calculus is extended with more sophisticated constructs; in the extended calculus some actions may be classi ....

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K. Honda, V. Vasconcelos, and N. Yoshida. Secure information ow as typed process behaviour. In Proceedings ESOP'00, number 1782 in LNCS, pages 180-199, 2000.

....encryption decryption primitives preserve values of type Secret from certain kinds of attackers. It would be interesting to add these primitives to the our security calculus and to try to adapt the associated type rules to the set of I Types. An extension of the calculus is also considered in [17], where a sophisticated type system is used to control information ow. The judgements in their system take the form s P . A where s is a security level, P is a process term, A is a poset of so called action nodes and is a type environment. Their environments are quite similar to ours, ....

....input output types annotated with, among other things, security levels. However their intuition, and much of the technical development, is quite di erent from ours. In summary it appears that our type system addresses information ow within the core calculus while the more sophisticated one of [17] controls the ow allowed via the extra syntactic constructs of their language. However a more thorough comparison between the two systems deserves to be made. Acknowledgements: The research was partially funded by EPSRC grant GR L93056, and ESPRT Working Group Confer2. The authors would like to ....

Kohei Honda, Vasco Vasconcelos, and Nobuko Yoshida Honda. Secure information ow as typed process behaviour. In Proceedings of European Symposium on Programming (ESOP) 2000. Springer-Verlag, 2000.

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K. Honda, V. Vasconcelos, and N. Yoshida. Secure information ow as typed process behaviour. In Proceedings ESOP'00, number 1782 in LNCS, pages 180-199, 2000.

No context found.

Kohei Honda, Vasco Vasconcelos, and Nobuko Yoshida Honda. Secure information ow as typed process behaviour. In Proceedings of European Symposium on Programming (ESOP) 2000.

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Kohei Honda, Vasco T. Vasconcelos, and Nobuko Yoshida. Secure information ow as typed process behaviour. In Proc. ESOP'99, 2000.

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Kohei Honda, Vasco T. Vasconcelos, and Nobuko Yoshida. Secure information ow as typed process behaviour. In Proc. ESOP'99, 2000.

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Kohei Honda, Vasco Vasconcelos, and Nobuko Yoshida Honda. Secure information ow as typed process behaviour. In Proceedings of European Symposium on Programming (ESOP) 2000.

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K. Honda, V. Vasconcelos, and N. Yoshida. Secure information ow as typed process behaviour. In Proceedings of ESOP 2000.

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