| Burmester, M., Y. Desmedt, and J. Seberry. (1998). "Equitable Key Escrow with Limited Time Span (or How to Enforce Time Expiration Cryptographically)." In Advances in Cryptology---ASIACRYPT '98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1514. Berlin: Springer, pp. 380--391. |
....between the following two distributions with non negligible advantage over a random guess: g ) where x Z p , and : g 1 , g 2 , g n ) where g 1 , g 2 , g n G. Notice that 2 PDDH is the same as the Decisional Square Exponent Di#eHellman assumption [BDS98,SS01]. We also need a weaker, computational assumption defined below. n Power Computational Di#e Hellman (n PCDH) assumption. No probabilistic polynomial time algorithm can compute g given g , g with non negligible probability. The 2 PCDH assumption is equivalent to the Computational ....
M. Burmester, Y. Desmedt, and J. Seberry, "Equitable key escrow with limited time span (or, How to enforce time expiration cryptographically)," Proc. of Asiacrypt'98, pp. 380--391, 1998.
....x. But to get c, he must carry out brute search for a. From the description above, we can see that once LEA has monitored a user, he knows the user s private key c for ever. That will cause abuse. Of course, for general key escrow schemes, such problem exists, too. We call it monitoring problem. [2] proposes a new partial key escrow scheme, which avoids such a problem. But it leaves open for partial key escrow. In this paper, although we are not intend to propose a new escrow scheme, we construct a new monitoring scheme. And the escrow scheme is based on [5] When monitoring, an escrow ....
M. Burmester, Y. Desmedt, and J. Seberry, "Equitable key escrow with limited time span ( or How to enforce time expiration cryptographically )," Advances in Cryptology-Asiacrpt'98, LNCS 1514, pp 380-391, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1998.
....to the LEAF obscuring attack. Fault Detectable Equitable Key Escrow of ACISP 99 : Limiting escrow activity in time has been an important requirement for key escrow systems. Recently several protocols were proposed for limited time span key escrow (see x3:5 of [4] and contract bidding (see x3 of [1] and x4 of [4] In the following, for our analysis, the Viswanathan Boyd Dawson will be briefly reviewed. Bob generates a large prime p such that p = 2n 1, where n = p 1 p 2 and large primes p 1 = p 2 = 3 mod 4. Bob then chooses a generator g of Z p , his privatekey x 2R Zn and the public key ....
....share, then it will be difficult to compute the old private key from the existing shares. 4) For secure communication at time = t, Alice sends Bob the ElGamal encryption ElG(m) g r ; my r t ) r 2R Z p Gamma1 of a message m 2 Z p with y t . Vulnerability to Double Encryption Attack : In [1] and [4] both of them insist that their proposals do not require tamper proof H W or S W for security of the system. However, let s consider the case that, at time = t, two rogue users Alice and Bob agree to perform a secure communication at time = t 1. First, at time = t, Alice asks Bob for ....
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M.Burmester, Y.G.Desmedt, and J.Seberry, "Equitable Key Escrow with Limited Time Span (or, How to Enforce Time Expiration Cryptographically) ", Advanced in Cryptology - Asiacrypt'98, Springer-Verlag, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS 1514, pp.380-391, 1998.
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Burmester, M., Y. Desmedt, and J. Seberry. (1998). "Equitable Key Escrow with Limited Time Span (or How to Enforce Time Expiration Cryptographically)." In Advances in Cryptology---ASIACRYPT '98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1514. Berlin: Springer, pp. 380--391.
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