M.Abadi,C.Fournet,andG.Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In POPL '00: Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pages 302--315. ACM Press, 2000.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....which studies an infrastructure providing a similar abstraction to that of this paper. All involve more or less idealised models of algorithms rather than directly executable code. The latter includes encodings of choice [NP96] # join communication [FG96] and authenticated communication [AFG00] all in terms of some code that in principle is executable. There is a trade o# here: the idealised models can be expressed in a simpler formal framework, greatly simplifying correctness proofs, but they are further removed from implementation, increasing the likelihood that important details ....

Martn Abadi, Cedric Fournet, and Georges Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In Proceedings of POPL '00. ACM, 2000.

.... is related to the verification of an entity s claimed identity [1] while message authentication should make it possible for the receiver of a message to ascertain its origin [2] In recent years there have been some formalizations of these di#erent aspects of authentication (see, e.g. [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16]) These formalizations are crucial for proofs of authentication properties, that sometimes have been automatized (see, e.g. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] # This work has been partially supported by MURST Progetto TOSCA, Progetto AI, TS CFA and Progetto Metodi formali per la Sicurezza . We here ....

M. Abadi, C. Fournet, G. Gonthier. Authentication Primitives and their compilation. In Proc. of POPL'00, pp. 302--315. ACM Press, 2000.

....[7, 18] 16 In contrast, little work seems to have been done on formalizing secure RPC. Of note is the work of Abadi, Fournet, and Gonthier [2, 3] who show how to compile the standard join calculus into the sjoin calculus, and show that the compilation is fully abstract. In a subsequent paper [4], they treat similarly and more simply a join calculus with authentication primitives: each message contains its source address, there is a way to extract the principal owning a channel from the channel, and any piece of code runs as a particular principal. Their fully abstract translation gives ....

M. Abadi, C. Fournet, and G. Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In 27th ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL'00), pages 302--315, 2000.

.... (an extension of the asynchronous pi calculus [29, 28, 10, 11, 23, 37] that represents a small kernel programming language with a cryptographic type system, and we use process equivalence techniques to reason about the preservation of secrecy and integrity properties of programs in this language [8, 4, 6, 5, 7]. In the next section we describe the ec calculus, an extension of the asynchronous pi calculus with cryptographic types. In Sect. 3 we describe the spi calculus, a machine language into which the ec calculus can be translated; this is an extension of the pi calculus with primitive ....

.... a is represented by the process a[P] This gives a two level syntax, of processes (which may be multi threaded) and principals (of which there may be several, communicating during their execution) Unlike cryptographic extensions of process calculi such as the spi calculus and the sjoin calculus [7, 8], keys and key pairs are not explicit in the ec calculus. The private key of a principal is implicitly available for signing and decryption to code executing within that principal. The public key of a principal is implicitly available for authentication and encryption to any process that knows ....

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M. Abadi, C. Fournet, and G. Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In Proceedings of ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, 2000.

....typing systems and their equivalences for the Spi calculus and Join calculi in a series of work, e.g. 1, 2, 4] In particular in [1] Abadi establishes a secrecy theorem based on a may equivalence by using type information for controlling the interface of the attacker. Abadi, Fournet and Gonthier [5] also study a process calculus with constructs for authentication and show a full abstraction translation of this calculus into a Join calculus. The main di erence with [1, 2, 5] is that we take more abstract approach using linearity of communication in order to limit the environments of opponent ....

....on a may equivalence by using type information for controlling the interface of the attacker. Abadi, Fournet and Gonthier [5] also study a process calculus with constructs for authentication and show a full abstraction translation of this calculus into a Join calculus. The main di erence with [1, 2, 5] is that we take more abstract approach using linearity of communication in order to limit the environments of opponent processes without speci c security constructors such as signatures and nonces, and then apply it for information ow analysis by adding simple security levels to channels. ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Abadi, M., Fournet, C. and Gonthier, G., Authentication Primitives and their Compilation, POPL'00, 302-315, ACM, 2000.

....which studies an infrastructure providing a similar abstraction to that of this paper. All involve more or less idealised models of algorithms rather than directly executable code. The latter includes encodings of choice [NP96] join communication [FG96] and authenticated communication [AFG00] all in terms of some code that in principle is executable. There is a trade o here: the idealised models can be expressed in a simpler formal framework, greatly simplifying correctness proofs, but they are further removed from implementation, increasing the likelihood that important details ....

Martn Abadi, Cedric Fournet, and Georges Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In Proceedings of POPL '00. ACM, 2000.

....can be applied easily to the setting of abstract types, because abstract types can be interpreted as existential types [16] and existential types can be encoded into universal types. Alternatively, parametricity can be extended directly to existential types [16, 20] Abadi, Fournet, and Gonthier [4 6] have studied process calculi with security features such as authentication and private communication, and presented fully abstract encodings of these systems into process calculi with cryptographic primitives (adaptations of the spi calculus [1, 7] and the join calculus [11, 12] As their work ....

Martn Abadi, Cedric Fournet, and Georges Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pages 302-315, 2000.

....setting of universal types, it can be applied easily to the setting of abstract types, because they can be interpreted as existential types [14] which can be encoded by universal types. Alternatively, parametricity can be extended directly to existential types [17] Abadi, Fournet, and Gonthier [4 6] have studied process calculi with security features such as authentication and private communication, and presented fully abstract encodings of these systems into process calculi with cryptographic primitives (adaptations of the spi calculus [1, 7] and the join calculus [9, 10] As their work ....

Martn Abadi, Cedric Fournet, and Georges Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pages 302-315, 2000.

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M.Abadi,C.Fournet,andG.Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In POPL '00: Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pages 302--315. ACM Press, 2000.

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M. Abadi, C. Fournet, and G. Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In POPL '00: Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pages 302--315. ACM Press, 2000.

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M. Abadi, C. Fournet, and G. Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL'00), pages 302-315. ACM, Jan. 2000.

No context found.

M. Abadi, C. Fournet, and G. Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In 27th ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL'00), pages 302--315, 2000.

No context found.

M. Abadi, C. Fournet, and G. Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In Proceedings of POPL'00, pages 302-315. ACM, Jan. 2000.

No context found.

Martn Abadi, Cedric Fournet, and Georges Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL 2000.

....and a notion of bisimulation. We obtain a general result in terms of that notion of bisimulation, then derive some privacy properties as corollaries. Thus, for the study of a particular protocol, we develop a special notion of observation of user processes. In contrast, in recent, related work [4, 3], we take a standard notion of observation, and develop communication protocols that are secure with respect to it (and which, for instance, rely on noise messages in order to hide communication patterns between compliant principals) We adopt the following notation convention. We write A, B ....

Martn Abadi, Cedric Fournet, and Georges Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In Proceedings of the 27th ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL 2000.

....but they are trivially modelled in an asynchronous setting they are just reduction steps and they do not provide any negative guarantee. Authentication and Secrecy Interpreting locations as security principals , we have also developed a model of authentication for a variant of the join calculus [4]. In this variants, we consider only a at and static parallel composition of locations. As in the distributed join calculus, every name belongs to the single location that de nes it, hence only that location can receive messages sent on that name, while other locations cannot even notice those ....

....reasoning on the security of distributed programs, but their semantics depends on global chemical conditions that are not necessarily met in practical implementations when communicating with an untrusted remote machine, there is no way to check that it is running a correct 50 implementation. In [4], the main technical result is that these properties can also be faithfully implemented using standard cryptographic primitives, with much less assumptions on the network. This result is expressed in terms of bisimilarity equivalences. Acknowledgement These lecture notes are partly derived from ....

M. Abadi, C. Fournet, and G. Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In Proceedings of POPL'00, pages 302-315. ACM, Jan. 2000.

....of new keys and other fresh quantities. It also enables reasoning with equivalence and implementation relations. Furthermore, the process calculus permits treating security protocols as programs written in a programming notation subject to typing, to other static analyses, and to translations [1, 3, 4, 2, 10, 11, 9, 13]. The applied pi calculus has many commonalities with the original pi calculus and its relatives, such as the spi calculus (discussed above) In particular, the model of communication adopted in the applied pi calculus is deliberately classical: communication is through named channels, and value ....

Martn Abadi, Cedric Fournet, and Georges Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In Proceedings of the 27th ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pages 302-315, January 2000.

....does not have any unintended consequences. In the Argumentum Ornithologicum [8] the di#erence of a fresh quantity from particular integers leads to the conclusion that God exists. Some recent research e#orts provide limited but rigorous justifications for abstract treatments of cryptography [2, 3, 5, 22, 30] (see also [20] They establish relations between: secure channels, secure message transmission, and other high level notions, formal accounts of cryptography, of the kind discussed in this section, and lower level accounts of cryptography, based on standard concepts of computation on ....

Martn Abadi, Cedric Fournet, and Georges Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In Proceedings of the 27th ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pages 302--315, January 2000.

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Abadi, M., Fournet, C. and Gonthier, G., Authentication Primitives and their Compilation, POPL'00, 302-315, ACM, 2000.

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Mart'in Abadi, C'edric Fournet, and Georges Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pages 302--315, 2000. 20

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M. Abadi, C. Fournet, and G. Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In Proceedings of 2000.

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Martn Abadi, Cedric Fournet, and Georges Gonthier. Authentication primitives and their compilation. In Proceedings of POPL '00 [ACM00], pages 302-315.

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M. Abadi, C. Fournet, G. Gonthier. Authentication Primitives and their compilation. In Proceedings of Principles of Programming Languages (POPL'00), pp. 302--315. ACM Press, 2000.

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