Shenker, S. (1990). E#cient network allocations with selfish users, in "Performance '90," pp. 279--285, North-Holland, Amsterdam. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions - Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou.. (2000) (82 citations) Self-citation (Shenker) (Correct)
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Shenker, S. (1990). E#cient network allocations with selfish users, in "Performance '90," pp. 279--285, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions - Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou.. (2000) (82 citations) Self-citation (Shenker) (Correct)
....the execution of the whole algorithm; ideally, this number will be O(1) with each round of computation triggered by a round of incoming messages. COST SHARING 9 at Nash equilibrium. Still others adopt the mechanism design approach and modify network designs to cope with user selfishness (e.g. [6, 16, 30, 32, 33]) There is also significant use of mechanism design in distributed artificial intelligence (e.g. 29, 34] and in market based computation (e.g. 37] Despite their increasing role in some of the more applied areas in computer science, incentives have rarely been an important consideration in ....
Shenker, S. (1990). E#cient network allocations with selfish users, in "Performance '90," pp. 279--285, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
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