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M. Morreau and S. Kraus. Syntactical treatments of propositional attitudes. Arti...cial Intelligence, 106:161--177, 1998.

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From Logic Programming Semantics to the Consistency of.. - Bolander (2003)   (Correct)

....stronger introspective beliefs and engage in stronger meta reasoning than in the classical modal operator approach. Results by Montague [1963] and Thomason [1980] show, however, that the predicate approach is prone to inconsistency. More recent results by des Rivi eres Levesque [1988] and Morreau Kraus [1998] show that we can maintain the predicate approach if we make suitable restrictions to our set of epistemic axioms. Their results are proved by careful translations from corresponding modal formalisms. In the present paper we show that their results fit nicely into the framework of logic ....

....in this field. This does not only allow us to demonstrate a close connection between consistency problems in the syntactic treatment of propositional attitudes and problems in semantics for logic programs, but it also allows us to strengthen the results of des Rivi eres Levesque [1988] and Morreau Kraus [1998] . 1 Introduction The approach most often used in constructing formal theories for reasoning about multiagent systems is to formalise the agents beliefs and knowledge through modal operators. An alternative approach is to formalise these propositional attitudes as predicates of a first order ....

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Michael Morreau and Sarit Kraus. Syntactical treatments of propositional attitudes. Artificial Intelligence, 106(1):161--177, 1998.


Maximal Introspection of Agents - Bolander (2002)   (1 citation)  (Correct)

....that none of (1) 4) is universally consistent. That (1) and (2) are not universally consistent is a direct consequence of a theorem of Montague in [7] That (3) is not universally consistent is a direct consequence of a theorem of Thomason in [13] Both these theorems are reviewed in [3] and [8]. Finally, that (4) is not universally consistent is proved in Section 5.3. # The fact that (1) is not universally consistent is probably not a serious problem, since (R2) is a very strong principle that beliefs of agents would not be likely to satisfy (at least not in the syntactic treatment) We ....

....U becomes the theory (BC1) BC2) We assume that first order predicate logic is formulated such that the only rule of inference is modus ponens (see e.g. 1] and by (15) we then get which contradicts (D) Thus (4) is not universally consistent. 6 Conclusion As argued in e.g. [2,8,9,10] representing beliefs of agents should be done syntactically through predicates of first order logic to ensure su#cient expressivity. Unfortunately it turns out that representing beliefs syntactically easily leads to inconsistency of the representing system [7,8,13] This calls for work in ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Morreau, M. and S. Kraus, Syntactical treatments of propositional attitudes, Artificial Intelligence 106 (1998), pp. 161--177.


A Logic for Characterizing Multiple Bounded Agents - Grant, Kraus, al. (2000)   (7 citations)  Self-citation (Kraus)   (Correct)

....not used at all. In particular, we have stratified time, not all beliefs are held at the same time, or inherited once held. In addition, we have no infinity point at which there is logical closure. 4 Partial solution to these problems can be obtained by restricting the language of the agents [45, 11]. The language of our agents is not restricted. 2.5 Complexity concerns Our meta theory is first order, hence semi decidable, but in general we cannot guarantee any low degree of complexity. This however may not be troubling, since the intended practical use of such a formalism is not for online ....

M. Morreau and S. Kraus. Syntactical treatments of propositional attitudes. Artificial Intelligence journal, 106:161--177, 1998.


Reasoning about Knowledge and Belief: A Syntactical Treatment - Fasli (2002)   (3 citations)  (Correct)

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M. Morreau and S. Kraus. Syntactical treatments of propositional attitudes. Arti...cial Intelligence, 106:161--177, 1998.


Logical Omniscience and Resourse-Bounded Agents - Whitsey (2004)   (Correct)

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M. Morreau and S. Kraus. Syntactical treatments of propositional attitudes. Artificial Intelligence, (106):161--177, 1998.


Logical Omniscience: A Survey - Whitsey (2003)   (1 citation)  (Correct)

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M. Morreau and S. Kraus. Syntactical treatments of propositional attitudes. Artificial Intelligence, 1998.


Logical Theories for Agent Introspection - Bolander (2003)   (Correct)

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Michael Morreau and Sarit Kraus. Syntactical treatments of propositional attitudes. Artificial Intelligence, 106(1):161--177, 1998.

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