| Lindsay, P.A. and J. McDermid. A Systematic Approach to Software Safety Integrity Levels.inProceedings of the 16th International Conference on Computer Safety. 1997. Berlin: Springer. |
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Lindsay, P.A. and J. McDermid. A Systematic Approach to Software Safety Integrity Levels.inProceedings of the 16th International Conference on Computer Safety. 1997. Berlin: Springer.
.... hazard analysis only, illustrated by two common hazard analysis techniques: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Risk assessment is generally more difficult, especially in early phases of system design, but space does not permit a fuller discussion here; see [lin97] for a proposed approach. The hazard analysis techniques are presented and an approach to their application to the general process control system is proposed. Systematic structure of the analyses is encouraged through correlation with the architectural model. FMEA is an inductive, or bottom up, ....
P.A. Lindsay, and J.A. McDermid, "A systematic approach to software safety integrity levels", to appear in Proc. 16 th International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security (SAFECOMP'97), Springer Verlag, 1997.
....standards such as IEC 61508 [10] use the concept of safety integrity level to capture the fact that some system components are more relied on than others for safety and risk reduction. However, the definition of safety integrity differs widely between standards and, as we have argued elsewhere [13], the variation undermines the credibility of the concept. This paper takes the broad, simple view that component safety integrity has two fundamental aspects: 1. a functional aspect, relating to what the component is supposed to do or not do; and 2. a quantitative aspect, relating to the ....
....including hardware, software and operational procedures and does not presume any particular safety architecture. 4 1. 3 A process for integrity allocation We have previously suggested that Cause Consequence Analysis (CCA) 9] should be used to analyse such situations and to set safety targets [13]. CCA is a combination of FTA and ETA that enables both the causes and consequences of hazards to be investigated within a single framework. Thus CCA potentially gives a way of setting derived requirements for mitigating functions, as well as on equipment that can cause hazards. The purpose of ....
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P.A. Lindsay and J.A. McDermid, A systematic approach to software safety integrity levels, in P. Daniel, ed., Proceedings of 16th International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security (SAFECOMP'97) (Springer, Berlin, September 1997) 70-82.
....environment and the regulatory expectations. If appropriate assurance cannot be acquired, the costs involved in reverse engineering a safety case for COTS, 5 and in maintaining the safety case in the face of component upgrades, can outweigh the potential savings of off the shelf procurement [19]. A similar consideration applies to reuse of components or software platforms. At present, there are very few cost effective methods of providing assurance of COTs in safety critical systems. 5.3 Safety Integrity Levels as a sticking point Most safety standards employ a notion of Safety ....
P. Lindsay and J. McDermid, "A systematic approach to software safety integrity levels," in Proceedings of SAFECOMP'97, York, 1997.
....presents documented evidence that the system is safe to operate. For software components, there generally needs to be an assessment of the software s required contribution to safety, in the form of a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) that indicates how much the system relies on the software for safety [Lindsay97]. The standards typically recommend that certain activities (typically safety oriented V V activities, but also important infrastructure activities such as configuration management) be undertaken during development of safety related software, and require that the rigor and independence with which ....
P.A. Lindsay and J.A. McDermid, A Systematic Approach To Software Safety Integrity Levels, in: Proceedings 16 th Internat Conf on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security (SAFECOMP'97), York 1997, Springer Verlag, 1997. http://svrc.it.uq.edu.au/Bibliography/svrc-tr.html?97-04
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