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Alec Yasinsac and Wm. A. Wulf, "A Framework for A Cryptographic Protocol Evaluation Workbench", to appear in The International Journal of Reliability, Quality and Safety Engineering (IJRQSE), Sept 2001

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Security or Privacy, Must We Choose? - Burmester, Desmedt, Wright..   (Correct)

....as well as authentication. Our ability to apply cryptographic methods to the authentication problem rests with the infrastructure that is established to handle the myriad required functions. The foundational components of this infrastructure are security protocols that apply cryptographic tools [15]. Public key infrastructures (PKIs) have been proposed and partially deployed as a method for facilitating authentication in security protocols. However, there have also been advisories issued about the risk of such infrastructures if they are oversimplified (see e.g. 5] Nonetheless, because ....

Alec Yasinsac and Wm. A. Wulf, "A Framework for A Cryptographic Protocol Evaluation Workbench", to appear in The International Journal of Reliability, Quality and Safety Engineering (IJRQSE), Sept 2001


The Weakest Precondition Protocol Analysis Environment - Yasinsac, Runy   (Correct)

....understand. By evaluating protocols using weakest precondition reasoning, we seek to find flaws that exist in these protocols. Additionally, even if no new flaws are found, a more thorough understanding of the workings of the protocol is gained. More detail about CPAL ES can be found in [18] and [19]. The rest of this paper will show how an integrated workbench is being developed which allows for easier use of CPAL ES. First, the development of a software library that allows for version control and parallel protocol development will be discussed. Second, the conversion of CPAL ES from ....

Alec Yasinsac and Wm. A. Wulf, "A Framework for A Cryptographic Protocol Evaluation Workbench", to appear in the International Journal of Reliability, Quality and Safety Engineering (IJRQSE), Apr 2001


An Analysis Of The Secure Routing Protocol For Mobile Ad Hoc.. - Marshall, II (2003)   (2 citations)  Self-citation (Yasinsac)   (Correct)

....goals. Borrowing concepts from programming language design, the analyst develops a formal syntax to represent the protocol steps and a semantics to reason about the meaning of these steps. For our study, we have chosen the Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Language Evaluation System (CPAL ES) [21], an existing formal methods environment developed specifically for security protocol analysis. In the following sections, we introduce CPAL ES and our use of it in the analysis of SRP. 4.1 Syntax of CPAL ES CPAL ES uses protocol specifications in standard notation as a guideline for creating a ....

....secret key. A: hash(parm1,parm2) Naturally, CPAL ES supports symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. However, the four features described above (send, receive, concatenation and functions) are the only ones we employ in our analysis. For a more thorough description of the CPAL ES syntax, see [21, 22]. 4.2 Semantics of CPAL ES CPAL ES uses weakest precondition logic to reason about security protocols, building on Hoare logic [23, 21] We illustrate this concept with an example. Suppose we execute the statement (y : x 3) and that we want the postcondition (y = 7) to be true after ....

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Alec Yasinsac and Wm. A. Wulf. A framework for a cryptographic protocol evaluation workbench. The International Journal of Reliability, Quality and Safety Engineering (IJRQSE), 8(4):373--89, 1 December 2001.


An Environment for Security Protocol Intrusion Detection - Yasinsac (2001)   (3 citations)  Self-citation (Yasinsac)   (Correct)

....flaws or vulnerability. Further, Meadows did conduct analysis of the entire IKE protocol, but partitioned the analysis by component, with no integrated analysis, which is a dangerous proposition since the components share common keys. 4] documents an end to end analysis of TLS using the CPAL ES [39]. As reliance on these protocols increases in volume and economic impact, the analysis will intensify and additional flaws will be found. We will continue to utilize the results of this research as attack signatures in dynamic protocol analysis. We also devise signatures for security protocol ....

Alec Yasinsac and Wm. A. Wulf, "A Framework for A Cryptographic Protocol Evaluation Workbench", Proceedings of the Fourth IEEE International High Assurance Systems Engineering Symposium (HASE99), Washington D.C., Nov. 1999, http://www.cs.fsu.edu/~yasinsac/framewk.pdf


Detecting Intrusions in Security Protocols - Yasinsac (2000)   (2 citations)  Self-citation (Yasinsac)   (Correct)

....or vulnerability. Further, Meadows did conduct analysis of the entire IKE protocol, but partitioned the analysis by component, with no integrated analysis, which is a dangerous proposition since the components share common keys. YC00] documents an end to end analysis of TLS using the CPAL ES [YW99]. As reliance on these protocols increases in volume and economic impact, the analysis will intensify and additional flaws will be found. We will continue to utilize the results of this research as attack signatures in dynamic protocol analysis. We also devise signatures for security ....

Alec Yasinsac and Wm. A. Wulf, "A Framework for A Cryptographic Protocol Evaluation Workbench", Proceedings of the Fourth IEEE International High Assurance Systems Engineering Symposium (HASE99), Washington D.C., Nov. 1999, http://www.cs.fsu.edu/~yasinsac/framewk.pdf

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