| Berry Schoenmakers, A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and its Applications to Electronic Voting, Crypto 1999. |
....and vulnerability to attack. A number of papers in the cryptographic literature have described ways of achieving robust and verifiable electronic elections, i.e. elections in which ballots and processing data are posted to a publicly accessible bulletin board. For some recent examples, see [6, 13, 15, 19, 21, 24, 27, 33]. There are two other threats, however, that it is equally crucial to address in a fair and democratic election process: We speak of voter coercion and vote buying. Internetbased voting does not introduce these problems, but it does have the potential to exacerbate them by extending the reach and ....
B. Schoenmakers. A simple publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme and its application to electronic voting. In M. Weiner, editor, CRYPTO '99, pages 148--164. Springer-Verlag, 1999. LNCS no. 1666.
....availability and intrusion tolerance. The adversaries must turn off partial CAs to turn off certification services, while they must break in partial CAs to steal the signing key . Further contributions on proactive secret share updates [37, 29, 28, 81] verifiable secret sharing [24, 91, 87], and fully distributed DCA [52] offer more security warranties in applying the decentralized scheme in the context of scalable networks with long term adversaries and untruthful coalition members. In a scalable network with large number of secret share holders, not only the secret shares ....
B. Schoenmakers. A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and its Application to Electronic Voting. In CRYPTO, pages 148--164, 1999.
....and intrusion tolerance. The adversaries must turn off 9 partial CAs to turn off certification services, while they must break in partial CAs to steal the signing key . Further contributions on proactive secret share updates [16, 9, 8, 32] verifiable secret sharing [5, 40, 36], and fully distributed DCA [24, 20] offer more security warranties in applying the de centralized scheme in the context of scalable networks with long term adversaries and untruthful coalition members. In a scalable network with large number of secret share holders, not only the secret shares ....
B. Schoenmakers. A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and its Application to Electronic Voting. In CRYPTO, pages 148--164, 1999.
....and intrusion tolerance. The adversaries must turn off (N Gamma K 1) partial CAs to turn off certification services, while they must break in K partial CAs to steal the signing key SK 0 ff . Further contributions on proactive secret share updates [16, 9, 8, 31] verifiable secret sharing [5, 39, 35], and fully distributed DCA [23, 19] offer more security warranties in applying the de centralized scheme in the context of scalable networks with long term adversaries and untruthful coalition members. In a scalable network with large number of secret share holders, not only the secret shares ....
B. Schoenmakers. A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and its Application to Electronic Voting. In CRYPTO, pages 148--164, 1999.
....entire system needs to restart if this number changes. In other words, the existing secret shares and sometimes the current signing key need to be regenerated when a new member joins. Contributions from [5, 15] improve the robustness of scheme by various techniques like verifiable secret sharing [3, 17, 13] and proactive secret share update [7] However, the application domain is still group oriented multi signature with fixed number of share holders. Their algorithms cannot be directly applied in large scale networks with dynamic node membership. We have devised a new algorithm to meet the demand ....
....ID wins in the case of version conflicts. 4.4 Discussions Verifiable Secret Sharing If there are compromised secret share holders in the network, values other than the secret shares may be used by the adversaries to sign and issue false partial certificates. With verifiable secret sharing (VSS) [3, 17, 13] employed with the multi signature algorithms, signing a message with a wrong secret share can be detected publicly or by the service requester. In the proactive update scheme proposed by [7] VSS is also employed to enforce proper secret share updates. In our architecture, the self initialization ....
B. Schoenmakers. A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and its Application to Electronic Voting. In CRYPTO, pages 148--164, 1999.
....entire system needs to restart if this number changes. In other words, the existing secret shares and sometimes the current signing key need to be regenerated when a new member joins. Contributions from [5, 15] improve the robustness of scheme by various techniques like verifiable secret sharing [3, 17, 13] and proactive secret share update [7] However, the application domain is still group oriented multi signature with fixed number of share holders. Their algorithms cannot be directly applied in large scale networks with dynamic node membership. We have devised a new algorithm to meet the demand ....
....ID wins in the case of version conflicts. 4.4 Discussions Verifiable Secret Sharing If there are compromised secret share holders in the network, values other than the secret shares may be used by the adversaries to sign and issue false partial certificates. With verifiable secret sharing (VSS) [3, 17, 13] employed with the multi signature algorithms, signing a message with a wrong secret share can be detected publicly or by the service requester. In the proactive update scheme proposed by [7] VSS is also employed to enforce proper secret share updates. In our architecture, the self initialization ....
B. Schoenmakers. A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and its Application to Electronic Voting. In CRYPTO, pages 148--164, 1999.
....as the underlying cryptographic primitives (e.g. RSA) by the simulatability arguments. Self defensive, built in detection mechanisms. While our design works with any intrusion detection algorithms and mechanisms that are of each individual node s choice, we apply the verifiable techniques [12, 14] as built in mechanisms to detect adversaries that attack our security protocols. Our design features the fully distributed and localized algorithms and protocols. These properties comply with the ad hoc nature of the infrastructureless wireless networks, which are critical to practical ....
....node that receives or overhears a partial certificate can verify the validity. This scheme can be integrated as part of the monitoring mechanism to help immediate detection of misbehaving or broken nodes. Our approach is to apply the technique of publicly verifiable secret sharing as proposed in [13, 14]. Assume node v j is serving v i with a partial certificate CERT v j . The challenge here is that although the statement cert is public, the share P v j that is supposed to be applied on cert is private to v j . The problem can be formulated as given CERT v j and cert, how node v j proves to an ....
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B. Schoenmakers, "A simple publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme and its application to electronic voting," CRYPTO'99, 1999.
....through a special type of broadcast channel. Rather than hiding the correspondence between the voter and his ballot, the value of the vote is hidden. Among 2 these latter type of schemes are [Ive91, SK94, BT94] More recent proposals are those of Cramer et al. CFSY96, CGS97] and Schoenmakers [Sch99] For other related work on electronic voting schemes see [FOO92, OO89, NR94, HS00] 1.2 Our Contributions This work s first contribution is that it elicits the fact that all current proposals for electronic voting schemes disclose the final tally of the votes. As discussed above this may be ....
B. Schoenmakers. A simple publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme and its application to electronic voting. In Crypto'99, 148--164. Springer-Verlag. LNCS Vol. 1666.
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B. Schoenmakers. A simple publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme and its application to electronic voting. In Advances in Cryptology--- CRYPTO '99, volume 1666 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 148--164, Berlin, 1999. Springer-Verlag.
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Berry Schoenmakers, A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and its Applications to Electronic Voting, Crypto 1999.
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Berry Schoenmakers. A simple publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme and its application to electronic. In CRYPTO '99: Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, pages 148--164, London, UK, 1999. Springer-Verlag.
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Schoenmakers B. A simple publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme and its application to electronic voting. In CRYPTO, 1999; pp. 148 -- 164.
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B. Schoenmakers, A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and its Application to Electronic Voting. Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'99, (1999)148-164.
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B. Schoenmakers. A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and Its Application to Electronic Voting. In Crypto'99, LNCS 1666, pp. 148-164. SpringerVerlag, 1999.
No context found.
Berry Schoenmakers. A simple publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme and its application to electronic voting. In Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO'99, pages 148--164. Springer-Verlag, 1999.
No context found.
Berry Schoenmakers. A simple publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme and its application to electronic voting. Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO, 1666 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science:148-- 164, 1999.
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B. Schoenmakers. A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and its Application to Electronic Voting. In CRYPTO, pages 148--164, 1999.
No context found.
Berry Schoenmakers, A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and its Applications to Electronic Voting, Crypto 1999.
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