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Proc. of the 10th International Conference on Network.. - Incentive Engineering In (2002) (Correct)
....and cost functions, users will solely maximize their utility functions and ignore the cost functions as long as the non monetary cost is below the nonmonetary budget. Consequently, our incentive engineering mechanisms turn this non cooperative game into an equivalence of a Nash bargaining solution [20, 15], whose operating point has better properties, i.e. Pareto optimum and Nash bargaining fair) than the Nash equilibrium operating point for a non cooperative congestion pricing market. The IA and SA service classes trade off the average amount of allocated bandwidth with allocation stability; ....
....designed to constrain a mobile device s strategy space while minimizing the amount of signalling overhead. In this section, we briefly discuss the properties of the resulting allocations. Refer to [12] for a detailed discussion. Proposition 1 The IA allocation mechanism is Nash Bargaining Fair [15] with different budget # i,I and maximum bandwidth b i . This is a special case (i.e. a single link allocation) of the asymmetric Nash Bargaining solution given in [20] Proposition 2 For wireless users preferring high throughput, the dominant strategy is to subscribe to the IA service. The ....
J. Nash. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 18(2):155-- 162, April 1950.
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