Louis Claude Guillou and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. A \paradoxical" indentity-based signature scheme resulting from zero-knowledge. In Goldwasser Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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On the Power of Claw-Free Permutations - Dodis, Reyzin (2002) (4 citations) (Correct)
.... Hash (PFDH [Cor02] and Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS [BR96] We remark that another family of similar schemes is described in [MR02] These signatures utilize the swap method, and are designed for the purpose of improving the exact security of several Fiat Shamir based signature schemes [FS86, GQ88, OS90, Mic94]. However, one can observe that the resulting signature schemes can be all viewed as less ecient and more complicated variants of the PFDH scheme, so we do not describe them. In the following, f is a trapdoor permutation with domain D, public key is f and secret key is f . FDH: Sig(m) returns ....
Louis Claude Guillou and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. A \paradoxical" indentity-based signature scheme resulting from zero-knowledge. In Goldwasser [Gol88], pages 216-231.
Amortized E-Cash - Liskov (2001) (Correct)
....we ll the mentioned de nitional gap, and use the term amortized to evoke that the traditional anonymity requirements have purposely been weakened. Further, we prove the security of our scheme based on the simple assumption that a zero knowledge based signature scheme (e.g. any of [11] 20] [16], 29] is secure. For concreteness, we present our scheme based on the Schnorr signature scheme [29] whose security provably equals that of the discrete logarithm problem in the random oracle model. Thus this security assumption alone suces for amortized e cash. We also attain eciency in our ....
.... (j4n ) x s (j 4n ) i 4n ; t 4n ) 18 (a; b) A(y 4n ; x (j 4n ) a 6= b and b (a) 2c = b (b) 2c and ( j u ; i u ) j v ; i v ) u = v) 1=3 k c . 19 Chapter 3 Our Scheme Our solution relies on zero knowledge based signature schemes such as those presented in [11] 20] [16], 29] Such schemes sign a message M in three steps: a commitment step, which is independent of the message, a challenge step, which is message dependent, and a response step, in which the secret key is used. Our e cash scheme can work with any such a signature scheme. But, for concreteness (and ....
Louis Claude Guillou and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. A \paradoxical" indentity-based signature scheme resulting from zero-knowledge. In Advances in Cryptology: Cyrpto '88, 1988.
Improving the Exact Security of Digital Signature Schemes - Reyzin (1999) (6 citations) (Correct)
.... a random function is just as good as the challenge produced by a live veri er an attacker cannot produce a challenge that suits its needs because H is random (and hence, in particular, hard to invert) Since [FS86] many such signature schemes have been proposed (see, e.g. FFS88] Bet88] [GQ88], OO88] MS88] Sch89] BDPW89] Gir90] BM90] OS90] Oka92] Mic94] Sho96] Sch96] PS96] PS98] OO98] Many have been proven secure in the so called random oracle model (articulated in [BR93] Essentially, these are proofs that rely on some cryptographic assumption (such as ....
....large q sig and q hash , then the reduction proving the security is called tight. 10 Chapter 3 The E Scheme 3. 1 Signature and Veri cation Algorithms We describe the following ID and signature scheme from [Mic94] with similarities to the Ong Schnorr ( OS90] and the Guillou Quisquater ([GQ88]) schemes. Number Theory. Let k and l be two security parameters. Let p 1 3 (mod 8) and p 2 7 (mod 8) be two primes of approximately equal size and n = p 1 p 2 be an l bit integer (such n is called a Williams integer [Wil80] To simplify further computations, we will assume not only that n ....
Louis Claude Guillou and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. A \paradoxical" indentitybased signature scheme resulting from zero-knowledge. In Goldwasser [Gol88], pages 216-231.
Improving The Exact Security Of Digital Signature Schemes - Micali, Reyzin (2000) (6 citations) (Correct)
....for a reasonably large q sig and q hash , then the reduction proving the security is called tight. 3 The E Scheme 3. 1 Signature and Veri cation Algorithms We describe the following ID and signature scheme from [Mic94] with similarities to the Ong Schnorr ( OS90] and the Guillou Quisquater ([GQ88]) schemes. Number Theory. Let k and l be two security parameters. Let p 1 3 (mod 8) and p 2 7 (mod 8) be two primes of approximately equal size and n = p 1 p 2 be an l bit integer (such n is called a Williams integer [Wil80] To simplify further computations, we will assume not only that n ....
Louis Claude Guillou and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. A \paradoxical" indentity-based signature scheme resulting from zero-knowledge. In Goldwasser [Gol88], pages 216-231.
Forward-Secure Signatures with Optimal Signing and Verifying - Itkis, Reyzin (2001) (41 citations) (Correct)
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Louis Claude Guillou and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. A \paradoxical" indentity-based signature scheme resulting from zero-knowledge. In Goldwasser
Generalized Key-Evolving Signature Schemes or How to Foil an.. - Itkis, Xie (2003) (Correct)
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Louis Claude Guillou and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. A \paradoxical" indentitybased signature scheme resulting from zero-knowledge. In Sha Goldwasser, editor, Advances in Cryptology|CRYPTO '88, volume 403 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 216-231. Springer-Verlag, 1990, 21-25 August 1988.
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