Lewis, D. (1972). Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50, 249--258. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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On the Type/Token Relation of Mental Representations - Aydede (2000) (1 citation) (Correct)
....or doxastic background. This is ironic, of course. Stich s advertisement to the contrary, his own STM is plagued by problems exactly parallel to those that he claimed plague content based psychologies. See my (forthcoming. for a detailed and sustained criticism of Stich in this regard. 20 See Lewis (1972) and Loar (1982) For an accessible introduction to the method, see Block (1980) 17 with its Ramsey sentence containing only some of the generalizations covering the token. 21 The way I initially characterized content functionalism above should be understood in this latter sense. See ....
Lewis, David (1972). "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50, pp. 249--258.
Folk Psychology? - Stephen Stich Ian (Correct)
....an explicit statement of what they tacitly know . We can now begin to pull apart some of the very different ways in which the label folk psychology might be used. In a series of influential papers, David Lewis drew attention to what he called the platitudes of commonsense psychology. (Lewis, 1970, 1972) These are generalizations that are common knowledge amongst ordinary folk. Almost everyone assents to them, and almost everyone knows that almost everyone else assents to them. These platitudes are, near enough, the intuitively obvious generalizations discussed in the previous paragraph. On ....
Lewis, D. (1972). "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50.
Functionalism, Subjective Experience, and Psycho-Physical Identity - Liz (1995) (Correct)
....properties P so defined through certain functional roles. Mental states must mediate between the inputs and outputs of some systems. They interact upon one another to integrate appropiate inputs and to produce appropriate outputs (about that see, for instance, Block, 1978, 261; Harman, 1973:41; or Lewis, 1972:249) Inputs and outputs can be described in a way more or less orientated toward physiology, toward behavior, or merely toward information processing. That different focusing entails differences in the functionalist use of Physical 2 properties and relations with respect to the inputs and ....
....condition holds: ffl (C) For any domain and any extensional interpretation of its terms O 1 ; Om , there is at most one extensional intepretation of each T 1 ; Tn such that the theory comes true in that domain. In the contex of his peculiar treatement of theoretical terms, David Lewis (1972) makes a similar point directly claiming that functional roles must be uniquely occupied. If condition C holds for a theory, then the extension of Ramsey constants T i could not be other but the extension of its T i terms. The extension of the Ramsey constants for the theoretical terms of a ....
LEWIS, D. (1972) "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications", Australasian Journal of Philosophy L, 3.
Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room - Chalmers (1992) (9 citations) (Correct)
.... (at an appropriate level of abstraction) The view that it is abstract causal structure that is essential to mentality has been an implicit assumption of the AI research program since Turing (1950) but was first articulated explicitly, in various forms, by Putnam (1960) Armstrong (1970) and Lewis (1970), and has become known as functionalism. From here, it is a very short step to computationalism, the view that computational structure is what is important in capturing the essence of mentality. This step follows from a belief that any abstract causal structure can be captured computationally: a ....
Lewis, D. (1970). Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50, 249--258.
Consciousness and Cognition - Chalmers (Correct)
.... materials (such as computers, perhaps) There are other, more specific brands of functionalism, such as those that identify mental events with semantically transparent computational processes (Fodor 1975) and those that require definition with respect to common sense psychological theories (Lewis 1972). Unless otherwise specified, it is functionalism in the broadest sense which is meant here. Going along with this approach is the metaphor of mind as system. On this view, consciousness is best understood as a particular aspect of the function of a complex system (a simplistic example might be ....
Lewis, D. (1972). Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 249-258.
Causation In The Special Sciences: The Case For Pragmatism - Price (Correct)
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Lewis, D. (1972). Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50, 249--258.
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