Anna Lysyanskaya, Ronald L. Rivest, Amit Sahai, and Stefan Wolf. Pseudonym systems. In Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC)  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....[44, 45] Payment units in fair o#ine electronic payment systems are also similar to anonymous credentials, which can be used for anonymous authentication [46, 47, 48, 49, 50] Many schemes for anonymous authentication support identity recovery while employing di#erent techniques. Some schemes [51, 52, 53, 54, 55] have been related to our approach in [3] Other recent work is described in [56, 57, 58, 59] Since the resources of the target service are accessed using anonymous and pseudonymous credentials or payment units, the target service does not learn identifying information about the users during ....

Anna Lysyanskaya, Ronald L. Rivest, Amit Sahai, and Stefan Wolf. Pseudonym systems. In Howard Heys and Carlisle Adams, editors, Proceedings of the 6th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC'99), pages 184--199, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, August 1999. Springer.

....the system design herein, none of these provides any means for guaranteeing unique identities or for authenticating property attributions, two of our main security goals. Recent work on pseudonym systems that reduces the use of a trusted center and that discourages identity sharing is presented in [16]. This work also has many of the same security goals as ours, including the two just mentioned. However, its focus is more on provability of security for theoretical systems while ours is on practical realisability of systems. Also, not all of the goals are the same. In [16] e ectively even ....

....sharing is presented in [16] This work also has many of the same security goals as ours, including the two just mentioned. However, its focus is more on provability of security for theoretical systems while ours is on practical realisability of systems. Also, not all of the goals are the same. In [16], e ectively even collaborating registrars and issuers cannot compromise a GUP. On the other hand, except in the case of double spending a single use certi cate, there is no provision for escrowing identity so as to be able to reveal the GUP and or public identity of misbehaving principals. In ....

Anna Lysyanskaya, Ronald L. Rivest, Amit Sahai, and Stefan Wolf. \Pseudonym Systems ", in Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC '99) forthcoming in Springer-Verlag LNCS.

....this paper, we propose a new e#cient anonymous credential system, considerably superior to previously proposed ones. The communication and computation costs of our solution are small, thus introducing almost no overhead to realizing privacy in a credential system. An anonymous credential system [Cha85, CE87, Che95, Dam90, LRSW99] consists of users and organizations. Organizations know the users only by pseudonyms. Di#erent pseudonyms of the # Extended version of what is to appear in: Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT 2001. same user cannot be linked. Yet, an organization can issue a credential to a pseudonym, and the ....

....demonstrations cannot be linked to each other. Basic desirable properties. It should be impossible to forge a credential for a user, even if users and other organizations team up and launch an adaptive attack on the organization. Each pseudonym and credential must belong to some well defined user [LRSW99]. In particular, it should not be possible for di#erent users to team up and show some of their credentials to an organization and obtain a credential for one of them that that user alone would not have gotten. Systems where this is not possible are said to have consistency of credentials. As ....

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Anna Lysyanskaya, Ron Rivest, Amit Sahai, and Stefan Wolf. Pseudonym systems. In Howard Heys and Carlisle Adams, editors, Selected Areas in Cryptography, volume 1758 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Verlag, 1999.

....the enforcement of a single digital identity per person as another goal) has already been suggested by David Chaum [52] Chaum s is a person organization s purpose is to ensure that each person has at most one digital identity. Also, Anna Lysyanskaya, Ronald Rivest Amit Sahai and Stefan Wolf [117] already introduced the idea of a master key, which possession enables the e ective impersonation of the key owner. We will examine these schemes further in section 6.3. 4.5 What information We focus in this section on the nature of the information that would be recorded in the system, on where ....

....later schemes [73, 57] e ectively preserves the individual s privacy against colluding organizations, but does not protect the organizations against colluding individuals to share their credentials. The pseudonym system introduced by Anna Lysyanskaya, Ronald Rivest, Amit Sahai and Stefan Wolf [117] in 1999 e ectively addresses the problem, and adds some additional properties to Chaum s credential system. Jan Camenish and Anna Lysyanskaya [46, 47] improved this pseudonym system in 2001 2002, by constructing in 2001 2002 a multiple show credential system and mechanisms for credential ....

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Anna Lysyanskaya, Ronald L. Rivest, Amit Sahai, and Stefan Wolf. Pseudonym systems (extended abstract). In Howard Heys and Carlisle Adams, editors, Selected Areas in Cryptography, pages 184-199. Springer-Verlag, 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science No. 1758.

....and it is important to design them with the broadest possible uses in mind. Consider the use of signature schemes for constructing an anonymous credential system. While such a system can be constructed from any signature scheme using general techniques for cryptographic protocol design [LRSW99] doing it in this fashion is very inecient. Let us explain this point in more detail. In a credential system, a user can obtain access to a resource only by presenting a credential that demonstrates that he is authorized to do so. In the paper based world, examples of such credentials are ....

....has the right credential. Additionally, an anonymous credential system allows the user to obtain a credential anonymously. Such systems were rst envisioned by David Chaum [Cha85] and have been further studied by Chaum and Evertse [CE87] Brands [Bra99] and Lysyanskaya, Rivest, Sahai, and Wolf [LRSW99] 14 Using general techniques of zero knowledge proofs and zero knowledge proofs of knowledge [GMR85, GMR89, GMW86, GMW87b, BG92] it is possible to prove statements such as I have a signature, without saying anything more than that (i.e. without disclosing what this credential looks like or ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Anna Lysyanskaya, Ron Rivest, Amit Sahai, and Stefan Wolf. Pseudonym systems. In Howard Heys and Carlisle Adams, editors, Selected Areas in Cryptography, volume 1758 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Verlag, 1999.

....to previously proposed ones. The communication and computation costs of our solution are small, thus introducing almost no overhead to realizing privacy in a credential system. Extended version of what is to appear in: Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT 2001. 1 An anonymous credential system [Cha85, CE87, Che95, Dam90, LRSW99] consists of users and organizations. Organizations know the users only by pseudonyms. Different pseudonyms of the same user cannot be linked. Yet, an organization can issue a credential to a pseudonym, and the corresponding user can prove possession of this credential to another organization (who ....

....demonstrations cannot be linked to each other. Basic desirable properties. It should be impossible to forge a credential for a user, even if users and other organizations team up and launch an adaptive attack on the organization. Each pseudonym and credential must belong to some well de ned user [LRSW99]. In particular, it should not be possible for di erent users to team up and show some of their credentials to an organization and obtain a credential for one of them that that user alone would not have gotten. Systems where this is not possible are said to have consistency of credentials. As ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Anna Lysyanskaya, Ron Rivest, Amit Sahai, and Stefan Wolf. Pseudonym systems. In Howard Heys and Carlisle Adams, editors, Selected Areas in Cryptography, volume 1758 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Verlag, 1999.

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Anna Lysyanskaya, Ronald L. Rivest, Amit Sahai, and Stefan Wolf. Pseudonym systems. In Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC)

No context found.

Anna Lysyanskaya, Ron Rivest, Amit Sahai, and Stefan Wolf. Pseudonym systems. In Proceedings of SAC 1999, volume 1758 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 184--99. Springer-Verlag, 1999.

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