E. Biham, A. Shamir, Di#erential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems, Advances in Cryptology crypto'97, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1233, pp. 513--525, 1997.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....is patented. However, it is conceivable, that an attacker can overcome these countermeasures in FPGA with fault injection. This kind of attack was first introduced in [BDL97] and it was shown how to break public key algorithms by exploiting hardware faults. This publication, was followed by [BS97] where the authors introduced di#erential fault analysis, which can potentially be applied against all symmetric algorithms in the open literature. Meanwhile there have been many publications that show di#erent techniques to insert faults, e.g. electro magnetic radiation [QS01] infrared laser ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir. Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO '97, pages 513--525. Springer-Verlag, 1997. LNCS 1294.

....recover multiplier d. 1. 1 Physical security Kocher et al. introduced the notion of side channel analysis in [14, 15] and showed the importance for an implementation of being resistant against sidechannel analysis (e.g. secret leakage from power consumption) Resistance against fault analysis [7, 5] is another threat and should be taken into account, since sensitive information may leak when the cryptosystem operates under unexpected conditions. The security of point multiplication on elliptic curves in the presence of faults was considered by Biehl, Meyer and M uller [4] They extended ....

Eli Biham and Adi Shamir. Dierential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In B.S. Kaliski Jr., editor, Advances in Cryptology { CRYPTO '97, volume 1294 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 513-525. Springer-Verlag, 1997.

....the code. However, we show how to extract the secret key from the system in only a few cryptographic operations and come to the conclusion that current obfuscation techniques for hiding a secret key are not strong enough to resist certain attacks. Our attack is based on di#erential fault analysis [17] in which an attacker injects errors into the code in order to get information about the secret key. The impact of this attack is comparable to an attack on an RSA implementation based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem that requires only one faulty RSA signature in order to extract the private key ....

....This attack exploits some properties of the DES s boxes and requires about 2 encryptions. In contrast our attack works for any round based block cipher and requires only dozens of encryptions. We now describe how we use a simplified di#erential cryptanalysis called di#erential fault analysis [17] to recover the key in a few operations. In this attack an adversary flips bits in the input to the last round function f n and computes the di#erent outputs to find out the round function f n of the last round n. When injecting single bit faults into the last round using chosen ciphertexts ....

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E. Biham and A. Shamir. Di#erential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1294:513--525, 1997.

....9 1 Introduction In September 1996, Boneh, Demillo, and Lipton [2] from Bellcore announced a new type of cryptanalytic attack which exploits computational errors to find cryptographic keys. Their attack is applicable to public key cryptosystems such as RSA, excluding secret key algorithms. In [3], E. Biham A.Shamir extend this attack to various secret key cryptosystems such as DES, and call it Di#erential Fault Analysis (DFA) They applied the di#erential cryptanalysis to Data Encryption Standard (DES) in case of hardware fault model. We further assume that the attacker is in physical ....

....round. We denote by S i,A the state after the i AddRoundKey. S i,A = S K i The SubByte transformation consists in applying on each element of the matrix S an elementary transformation s. We denote by S i,Su the state after the i SubByte. S = # # # S[2] S[6] S[10] S[14] S[3] S[7] S[11] S[15] # # S i,Su = # # # s(S[2] s(S[6] s(S[10] s(S[14] s(S[3] s(S[7] s(S[11] s(S[15] # # , where s is the non linear application defined by s(x) a x 1 b, if x 0, b, if x = 0. a is a linear invertible application over GF (2) a M 8 (GF (2) is ....

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E. Biham & A.Shamir, Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, CS 0910, Proceedings of Crypto'97.

....scenarios which consist in in uencing or perturbating the behavior of the device in order to infer the secret. These attacks include Boneh et al. s induction of transient faults during RSA computations [3] or even cutting wires and forcing given bit values, such as in Di erential Fault Analysis [2, 14] of DES. In this paper we consider a new kind of passive attacks, which appears to be more powerful than the previous ones. No statistical analysis is needed in most cases. We suppose that the attacker simply has access to a probe station, which (for the non specialist) is a kind of needle that ....

....above two attacks, it turns out that probing a single bit during a single signature generation suces to recover the random exponent k. The device s secret key can thus be easily infered from the knowledge of k and the output signature. 3 Probing Attacks on DES Following Biham and Shamir s work [2] on Di erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, as well as Schneier et al. s ideas on sidechannel attacks [17] we take a closer look at probing secret key algorithms, which may be considered as yet another side channel where information leak. As we saw before, probing is considered as ....

E. Biham, A. Shamir. Dierential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology - Crypto'97, LNCS 1294, pages 513-525. Springer-Verlag, 1997.

....RSA CRT with both a correct and a faulty signature of the same message. Lenstra then improved their attack [14] by finding one of the factors of the public modulus using only one faulty signature of a known message. In October 1996, Biham and Shamir published an attack on secret key cryptosystems [6] entitled Di#erential Fault Analysis (DFA) and in 2000, Biehl, Meyer and Muller presented a paper describing two types of DFA attacks on ECC [5] DFA is frequently used nowadays to test the security of cryptographic smartcards applications, especially those using the DES. On the 2 October 2000, ....

....DES. On the 2 October 2000, the AES was chosen to be the successor of the DES and, since then, it is used more and more in smartcards applications. So it seems interesting to investigate what is feasible on the AES by using DFA. Unfortunately, the existing DFA attacks on symmetric cryptosystems [6] do not work on the AES. This is why we work to find a way to attack the AES by using DFA. On a smartcard, a fault may be induced by its owner in many ways, such as power glitch, clock pulse or radiation of many kinds (laser, etc. These external interventions may induce a fault, but we do not ....

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E. Biham and A. Shamir, Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science vol. 1294, Advances in Cryptology, proceedings of CRYPTO'97, pp. 513-525, 1997.

....attacks on RSA with CRT: Concrete Results and Practical Countermeasures C. Aum uller P. Bier W. Fischer P. Hofreiter J. P. Seifert In neon Technologies Security ChipCard ICs CC TI Concepts Innovations D 81609 Munich Germany Abstract. This article describes concrete results and practically approved countermeasures concerning di erential fault attacks on RSA using the CRT. It especially investigates smartcards with a RSA coprocessor where any hardware countermeasure to defeat such fault attacks have been switched o . ....

....stress at the right position during the computation. Naturally, a detailed error analysis model followed, specifying every failure point during the RSA CRT operation. This model nally allowed to develop and present here new very practically oriented software countermeasures hedging the observed and characterized fault attacks. Eventually, we present the security analysis of our new developed software RSA CRT DFA countermeasures. Thanks to their careful speci cation according to the observed and analyzed errors they resisted all kinds of physical stress attacks and were able to ....

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E. Biham, A. Shamir, \Dierential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems", Proc. of CRYPTO '97, Springer LNCS vol. 1294, pp. 513-525, 1997.

....and access to enclosed cryptographic keys (smartcards and their like) The assumptions about the security of these hardware mechanisms are not always correct. There are several methods that use hardware faults in the secure hardware solutions in order to nd the keys that are enclosed inside [3, 5, 4, 18]. Our schemes obtain their claimed security without any secure hardware requirements. Should such devices be used to store the keys, they will undoubtedly make the attack even more expensive, but this is not a requirement. 1.0.1 Our approach Fighting piracy in general has the following ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir, Dierential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, Proc. Advances in Cryptology { Crypto '97, Springr-Verlag LNCS 1294 (1997), 513-525.

....too hard to build a system that denied an attacker access to this magnitude of plaintext. In the last few years, new kinds of cryptanalytic attack have begun to appear in the literature: attacks that target speci c implementation details. Both timing attacks [Koc96] and di erential fault analysis [BDL97,BS97] make assumptions about the implementation, and use additional information garnered from attacking certain implementations. Failure analysis [HGS97,Bel96] assumes a one bit feedback from the implementation was the message successfully decrypted in order to break the underlying cryptographic ....

....attack just isn t possible against an implementation that doesn t permit an attacker to create and exploit the required faults but they can be much more powerful. For example, di erential fault analysis of DES requires between 50 and 200 ciphertext blocks (no plaintext) to recover a key [BS97]. In this paper, we consider the general class of side channel attacks against product ciphers. A side channel attack occurs when an attacker is able to use some additional information leaked from the implementation of a cryptographic function to cryptanalyze the function. Clearly, given enough ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir, \Dierential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems," Advances in Cryptology|CRYPTO '97 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1997, pp. 513-525.

....NMR scanning, and electronic emanations. 21 With many algorithms it is possible to reconstruct the key from these side channels. While total resistance to side channel cryptanalysis is probably impossible, we note that Two sh executes in constant time on most processors. Fault analysis [BDL97, BS97] can be used to successfully cryptanalyze this cipher. Again, we believe that total resistance to fault analysis is an impossible design constraint for a cipher. The resistance to fault analysis of any block cipher can be improved using classical fault tolerance techniques. 8.10 Attacking Simpli ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir, \Dierential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems," Advances in Cryptology | CRYPTO '97 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1997, pp. 513-525.

....modulus is used the number of executions is O(n log n) Both attacks use faults that corrupt the prover while it is waiting for a challenge from the veri er. Since the initial publication of our results several authors devised faults based attacks on other cryptographic systems. Biham and Shamir [5] presented elegant and novel attacks on DES. Some of their techniques can be used to recover the secret key of a totally unknown cipher. Anderson and Kuhn [2] used a di erent fault model to obtain attacks against symmetric ciphers. Bao et al. 3] devised fault attacks against DSS and several other ....

E. Biham, A. Shamir, \Dierential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems", in Proc. of Crypto' 97, LNCS 1294, Springer-Verlag, pp. 513-528, 1997.

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E. Biham, A. Shamir, Di#erential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems, Advances in Cryptology crypto'97, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1233, pp. 513--525, 1997.

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E. Biham, A. Shamir. Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology - Crypto'97, LNCS 1294, pages 513-525. Springer-Verlag, 1997.

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E. Biham and A. Shamir, Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO'97, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1294, pp. 513--525, 1997.

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E. Biham, A. Shamir, Di#erential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems, Advances in Cryptology crypto'97, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1233, pp. 513--525, 1997.

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E. Biham, A. Shamir. Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology - Crypto'97, LNCS 1294, pages 513-525. Springer-Verlag, 1997.

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E. Biham, A. Shamir, Dierential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, pp. 513-525, Advances in Cryptology { Crypto '97 (lncs 1294), Springer-Verlag, 1997. Revised : Technion - C.S. Dept. - Technical Report CS0910-revised, 1997.

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E. Biham, A. Shamir, \Dierential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems", pp. 513-525, Advances in Cryptology { Crypto '97, Springer LNCS 1294 (1997). Revised : Technion - C.S. Dept. - Technical Report CS0910-revised, 1997.

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Eli Biham, Adi Shamir, Dierential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, pp. 513-525, Advances in Cryptology { Crypto '97 (lncs 1294), Springer-Verlag, 1997. Revised : Technion - C.S. Dept. - Technical Report CS0910-revised, 1997.

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Eli Biham, Adi Shamir, Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, pp. 513-525, Advances in Cryptology --- Crypto '97 (lncs 1294), SpringerVerlag, 1997. Revised : Technion - Computer Science Department - Technical Report CS0910-revised, 1997.

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E. Biham, A. Shamir, \Dierential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems", pp. 513-525, Advances in Cryptology { Crypto '97, Springer LNCS 1294 (1997). Revised : Technion - C.S. Dept. - Technical Report CS0910-revised, 1997.

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Eli Biham, Adi Shamir, Dierential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, pp. 513-525, Advances in Cryptology | Crypto '97 (lncs 1294), Springer-Verlag, 1997. Revised : Technion { Computer Science Department { Technical Report cs0910-revised, 1997.

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Eli Biham, Adi Shamir, Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, pp. 513-525, Advances in Cryptology -- Crypto '97 (lncs 1294), Springer-Verlag, 1997. Revised : Technion - Computer Science Department - Technical Report CS0910-revised, 1997.

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E. Biham and A. Shamir. Dierential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. Proceedings of Crypto' 97, pages 513-525, 1997.

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E. Biham and A. Shamir. Di#erential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. Proceedings of Crypto' 97, pages 513--525, 1997.

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E. Biham and A. Shamir. Di#erential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In B.S. Kaliski Jr., editor, Proc. Crypto'97, pages 513--525. LNCS 1294, 1997.

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Eli Biham, Adi Shamir. Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1294, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp.513-??, 1997.

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E. Biham and A. Shamir, Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO'97, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1294, pp. 513--525, 1997.

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E. Biham, A. Shamir, Di#erential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems, Advances in Cryptology crypto'97, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1233, pp. 513--525, 1997.

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E. Biham, A. Shamir. Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology - Crypto'97, LNCS 1294, pages 513-525. Springer-Verlag, 1997.

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E. Biham and A. Shamir. Di#erential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In B.S. Kaliski Jr, editor, Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO '97, volume 1294 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 513--525. Springer-Verlag, 1997.

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E. Biham and A. Shamir, Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, In Advances in Cryptography, Crypto'97, LNCS 1294, pages 513--525, 1997.

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Eli Biham and Adi Shamir. Di#erential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In B.S. Kaliski Jr., Ed., Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '97, volume 1294 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 513--525. Springer, 1997.

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E. Biham and A. Shamir, Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, In Advances in Cryptography, Crypto'97, LNCS 1294, pages 513--525, 1997.

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E. Biham and A. Shamir, \Dierential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems," Advances in Cryptology|CRYPTO '97 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1997, pp. 513-525. 13

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E. Biham, A. Shamir, Di#erential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems, In volume 1294 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 513-525, Springer-Verlag, 1997.

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E. Biham, A. Shamir. Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology - Crypto'97, LNCS 1294, pages 513-525. Springer-Verlag, 1997.

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E. Biham, A. Shamir, Di#erential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems, Advances in Cryptology crypto'97, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1233, pp. 513--525, 1997.

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E. Biham and A. Shamir. Di#erential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In B.S. Kaliski Jr, editor, Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO '97, volume 1294 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 513--525. Springer-Verlag, 1997.

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E. Biham, A. Shamir. Di#erential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology - Crypto'97, LNCS 1294, pages 513-525. Springer-Verlag, 1997.

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E. Biham and A. Shamir. Di#erential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In B. S. Kaliski Jr., editor, 17th Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO), volume LNCS 1294, pages 513--525, Santa Barbara, California, Aug 1997. Springer-Verlag, Berlin. 1

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E. Biham and A. Shamir. Di#erential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In B.S. Kaliski Jr, editor, Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO '97, volume 1294 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 513--525. Springer-Verlag, 1997.

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