| S. Micali. Certified E-mail with invisible post offices. Available from author; an invited presentation at the RSA '97 conference, 1997. |
....committed to keeping the share from Bob, but Bob has not committed to anything. 7 At this point, Alice s only recourse is to broadcast a complaint against Bob and hope that the reputation system causes others to recognize that Bob has misbehaved. The alternative is to use a fair exchange protocol[35, 20], which is unreasonably communications intensive without a trusted third party. When Alice trades a share to a server Bob, Alice should keep a copy of the share around for a while, just in case Bob proves untrustworthy. This will increase the amount of overhead in the system by a factor of two or ....
S. Micali. Certified e-mail with invisible post-offices. In Talk at RSA '97.
....signatures, and present an efficient discrete log based scheme which uses new boolean combinations of proofs of membership and knowledge. We prove the scheme to be as secure as the Decisional Diffie Hellman problem. Related work. Contract signing is part of the broader problem of fair exchange [10, 16, 28, 33, 2]. More specifically, it can be considered fair exchange of digital signatures [3] The different existing approaches to contract signing were already described above. The term contract signing was first introduced in [8] The first optimistic scheme in the sense defined above was based on the ....
S. Micali. Certified e-mail with invisible post offices. Presented at the 1997 RSA Security Conference, 1997.
....number of signatories was only recently considered, with most of the work concentrating on the case of two parties. In this paper we present a general n party optimistic contract signing protocol. Electronic contract signing. Contract signing is part of the broader problem of fair exchange [8, 11, 17, 21, 2]. More specifically, it can be considered fair exchange of digital signatures [4] The term contract signing was first introduced in [7] Early work on electronic contract signing, or more generally, fair exchange of secrets signatures, focused on the gradual release of secrets to obtain ....
S. Micali. Certified e-mail with invisible post offices. Presented at the 1997 RSA Security Conference, 1997.
....Young and Yung [33] show how to use a dormant escrow agent for key escrow. Brickell, Gemmel and Kravitz [5] and Stadler, Piveteau and Camenisch [32] show how to use a dormant escrow agent in electronic cash systems (more efficient schemes are presented in [29, 17] Quite recently, Micali [26] has shown how to use a dormant agent for certified mail. 1.3 Road map In Section 2 we describe some of the building blocks we use for our protocols. In Section 3 we discuss how to implement identity escrow using group signature schemes. In Section 4 we show how to achieve stronger separability ....
S. Micali. Certified E-Mail With Invisible Post Offices. Talk at Workshop on Secure Computation, Weizmann Institute, June, 1998.
....approach [1] It also relies on the use of a third party, but only in the case of an exception. Optimistic protocols exchanging money for a receipt or goods was first outlined in [4] Recently, detailed optimistic fair exchange protocols were presented for generic items [1] and certified mail [11]. All of these protocols rely on certain strong assumptions to guarantee termination. Only the risk taking player (originator) is allowed to invoke the third party. The other player (responder) cannot know the final state of the exchange unless and until the originator invokes the third party. The ....
....an abort token and a replacement contract containing the same me 1 . Therefore, the existence of such a pair can convince an arbiter that T was misbehaving. A similar argument can show that verifiability of T is guaranteed from the point of view of R as well. 3. 3 Invisibility of Third Party In [11], Micali has described the notion of an invisible third party. According to Definition 3.1, there are two forms of a valid contract. The second form makes it obvious that T was involved in protocol resolve. T is said to be visible in such a protocol. If the third party were invisible, the end ....
Silvio Micali. Certified e-mail with invisible post offices. Available from author; an invited presentation at the RSA '97 conference, 1997.
....approach [1] It also relies on the use of a third party, but only in the case of an exception. Optimistic protocols exchanging money for a receipt or goods was first outlined in [5] Recently, detailed optimistic fair exchange protocols were presented for generic items [1] and certified mail [12]. All of these protocols rely on certain strong assumptions to guarantee termination. Only the risk taking player (originator) is allowed to invoke the third party. The other player (responder) cannot know the final state of the exchange unless and until the originator invokes the third party. ....
....the protocol satisfies the effectiveness requirement (R1) Claim 2 Assuming that the communication channel between T and any other player is resilient, the optimistic contract signing protocol satisfies requirements R2a, R3, R4, and R5 for both O and R. 3. 3 Invisibility of Third Party In [12], Micali has described the notion of an invisible third party. According to Definition 3.1, there are two forms of a valid contract. The second form makes it obvious that T was involved in protocol resolve. T is said to be visible in such a protocol. If the third party were invisible, the end ....
Silvio Micali. Certified e-mail with invisible post offices. Available from author; an invited presentation at the RSA '97 conference, 1997.
....attempts to cheat or simply crashes; therefore, in the vast majority of transactions, the third party will not need to be involved at all. Following [1] we call our protocol optimistic; in addition to [1] optimistic protocols for several variants of the fair exchange problem are discussed in [6, 17]. Of course, one could use an on line trusted third party [8, 9, 12] in every transaction to act as a mediator, but the optimistic approach greatly reduces the load on the third party, which in turn This is IBM technical report RZ 2973, dated 11 17 97. reduces the cost and insecurity involved ....
S. Micali. Certified e-mail with invisible post offices. Unpublished manuscript, 1997 (presented at the 1997 RSA Security Conference).
No context found.
S. Micali. Certified E-mail with invisible post offices. Available from author; an invited presentation at the RSA '97 conference, 1997.
No context found.
Silvio Micali, Certified e-mail with invisible post offices, Invited presentation at the RSA '97 conference, 1997.
No context found.
S. Micali. Certified e-Mail with Invisible Post Offices. Presented at the 1997 RSA Security Conference, 1997.
No context found.
S. Micali. Certified E-mail with invisible post offices. Available from author; an invited presentation at the RSA '97 conference, 1997.
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