| L. Buttyan, S. Staamann, and U. Wilhelm. A simple logic for authentication protocol design. In 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 153--162. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1998. |
....a full information protocol to achieve given goals, especially if these goals are complex, as in ATSPECT. Second, the criteria for safely removing information seem fragile. One might well wonder whether they are always valid, or whether there are ambiguities in how to apply them. Buttyan et al. [3] describes a BAN style logic that they say motivates a design method, but it seems hard to abstract the method from the example they give. Perrig and Song s automated protocol generator APG [14] uses heuristics related to ours to generate plausible candidate protocols. APG then calls Athena [16] ....
L. Buttyan, S. Staamann, and U. Wilhelm. A simple logic for authentication protocol design. In 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 153--162, 1998.
....situations and beliefs which consist of the important syntactic components in our logic. In our full paper, we also demonstrate applications of our logic of how to analyze the dynamic aspect of beliefs in authentication protocols, such as Woo and Lam s symmetric key authentication protocol [3]. This part is omitted from this paper due to a space limitation. It is observed that our logic shares some semantic spirits of Abadi and Tuttle s logic [2] and Syverson and van Oorschot s logic [12] In fact, we have observed that by omitting situation terms, our logic may be viewed as an ....
L. Buttyan, S. Staamann, and U. Wilhelm, A simple logic for authentication protocol design, In Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop VII (CSFW'98), (IEEE), pp 153-161, 1998.
....able to be represented within other logics of protocol analysis. In this section, we address the application of our logic by analyzing a specific protocols using our logic. Woo and Lam proposed a symmetric key authentication protocol in [24] Basically, their protocol can be described as follows [3]. Principal A authenticates herself to principal B with the help of an authentication server S. Firstly, A sends her identifier to B, who responds with a freshly generated nonce NB . Then A encrypts the nonce with key KAS , which is shared between A and S, and sends the result to B. As B cannot ....
....concludes that she indeed talks with A. As pointed in [1] and [6] the original Woo and Lam protocol has some problems. For instance, it is possible for a malicious principal to masquerade as A to B 10 . A correction to Woo and Lam s protocol was then proposed by Buttyan, Staamann and Wilhelm [3] recently. Our analysis will be based on Buttyan, Staamann and Wilhelm s modified Woo and Lam protocol. Firstly, we describe the modified Woo and Lam protocol as follows. 1. A Gamma B : A 10 Details are referred to [3] 16 2. B Gamma A : B; NB 3. A Gamma B : fB; NB g KAS 4. B Gamma ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
L. Buttyan, S. Staamann, and U. Wilhelm, A simple logic for authentication protocol design, In Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop VII (CSFW'98), (IEEE), pp 153-161, 1998.
....a higher level of abstraction than the model presented in the work of Heintze and Tygar [91] through the use of logical secure channels instead of encryption. The notion of channels is also utilised by Buttyan, Staaman, and Wilhelm to present a simple logic for authentication protocol design [96]. These channels are abstract views of various types of secure communication links between principals. The way channels are used is similar to the use of Pi calculus channel primitives [83] The proposed Simple Logic preserves the simplicity of BAN logic and adopts some concepts from GNY logic. It ....
Buttyan L., Staamann S., Wilhelm U., A Simple Logic for Authentication Protocol Design, Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop XI, (1998) 153-162, IEEE Computer Society Press
No context found.
L. Buttyan, S. Staamann, and U. Wilhelm. A simple logic for authentication protocol design. In 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 153--162. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1998.
Online articles have much greater impact More about CiteSeer.IST Add search form to your site Submit documents Feedback
CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC