C. Adams, S. Farrell, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols, Request for Comments 2510, March 1999.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....Native Interface (JNI) for performance reasons. In order to adhere to standards, we used XML [18] to encode all the messages and SSL [10] to encrypt them. The coupon mint component receives blank coupon requests from the manufacturers and verification re quests from the retailers as HTTP POST [3, 8] mes sages and sends blank coupons or a certificates of use as an XML document in responses. The manufacturer component allows multiple manufacturers to define different promotions, through a Web based interface. For each promotion, the manufacturer supplies the promotion details, such as the ....

C. Adams and S. Farrell. Internet x.509 public key infrastructure certificate management protocols, 1999.

....co Di#e Hellman assumption. In the case of a proxy signature scheme based on the bilinear We assume, however, that during registration of public keys, all users prove knowledge [3] of the corresponding secret key, which is the recommended practice for certification authorities (e.g. [1, 21]) 5 aggregate signature scheme, the length of a proxy signature is the length of a warrant plus the length of a single short bilinear co GDH signature. Verification of a proxy signature requires three bilinear map computations, whereas verification of a delegation by certificate proxy signature ....

....by the keygeneration algorithm. In principle, they can even depend on the public keys of honest users. In order to prevent these rogue key attacks, we require all users to prove knowledge of the associated secret key during key registration, as is commonly recommended to be done in practice [1, 21]. To capture this, the adversary is required to output both the public key and the corresponding secret key for a new user. Alternatively, we could explicitly consider the key registration process in the model, and, in proofs of security, use the extractors guaranteed by the proof of knowledge ....

C. Adams and S. Farrell. Internet x.509 public key infrastructure: Certificate management protocols. RFC 2510, March 1999. 15

....between the Bowman NodeOS and the CANEs EE. The Bowman NodeOS interfaces are replaced by the security interfaces. The security guardian does the following security checkings [16] Authentication: It verifies the identification and the signature of the request messages. We use X. 509 certificates [17] and a simple public key infrastructure (PKI) for authentication. User A flow CANEs EE System Thread CANEs Signalling A flow Bowman NodeOS CANEs API Host OS Security Guardian (JNI, JVM) Policy Server Policy Administrator GUI U I1 I2 Figure 2: Integration of Active Security into ....

C. Adams and S. Farrell. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols. RFC 2510, March 1999.

.... specific standards in the field of smart cards and health care information systems accepted within the EU G7 (e.g. Net99, G796] The system must be in line with more general standards related to EDI, computer communications and public key infrastructure and accepted by ISO ANSI and IETF (e.g. [ISO99, ANSI, Ada99, Hou98, Hou99, ITU96, Ken98]) The system has to be based on widely available commercial solutions to reduce costs and enhance reliability, which basically implies web technology [Fre96, Fil97] With regard to smart card technology, the following architectural issues need to be addressed in order to achieve a level of ....

C. Adams, S. Farrell, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols, IETF RFC 2510, March 1999.

.... are considered to be qualified [6] if they meet the requirements set forth in Annex I of [6] and are provided by a Certification Service Provider meeting the requirements laid out in Annex II of [6] We have also considered the draft or final requirements and recommendations contained in [11, 5, 1, 8, 17, 14, 9]. We demonstrate the application of our framework by evaluating Certificate Revocation Lists [11, 8] and the Online Certificate Status Protocol [14] This paper is organised as follows: In section 2 we present the agnostic evaluation framework for CSI mechanisms itself. In section 3 we describe ....

Adams C., Farrell S., Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols, Request for Comments 2510, 1999 (available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2510.txt).

....to inject FIRE traffic. Third, and most importantly, the FIRE protocols are designed to be robust against the failure or subversion of an individual router or set of routers. B. Certificates and digital signatures FIRE s basic security mechanisms are based on public key cryptography, using X. 509 [1] certificates, and patterned after the existing work on Secure OSPF [31] and Secure BGP [25] Each FIRE node participates in a certificate hierarchy that is managed by the FIRE system. At the top of the hierarchy is the Root. Each separate FIRE instance has its own certificate hierarchy, therefore ....

C. Adams and S. Farrell. Internet x.509 public key infrastructure certificate management protocols. RFC 2510, IETF, Mar. 1999.

....protocols are used for on line interaction between PKI users and management entities, for example between a CA and a client system, or between two CAs that crosscertify each other. These protocols are used e.g. to register PKI users or client systems and requests for revocation of certificates [2]. 4.5 X.509 Attribute Certificate profile The following information is presented as stated in the PKIX Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization draft 5 [15] 12 HUT TML 2000 Tik 110.501 Seminar on Network Security 4.5.1 Fields of X.509 Attribute Certificate The fields in the body of ....

Carlisle Adams and Stephen Farrell. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols. RFC 2510, IETF Network Working Group, March 1999.

....initiated the Information Based Indicia Program (IBIP) 10] to support new public key cryptographic methods for using postal services on the Internet. The proposed infrastructure for IBIP is a three level X.509 based hierarchical PKI. Public Key Infrastructure for X. 509 certificates (PKIX) 11] [12] is a general certificate infrastructure. Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S MIME) 13] is a secure Internet mail system. The certification infrastructure of S MIME is based on PKIX infrastructure. Chokhani [14] proposed an X.509 based national PKI. There are also non X.509 based ....

Adams, C. and S. Farrell, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols, RFC 2510, March 1999.

..... Fourth Quarter 2000 6 TRUST MANAGEMENT The paper by Blaze et al. 54] was one of the first to introduce the term trust management, although prior security solutions for networked applications had an implicit notion of trust management based on PGP [47] or X. 509 public key certificates [46, 48], which are discussed in a later section. Blaze et al. defined trust management as a unified approach to specifying and interpreting security policies, credentials, and relationships that allow direct authorization of security critical actions [54] They have implemented several automated trust ....

....registered (along with their degree of trust) with the PGP system, then it computes a validity score (this measures how sure are we that this key belongs to this person) It is now the responsibility of each entity to query the system and to acquire keys as they are needed. The X. 509 trust model [46, 48] is a strictly hierarchical trust model for authentication. Each entity must have a certificate that is signed by the central certification authority or another authority, which has been directly or indirectly certified by it. This model assumes that certification authorities are organized into a ....

C. Adams and S. Farrell, RFC2510 - Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols, 1999, http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/htbin/rfc/rfc2510.html

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C. Adams, S. Farrell, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols, Request for Comments 2510, March 1999.

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C. Adams, S. Farrell, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols, Request for Comments 2510, March 1999.

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Adams C., Farrell S., Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols, Request for Comments 2510, 1999 (available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2510.txt).

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C. Adams and S. Farrell. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols. RFC 2510, IETF, March 1999.

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C. Adams and S. Farrel. Internet X.509 public key infrastructure: Certificate management protocols. Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 2510, March 1999.

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C. Adams and S. Farrell. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols. RFC 2510, IETF, Mar. 1999.

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