Computer Emergency Response Team. CERT Advisory CA-96.26 Denial-of-Service Attack via pings. http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-96.26. ping.html, Dec. 1996.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....approach relies on this property because we mark each packet with only a small piece of path state and the victim must observe many such packets to reconstruct the complete path back the the attacker. If many attacks emerge that require only a single packet to disable a host (e.g. ping of death [11]) then this assumption may not hold (although we note that even these attacks require multiple packets to keep a machine down) Second, measurement evidence suggests that while Internet routes do change, it is extremely rare for packets to follow many different paths over the short time scales ....

Computer Emergency Response Team. CERT Advisory CA-96.26 Denial-of-Service Attack via pings. http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-96.26. ping.html, Dec. 1996.

....approach relies on this property because we mark each packet with only a small piece of path state and the victim must observe many such packets to reconstruct the complete path back the the attacker. If many attacks emerge that require only a single packet to disable a host (e.g. ping of death [CERT96] then this assumption may not hold (although we note that even these attacks require multiple packets to keep a machine down) Second, measurement evidence suggests that while Internet routes do change, it is extremely rare for packets to follow many different paths over the short time scales ....

Computer Emergency Response Team. CERT Advisory CA-96.26 Denial-of-Service Attack via pings. http://www.cert.org/advisories/ CA-96.26.ping.html, December 1996.

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