H. R. Varian. Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. In Proceedings of USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 1995. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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An Efficient Approximate Algorithm for Winner.. - Sakurai, Yokoo, Kamei (2000) (4 citations) (Correct)
....world. Commercial auction sites have been very successful and continue to expand. Various studies on Internet auctions have already been made, from theoretical studies to practical studies. Among these various studies, those on combinatorial auctions have lately attracted considerable attention [8, 13]. Although conventional auctions sell a single item at a time, combinatorial auctions simultaneously sell multiple items with interdependent values and allow the bidders to bid on Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without ....
H. R. Varian. Economic mechanism design for computerized agent. In the First Usenix Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 1995.
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....this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and or a fee. Copyright 2000 ACM 0 89791 88 6 97 05 . 5.00 mechanism for resource allocation in computer systems. See e.g. [23, 9, 28, 33] and the many references therein. The basic argument goes along these lines: when some computational resource needs to be allocated in a distributed system, we would like the system to allocate it in the most bene cial way. If we auction the resource among all the con icting uses in an ....
Hal R. Varian. Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. In Proceedings of the First Usenix Conference on Electronic Commerce, New York, July 1995.
Fair Imposition - Shoham, Tennenholtz (2001) (2 citations) (Correct)
.... discussion) Our work also complements work in Distributed AI dealing with rules on interactions for self motivated agents (e.g. Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994; Kraus, 1997 ] as well as work bridging the gap between Game Theory and Computer Science [ Boutilier et al. 1997; Tennenholtz, 1999; Varian, 1995 ] Perhaps the most relevant line of research is work on optimal auction design (which is isomorphic to work on optimal design of procurement protocols; see [ Wolfstetter, 1996; McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Milgrom, 1987 ] for overviews) However, our setting, where fairness is the major objective ....
H.R. Varian. Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. Working paper, Berkeley University, 1995.
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....design, is one in which a self interested party can maximize her own utility through straightforward truth revelation about requirements and capabilities, whatever the strategies and behaviors of other parties. Participants are thus freed from the complexity of modeling other participants [27, 14]. A common example of strategyproof mechanisms is the second price auction. Thus, strat egyproof mechanisms nicely address the design principles [A1] incentives matter, A2] utility based and [A3] simple. Although there are well known economic limitations of strategyproof mechanisms (e.g. 7] ....
H.R. Varian. Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. In Proc. USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 1995.
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....agents. Strategies that can result in this type of unfair gain include: Hiding one s identity or taking on the identity of another. This includes changing identity in order to escape the consequences of poor service on prior commitments. 3 . Dishonest auctioneer In Vickrey type auctions [37, 36], the motivation for truth telling on the part of participants is predicated on their belief in the honesty of the auctioneer. Mis communication of the rules under which a transaction is being conducted. Failure to follow through on commitments. Discouragement of counterspeculation. ....
....counterspeculation. Opportunities for counterspeculation arise when the rules of negotiation allow agents to gain advantage by making use of factors other than their own capabilities and valuations [20] We are concerned with two general types of counterspeculation. Value based counterspeculation [28, 37, 36] occurs when agents use their own estimates of each other s valuations to set bid prices. In [8] we identified two classes of timebased counterspeculation opportunities. One of these situations occurs when supplier agents are allowed to expire their bids before the Request for Quotes expires. ....
Hal R. Varian. Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. In USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, New York, NY, July 1995.
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....distributional information about agent preferences. In addition to providing robustness to incorrect assumptions about the rationality and preferences of other agents, a dominant strategy implementation is useful computationally because agents can avoid game theoretic reasoning about other agents [32]. Unfortunately, the well known impossibility result of Myerson Satterthwaite [22] demonstrates that no exchange can be e#cient, budget balanced, and individual rational. This impossibility result applies even with quasi linear utility functions and Bayesian Nash implementation. By the ....
Hal R Varian. Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. In Proc. USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 1995.
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....banner space to the next highest bidder, and so on. The winners all pay the N 1 price, N being the total number of banner spaces available (if less than N 1 suppliers participate, the winners obtain the banner space for free) This protocol is an instance of the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) [5], where buyers are restricted to purchasing at most one good (i.e. banner space) The GVA is a prominent and widely used auction type, which has shown to be (dominantly) e#cient for independent valuations of the items. 2.2 Effectiveness and Feasibility The supplier must find and improve its ....
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Varian, H.R. "Economic Mechanism Design for Computerized Agents" Proceedings of the First USENIX Workshop of Electronic Commerce. USENIX Assoc. 1995, pp.13-21. Berkeley, CA, USA.
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Varian, H. R. 1995. Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. In Proc. USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce. Minor update, 2000.
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Varian, H. 1995. Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. In Proc. 1st USENIX Conference on Electronic Commerce.
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